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ABSTRACT 
 
 The research question is: ‘Is critical thinking compatible with confessional 
Catholic religious education as practiced in the Philippines? If so, in what way 
can it be taught to students and promoted in the classroom?’ Adopting an 
epistemological approach to critical thinking, I conducted a survey among 1,068 
teachers in our network of fifteen Catholic schools in the Philippines and found 
that a significant percentage of our teachers—especially those teaching religious 
education—exhibited a level of epistemic cognition considered incompatible with 
critical thinking. Drawing from critical realism and the Catholic notion of the 
believer’s ‘sense of the faith’ (sensus fidei), I proposed that critical thinking be 
understood not only as (a) the expression of one’s commitment to judgemental 
rationality to serve as the basis for one’s motivation for critical thinking, but also 
as (b) the exercise of one’s sensus fidei to guide the actual practice of Catholic 
religious critical thinking in particular. Based on these two conceptions, 
corresponding to the disposition and competence components of critical thinking, 
respectively, I recommend two initial concrete steps to promote the practice of 
Catholic religious critical thinking in our confessional religious education 
classrooms in the Philippines: (a) the inclusion of a staff development programme 
that promotes epistemic self-awareness especially vis-à-vis a Catholic religious 
epistemology; and (b) the identification of the development and exercise of 
sensus fidei as an explicit learning objective and its implications on curriculum, 
pedagogy, and assessment.  
235 words 
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REFLECTIVE STATEMENT 
 
 
In the years that I have devoted to the Ed.D. programme, I have 
experienced a broadening of my research interests and learning. I began the 
programme with a specific research agenda. As a teacher educator and school 
head in the Philippines, I encountered various basic challenges facing education 
in our country that shaped the questions I brought with me into the programme. 
One interest that I was eager to pursue and study in depth was formative 
assessment (or ‘assessment for learning’) based on an appreciation of the 
importance of assessment in learning—how it is designed, when it is designed, 
and what it is designed to measure (Black & William, 1998). I hoped to build 
expertise in assessment—particularly, in formative assessment—because of a 
desire to make a contribution in improving curriculum planning in the country. 
Through the various courses and the assignments, however, I grew 
acquainted with other issues in education, and I found myself asking new 
questions not only in direct relation to my professional practice, but also in the 
general field of education. My original interest in formative assessment eventually 
evolved into something more basic and concrete—a topic that I decided to 
pursue in my thesis: the promotion of critical thinking in Catholic religious 
education through critical realism and the doctrine of the ‘sensus fidei’. The topic 
is basic because of the fundamental value of critical thinking in education, and it 
is specific because the critical thinking that I investigate is particular to 
confessional Catholic religious education. 
I have to confess that I was initially wary about tackling such a particularly 
‘Catholic’ subject. One of my main reasons, in fact, for choosing the programme 
at the Singapore National Institute of Education and the UCL Institute of 
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Education, University of London was their non-Catholic identities. Not only have I 
been working in a Catholic K-12 school for over a decade, but I have also studied 
in Catholic institutions all my life, completing my masters’ degrees in philosophy 
and theology in a Catholic university. If I wanted to be a more effective Catholic 
educator, I felt that it was important to join other conversations and learn new 
languages, as it were. 
The Ed.D. programme offered me numerous opportunities for such new 
conversations and languages. The essay I wrote for Foundations of 
Professionalism in Education was called ‘Teaching as goal-less and reflective 
design:  A conversation with Herbert A. Simon and Donald Schön’.  In examining 
the apparently divergent views of Simon and Schön on professional work as 
design, I learned about their underlying agreement not only on the limits of 
human reason, but also on what it means to be a professional—i.e., Simon’s 
goal-less designer and Schön’s reflective practitioner. The paper gave me an 
opportunity to pursue my interest in assessment for learning by arguing that 
Simon’s ‘goal-less design’ and Schön’s ‘reflective practice’ provide a strong 
rationale for assessment for learning. Simon’s ‘goal-less design’, understood as 
openness to new emergent learning goals, renders teaching more responsive to 
student needs. Schön’s original notion of reflective practice—particularly, its 
definition as ‘a reflective conversation with the materials of the situation’—spelled 
out a stance and strategy for the designer-professional to recognize the 
uniqueness of every practice situation, to employ thoughtful trial-and-error to 
explore the phenomenon at hand, and to remain constantly open to what Schön 
calls the ‘situation’s back-talk’ (Schön, 1983).  I concluded that a teacher who 
‘reflects-in-action’ in Schön’s sense is a teacher who assesses-for-learning.   
While my first paper focused on formative assessment, my assignment for 
the first Educational Research module tackled another form of assessment for 
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learning:  the ‘formative use of summative assessments’ (Black and Wiliam, 
1998).  I proposed a case study to describe the efforts of teachers in a secondary 
school in using standardized achievement data for formative purposes.  The aim 
of the study was to generate insights on practical approaches for teachers to 
analyze such data to improve instruction. Especially given today’s increasing 
calls for accountability, educators and policymakers need to exercise caution in 
using standardized achievement data as the basis for claims and high-stakes 
decisions involving students and schools.  Correct data interpretation is possible 
only with an adequate understanding of what achievement testing has been 
designed to do—and not do. Given the risks of misuse of such data, an uncritical 
acceptance of such claims is increasingly acceptable, hence, strengthening the 
rationale for using these tests formatively rather than summatively (Leithwood, 
2004).   
For the specialist course in International Education, our assignment on the 
impact of globalization on Timor Leste enabled me to use my understanding of 
the issues discussed in class and apply it to the small post-colonial, post-conflict 
state of East Timor, and at the same time, to conduct comparative research while 
avoiding the usual pitfalls in the use of cross-national findings (Le Metais, 2000). 
This research helped me appreciate the complex effects of globalization and the 
important role of policies in addressing its adverse consequences.  Left to their 
own devices, the forces of globalization end up victimizing nations either because 
they are recovering from violent conflicts or undergoing political transitions 
without adequate preparation—or as in the case of East Timor, both.   I also 
learned how cross-national research should be sensitive to differences in context 
in order to yield helpful findings (Fairbrother, 2005).  As it serendipitously turned 
out, the insights I gained from this module was a great introduction to my new 
assignment, which involves assisting our newly opened school in East Timor. 
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The work I submitted for the last Educational Research module was a pilot 
study for my Institution Focused Study, which examined the impact of teacher 
beliefs, including epistemological and religious beliefs, on teaching practices in 
religious education among Jesuit high schools in the Philippines. Given my 
growing appreciation of the impact of teacher epistemologies on student learning, 
I surveyed the epistemological beliefs of teachers in Philippine Catholic schools 
for my IFS, employed a statistical modeling technique used prevalently in the 
literature, and identified five distinct dimensions of epistemological beliefs that 
surfaced from the data.  
For several reasons, the IFS represents for me an important academic 
milestone: First, the actual experience of the research provided me with an 
opportunity to conduct insider research and to learn how my role as such 
inevitably affects both the participants and the data generated in my interaction 
with them—hence, the need for careful ethical considerations. 
Secondly, conducting an in-depth empirical study of teacher 
epistemologies convinced me of the crucial role played by our tacit assumptions 
about knowledge and justification in education. Teacher epistemology has since 
then remained a major research and professional interest, as evident in my thesis, 
where I adopt an epistemological approach to critical thinking. 
Finally, what I learned from the IFS, both in terms of the subject matter 
and the process of the research, prepared me for my thesis work. It had 
uncovered additional questions about teacher epistemology that I wanted to 
explore in my thesis. Fascinated by these underlying tacit assumptions that so 
powerfully shape how teachers learn and teach, I planned to continue my study 
of teacher epistemologies—this time, in terms of epistemic understandings (Kuhn, 
et al., 2000)—in the thesis.  
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In many ways, my thesis work, which has survived a succession of three 
main supervisors, represents not only the different phases of my growth as a 
learner, but also a convergence of my research interests that have developed 
through these years of study: teacher epistemologies, critical realism, Catholic 
religious education, and critical thinking.  
For some reason, it was not easy for IOE to find me a thesis supervisor. It 
was only on the second research week that I managed to meet with my first one, 
who, to my disappointment, expressed neither belief in implicit epistemologies 
nor a desire to supervise an empirical study. Rather than request for another 
supervisor and fly back to London another time, I opted to change my topic to 
critical thinking in Catholic religious education, and immediately worked on my 
thesis proposal for a philosophical paper that was subsequently approved. Upon 
reflection on this apparent setback, I realized that the change offered an 
unforeseen—but in retrospect, much-welcomed—broadening of my intellectual 
horizon. My new thesis topic has provided me with a reason not only to learn how 
to write a philosophical paper (my IFS having been an empirical study), but also 
to research a question that I have personally grappled with as a secondary and 
tertiary level Catholic religious educator. Critical thinking and Catholic religious 
education seem like strange bedfellows despite the lip service that we religious 
educators pay to critical thinking. Many practitioners in the Philippines nurse 
some doubts about the possibility and desirability of promoting critical thinking in 
our confessional Catholic religion classes.  
After about a year, when I received an unexpected notification from my 
first supervisor that he was leaving the IOE, I secured the approval of the 
programme director to request the late Roy Bhaskar to accept me as his student.  
I had heard Roy speak at one of the classes during my first Research Week. 
After all the talk about post-modernism and social constructivism in my 
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doctoral studies, his was a surprising and welcome voice, and his critical realism 
appealed to me not only because it was a sound and much-needed meta-theory 
for research in the social sciences, but also because it seemed so compatible 
with the Catholic Christian faith.  
In critical realism, I have found a way of framing my research on critical 
thinking in confessional Catholic religious education. Moreover, it allowed me not 
only to re-incorporate into my thesis my interest in teacher epistemology, but also 
to include an empirical section in my thesis. Critical realism also enabled me to 
critique the statistical method that I had used in my IFS: If I want to be consistent 
as a critical realist, I need to exercise caution about claiming to identify so-called 
dimensions of epistemological beliefs based solely on factor analysis. 
Roy Bhaskar’s sudden passing last November 2015 was a major personal 
setback as Roy had by then become my friend. I was fortunate to have been 
assigned a new supervisor in Andrew Wright, who not only encouraged and 
supported me, but also challenged me to draw more substantially from Catholic 
theology. While upon his direction, my thesis took a new direction, this change of 
supervisor, far from hampering my work, actually enriched it. Apart from just 
using critical realism to under-labour for my research, I have also now drawn from 
the relevant, though until recently, underplayed, Catholic notion of the sensus 
fidei to address the issue of Catholic religious critical thinking.  
On the one hand, a critical realist epistemology has allowed me to: (a) 
anchor critical thinking to the primacy of reality, thus, correcting any lingering 
post-Enlightenment connotations of anthropocentrism; (b) frame critical thinking 
as the expression of an anti-relativist commitment to judgemental rationality, 
which, I propose, constitutes an important motivation for critical thinking; and (c) 
diagnose the problem of critical thinking in Philippine Catholic religious education 
as epistemological—specifically, an apparent lack of epistemic relativism in its 
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epistemology that makes Catholic religious critical thinking possible, but 
unnecessary. 
The notion of sensus fidei, on the other hand, makes explicit the critical 
realist character of a Catholic religious epistemology by: (a) affirming the socio-
historical and perspectival character of the Church’s reception of revelation and 
thus, uncovering its element of epistemic relativism, (b) recognizing the possibility 
of legitimate dissent to Church teachings and establishing the ‘openness’ of 
doctrine to change, critique, and correction that epistemic relativism entails, and 
(c) clarifying the Church’s capacity for its exercise of judgemental rationality. 
Moreover, critical thinking understood as the exercise of one’s sensus fidei 
clarifies the non-discursive and pre-conceptual—but no less rational and valid—
mode of knowing that Catholic religious critical thinking entails. 
The Ed.D. programme has been hard work, stretching me both 
intellectually and personally. In the process, I have learned to be a more 
reflective and ‘scholarly practitioner’ (Bentz, 1998). Not only have I been able to 
join new conversations and learn new languages, as I had hoped for at the 
beginning of the programme, but I have also begun to find a voice. 
As I submit the draft of my thesis, I am grateful for the many opportunities 
for learning that the programme has offered me, as well as for my mentors 
especially for the thesis work: the late Roy Bhaskar and Dr. Andrew Wright, as 
well as Dr. Denise Hawkes, who guided me in the data analysis of the empirical 
section of my work. 
 
2,005 words 
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CHAPTER ONE:   
 
CRITICAL THINKING IN CATHOLIC RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
 
   
  Is critical thinking compatible with the confessional Catholic religious 
education practised in the Philippines? If so, in what way can it be taught to 
students and promoted in the classroom? 
  To both friend and foe of Catholic education, these questions sound 
gratuitous at best. Critics of faith schools dismiss programmes that explicitly 
teach the doctrines of a particular religion as inherently indoctrinatory and hence 
incompatible with critical thinking. Advocates and practitioners of Catholic 
education, on the other hand, may have no doubt that in light of an intellectual 
tradition that has long held the mutuality of faith and reason,1 there is no reason 
why a confessional religious programme cannot promote critical rationality among 
students.  
  Given my professional experience, however, I am convinced that these 
questions are worth asking and that there is a need to problematize the issue of 
critical thinking in Catholic education—especially in Philippine Catholic schools, 
where the teaching of Catholic doctrine and the initiation of the student into the 
faith are identified as explicit goals. This issue of critical thinking needs to be 
investigated not only to address charges that confessional religious education 
hampers personal autonomy in general and employs indoctrination in particular,2 
                                            
1 The encyclical Fides et Ratio, which begins by calling faith and reason the ‘two wings’ that raise 
the human spirit to the contemplation of truth, contains a concise history of this tradition (John 
Paul II, 1998, §36-44). 
2 For some of the discussion, cf. Grace (2003); Groothius (2004); Halstead (2012); Hand (2003; 
2004); McKinney (2013); Pring (2005); Short (2003); Siegel (2004). 
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but also to assess whether or not our programmes are actually fulfilling the goals 
articulated for Catholic education, which includes fostering ‘a critical sense which 
examines statements rather than accepting them blindly’ (CCE, 1988, §49).3 
      The questions become particularly urgent given the challenges and issues 
faced by Catholic education in the third millennium, such as the marginalization of 
religion and its confinement to the private sphere (CCE, 2013, §9), students’ lack 
of religious and moral formation, and their increasing apathy to religion (CCE, 
1997, §6; Sullivan & McKinney, 2013). 
THE RESEARCH TOPIC AND ITS RATIONALE 
 
 The research question emerged from my professional practice as a 
Catholic educator in the Philippines. As head of a Catholic K-12 school in Manila 
and a religious educator in the secondary and tertiary levels, I have experienced 
the tension between the curricular demands of teaching the Catholic faith on the 
one hand and the pedagogical ideal of promoting critical rationality among our 
students on the other.  
From discussions with colleagues from the network of fifteen schools 
belonging to our religious congregation4, we have observed that: (a) critical 
thinking is not as purposefully and vigorously promoted in religious education as 
                                            
3  Nine documents from the Congregation for Catholic Education (formerly, the Sacred 
Congregation for Catholic Education) are particularly relevant in this study: (1) 'The Catholic 
School' (SCCE 1977), (2) 'Lay Catholics in Schools: Witness to Faith' (SCCE 1982), (3) 'The 
Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School' (CCE 1988), (4) 'The Catholic School on 
the Threshold of the Third Millennium' (1997), (5) 'Consecrated Persons and their Mission in 
Schools: Reflections and Guidelines' (2002), (6) 'Educating Together in Catholic Schools: A 
Shared Mission between Consecrated Persons and the Lay Faithful (2007), (7) ‘Circular letter to 
the Presidents of Bishops Conferences on religious education in schools (CCE, 2009), (8) 
'Education to Intercultural Dialogue in Catholic Schools: Living in Harmony for a Civilization of 
Love' (CCE, 2013), and (9) ‘Educating today and tomorrow: A renewing passion’ (Instrumentum 
laboris) (CCE 2014).                                                                                   . 
 
4 The network is called the Jesuit Basic Education Commission, which I chaired from 2007 to 
2013. 
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it is in the other subjects5; (b) religious educators in our schools feel ill-prepared 
to handle, much less promote, critical thinking in our classrooms, uncertain about 
how to handle our pupils’ questions and especially dissent; and (c) given the 
confessional approach in our religion curriculum, many more are ambivalent 
about the value of critical thinking in our classrooms. 
Moreover, we share the impression that while most of our students have 
no difficulty supplying the expected answers in their examination to obtain 
passing marks, based on anecdotal reports from parents and alumni over the 
years, many of our high school graduates stop attending religious services, with a 
growing number professing to be non-believers. These reports have led us to 
question the effectiveness of our schools’ religious education programmes. 
A fundamental question that I will address in this study is: ‘Is critical 
thinking even possible or desirable in a confessional Catholic religion class in the 
first place?’ What sort of religious epistemology is compatible with the Catholic 
doctrines on revelation especially given the central role played by authority in 
Catholic doctrinal matters? Is there, in other words, such a thing as Catholic 
religious critical thinking? 
Secondly, if it is the case that religious critical thinking is possible and 
legitimate, what initial steps can be taken so that we can promote it in religious 
education in our network of schools? 
In this primarily philosophical investigation, I will examine the possibility 
and legitimacy of critical thinking in confessional Catholic religious education and 
                                            
5 A recent study of Canadian Catholic schools observed the same discrepancy between the 
pedagogy employed in religious education and those in other subjects. Whereas they are taught 
to apply a critical method in the other disciplines, they are expected in their religious education 
classes merely to receive ‘factual knowledge’ about Church teaching and are offered little 
academic guidance, if any, on how to think critically about Church positions on such controversial 
issues as female ordination and same-sex marriage (McDonough, 2009, p. 189). 
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explore how critical thinking can best be practised and taught in light of the goals 
of Catholic religious education as articulated in official Church documents. I will 
use the findings of an empirical study conducted in our network of Catholic 
schools to frame the problem of Catholic religious critical thinking in our 
classrooms, drawing from Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of critical realism to interpret 
its findings. I will then argue that a religious epistemology based on Catholic 
doctrine is critical realist, and propose a form of critical thinking that is grounded 
on the Catholic doctrine of ‘sensus fidei’ and thus warranted in a confessional 
Catholic religious education classroom. 
CRITICAL REALISM AS UNDER-LABOURING PHILOSOPHY 
 
          Roy Bhaskar's critical realism will be used in this study as an ‘under-
labouring’ philosophical framework6 for analyzing critical thinking in general and 
Catholic religious critical thinking in particular. This choice has been largely 
shaped by my personal context, especially my Catholic faith. As discussed in a 
later chapter, I consider the central insights of critical realism compatible with the 
Catholic Christian faith, especially in comparison to alternative philosophies. 
More specifically, a critical realist epistemology can help elucidate the features of 
Catholic religious epistemology, an epistemology based on the doctrines of 
revelation and sensus fidei, every baptized Christian’s ‘sense of faith’ which is 
believed to be necessary in the reception of revelation, and which, I will argue, 
provides the basis for Catholic religious critical thinking. 
Critical realism, as the philosophical movement initiated by Bhaskar, refers 
to three distinct, interrelated stages: basic/original critical realism (a philosophy of 
                                            
6 Bhaskar’s well-known reference is from John Locke’s (1689) ‘Epistle to the Reader’ in Essay 
concerning human understanding, where he writes that it is ‘ambition enough to be employed as 
an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the 
way to knowledge’. 
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natural science known as transcendental realism, a philosophy of the social 
sciences called critical naturalism, and explanatory critique), dialectical critical 
realism, and the philosophy of metaReality. For this paper, I will be drawing 
primarily from original critical realism.7 
Critical realism as transcendental and immanent critique 
 
           ‘What must the world be like for science to be possible?’ In posing this 
deceptively simple and innocuous question, Roy Bhaskar builds a case for a 
revolutionary philosophy of science that forms the first stage of a philosophical 
movement that has eventually come to be known as critical realism. A powerful 
and searing critique of the prevailing philosophies of science at the time, 
transcendental realism exposes classical empiricism and transcendental 
idealism—exemplified in Hume and Kant, respectively—as deficient and flawed in 
their accounts of the practice of science (RTS). 
Transcendental critique 
 
Applying his own brand of the Kantian method, Bhaskar interrogates 
science by inquiring into the conditions necessary for its possibility and 
intelligibility. However, he subverts the Kantian method by refusing to restrict his 
conclusions to properties deduced about the human mind, as Kant has done, but 
as pertaining to the world. While Kant’s arguments in ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ 
led him to identify space, time, and causality as human-created conditions for the 
possibility for empirical knowledge, Bhaskar draws conclusions about the 
transcendentally necessary attributes of the world presupposed by the practice of 
science (RTS). 
                                            
7 For the development of critical realism, see especially the following by Bhaskar: A realist theory 
of science (1975), The possibility of naturalism (1978), Scientific realism and human 
emancipation (1986); Dialectic: The pulse of freedom (1993), and Philosophy of metaReality 
(2012). 
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Immanent critique 
 
Bhaskar’s transcendental analysis also cuts to the chase by focusing on 
two basic activities of science given its empirical and experimental character: 
Observation and experimental activity. Bhaskar employs these two activities of 
science as the very means of his critique of empirical realism. As a philosophy 
that defines the world exclusively in terms of the empirical, empirical realism 
reserves a privileged status for experience and consequently accepts the 
indispensable value of these two fundamental scientific activities. Through them 
Bhaskar undertakes an ‘Achilles’ heel critique’—a form of immanent critique 
which uses what is strongest and most valued by the rival position to expose the 
inconsistencies and contradictions internal to it (FCR, pp. 78-79). In this case, to 
refute both empiricists and idealists, Bhaskar leaves at their doorstep the 
irresistible Trojan horse of experience, and through it, conducts his immanent 
critique. 
Bhaskar’s transcendental and immanent critique not only exposes the 
shortcomings of the prevailing accounts of science, but also demonstrates that an 
adequate theory of science will, contrary to empiricist and idealist claims alike, 
require nothing less than an ontology of depth realism. This unapologetic 
restoration of ontology in Bhaskar’s philosophy of science has led to a vision of 
the world that is far more complex, mysterious, and fascinating than the virtual 
flatland suggested by empirical realism (RTS). Moreover, critical realism offers a 
more comprehensive and realistic account of the scientific enterprise, one that 
illumines its essential features as a discipline, its inherent fallibility and its 
legitimate goals and processes. This account also uncovers an ordering among 
its branches and fields that corresponds to the very structure of the world that 
science studies (RTS). 
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Implications for methodology 
 
This study, though primarily theoretical, will have an empirical component. 
Since the methodology used for the empirical investigation needs to be 
consistent with the meta-theory that underpins this work, some critical realist 
caution ought to be taken in particular with regard to the use of quantitative and 
statistical tools (Scott, 2005; 2007). 
Critical realism is averse to any form of reductionism—including the 
reduction of causation to mere correlation and more generally, the reduction of 
complex phenomena into what can be measured. An adequate and accurate 
explanation must take pains to account for the multiplicity of factors that shape 
phenomena, especially psychological and social phenomena (Bhaskar, 2014). 
Failing to account for the complexity of phenomena will amount at best to a 
superficial explanation of the object it investigates, or worse, a distorted one 
(Price, 2014). The fact that social phenomena are complex, however, does not 
eliminate the usefulness of quantitative models as long as they are used with 
caution and one avoids statistical positivism, which mistakes what legitimately 
serves as evidence as already constituting adequate explanation (Bhaskar, 
1998a; Lawson, 1997; Nash, 2005).  
To avoid using a methodology inconsistent with the work’s underlying 
meta-theory, the purpose of the empirical study has been limited to the diagnosis 
of the problem of critical thinking rather than a comprehensive explanation of it. 
The findings are used as evidence to support a hypothesis that requires further 
analysis and explanation. 
OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
           In this chapter, I will argue that the practice of critical thinking in Catholic 
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religious education needs to be problematized not only in spite of, but also 
precisely on account of the premium reserved for critical rationality in Catholic 
education.  
Having presented the research topic and its rationale, I will describe the 
context of Catholic religious education in the Philippines, followed by a discussion 
of Catholic education in general and religious education in particular as 
envisioned in key documents of the Catholic Church. I will argue that while its 
value is repeatedly affirmed in the Church documents, critical thinking becomes 
problematic in actual practice. The issue is particularly thorny due to three 
inherent tensions experienced by Catholic schools in the Philippines: (a) their 
twin goals of education and evangelization; (b) a precarious distinction between 
catechesis and religious education, particularly in the case of the confessional 
religious approach employed by Catholic schools in the Philippines; and (c) the 
dual nature of Catholic schools as academic and ecclesial institutions, which 
subjects them—at least officially—to direct Church supervision particularly in their 
religious education programme. 
In the next chapter, I will argue for an epistemological approach to critical 
thinking as a way of addressing the problem of critical thinking in confessional 
religious education. A review of the research literature on critical thinking will be 
provided before focusing on the epistemological underpinnings that make critical 
thinking possible. An empirical study conducted among teachers in our network 
of Catholic schools suggests the prevalence of a religious epistemology that is 
incompatible with critical thinking. Based on these findings, I hypothesize that the 
problem of critical thinking in our religious education classrooms may be partly, if 
not chiefly epistemological. 
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The third chapter begins with a summary of the central tenets of critical 
realism, and proposes a specifically critical realist account of critical thinking, 
which is framed as the expression of one’s commitment to judgemental rationality. 
Such a conception facilitates the analysis of critical thinking into the underlying 
principles of ontological realism and epistemic relativism. Judgemental rationality, 
which provides motivation for critical thinking, is possible only given an 
ontological realism and rendered necessary only with epistemic relativism. This 
critical realist account of critical thinking as the expression of judgemental 
rationality not only corrects rationalistic misconceptions about critical thinking, but 
also guides us in diagnosing the problem of Catholic religious critical thinking in 
our schools.  
In the fourth and final chapter, I will draw from the Catholic notion of a 
‘sensus fidei’—believed to be given to both the Church and the individual believer 
for the reception of revelation—to argue that a Catholic religious epistemology, 
based on its theology of revelation, is essentially critical realist, characterized by 
a commitment to judgemental rationality made possible not only by an ontological 
realism, but also—contrary to the prevailing religious epistemologies among our 
teachers—made necessary by an epistemic relativism. Such a Catholic religious 
epistemology not only makes religious critical thinking possible, but also 
mandates it, and in the process, supplies the needed motivation for critical 
thinking. Furthermore, I argue for an understanding of Catholic religious critical 
thinking as the authentic exercise of the believer’s sensus fidei.  
CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
          The contributions that the present study hopes to make, both professional 
and academic, are a function of its focus and limitations. First of all, this paper 
 28 
has an unapologetically practical purpose: To offer the religious educators in our 
network of schools guidance in promoting the practice of Catholic religious critical 
thinking in the classroom. The critical thinking that I examine is, therefore, limited 
to the particular genre of religious critical thinking that would be considered 
legitimate and valuable in a confessional Catholic religious education classroom. 
Moreover, this study will investigate Catholic religious education as 
contextualized in its Philippine setting, and more specifically, as offered in the 
network of schools that I work with.  
Its professional focus and limitations notwithstanding, I hope to make 
important professional and academic contributions in the fields of critical thinking, 
Catholic religious education, critical realism, and teacher epistemology. First of all, 
the concrete recommendations for promoting Catholic religious critical thinking in 
the classroom may be helpful for other Catholic schools in the Philippines, as well 
as schools elsewhere with similar contexts and needs. 
Secondly, the empirical investigation featured in this research hopes to 
contribute to the study of teacher epistemologies by addressing gaps in the 
research through the investigation of: (a) Filipino teachers for their level of 
epistemological development; and (b) practitioners rather than student teachers, 
which most similar research has focused on. Only a handful of epistemological 
research studies have been conducted among Filipino teachers, all of which were 
focused on dimensions of epistemological beliefs rather than epistemic 
development (Bernardo, 2008, 2009; Magno, 2010). Epistemological research 
elsewhere in Asia (e.g., China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan), 
albeit on the rise, has likewise concentrated on pre-service teachers and their 
epistemological beliefs  (Chai, 2006; Chai et al., 2008a, 2008b 2009, 2010a, 
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2010b; Chan, 2010; Chan & Elliott, 2000, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Hofer, 2010; Hong 
& Lin, 2010; So, Lee, Roh, & Lee, 2010).  
There are two important theoretical contributions that I hope to make in 
this thesis. The first is the proposed critical realist conception of critical thinking 
as the expression of one’s commitment to judgemental rationality. This 
commitment to judgemental rationality constitutes one’s disposition for critical 
thinking, but framing critical thinking in terms of judgemental rationality also 
enables us to analyze it in terms of its two conditions: ontological realism for its 
possibility and epistemic relativism for its necessity. Such an account of critical 
thinking, in true critical realist fashion, insists on the primacy of reality and serves 
as a corrective to any post-Enlightenment connotation of pure objectivity and 
universal rationality.  
Secondly, this study establishes the legitimacy and value of Catholic 
religious critical thinking in light of a religious epistemology articulated from 
Church doctrines on revelation, reception, and the sensus fidei. The Catholic 
religious epistemology that emerges is identified as explicitly critical realist and 
demonstrated as compatible with critical thinking. Moreover, the proposed 
conception of Catholic religious critical thinking as the exercise of one’s sensus 
fidei serves as the basis for the recommendations offered at the end of the study 
on the problem of critical thinking in confessional Catholic religious education. 
THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT 
 
 
The context in which Philippine Catholic schools operate may be unique in 
Asia. Of the estimated population of 92,337,852 million, 81% of its population 
consider themselves Roman Catholic (NSO, 2012). Moreover, according to a 
2012 study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at University of 
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Chicago, the Philippines ranked first among over 30 countries surveyed in 
Europe, US, and Asia in terms of ‘belief in God’: Of all the respondents, 94% 
‘believe in God now and…always have’. Compared to 38% in Israel and 35% in 
the United States—second and third placers, respectively—60% in the 
Philippines are ‘certain that God exists’, ‘always believed in God’ and strongly 
agree that ‘there is a personal God’ (Smith, 2012). 
Catholic schools in the Philippines 
 
This Filipino religiosity in general and its Catholicism in particular are 
reflected in the number of Catholic schools and universities in the country: For 
academic year 2013-14, the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines 
(CEAP) reported a total of 1,342 Catholic institutions nationwide, with 708 pre-
schools, 688 primary schools, 990 high schools, 236 colleges, 93 graduate 
schools, and 57 technical-vocational schools (CEAP, 2014). 
Table 1: Registered Catholic schools in the Philippines8 
 Pre-
school 
Primary 
School 
Secondary 
School 
College 
 
Graduate 
School 
Technical-
Vocational 
TOTAL 
Schools* 708 688 990 236 93 57 1,342** 
Students 63,654 326,442 559,701 506,019 28,028 8,214 1,492,058 
CEAP unpublished raw data (2014) 
* With the ongoing transition to a K-12 system in the Philippines, primary schooling has six grade levels (for 
children from 6 to 12 years old) and secondary school has six grade levels (for students from 12 to 17 years 
old).  
** This figure refers to the total number of Catholic educational institutions registered with the CEAP, some 
of which offer several levels of education. 
Primary and secondary education in state or public schools is fully funded 
by the government. Catholic schools, on the other hand, are either run by 
Catholic dioceses or privately owned by religious congregations. Two challenges 
faced by Philippine Catholic schools are decreasing student enrolment due to 
growing costs, as well as increasing teacher migration to state-run schools that 
offer higher salaries (CBCP, 2011). In addition, although 70% of the 1,342 CEAP 
                                            
8 Excluded from the report are a handful of Catholic institutions not registered with the CEAP.  
 
 31 
schools are small, struggling mission schools serving remote areas of the country, 
Catholic education has acquired an exaggerated elitist image because of the fees 
charged by a few prominent schools (Gutierrez, 2007). 
Noting what Pope Benedict XVI (2007) has called ‘the great educational 
emergency’, the Philippine bishops in their pastoral letter on 400 years of 
Catholic education in the country have observed that in addition to economic 
challenges, Catholic schools in the country are confronted with increasing 
secularism and relativism, leading not only to an apparent decrease in the appeal 
of Catholic education, but even more fundamentally, a diminishing regard from 
Catholic families for the Gospel and its values (CBCP, 2011).  
Based on data for the two recent academic years, all the schools 
belonging to our religious congregation’s network of K-12 schools have 
predominantly Roman Catholic student populations of at least 85%—with the 
exception of two that are located in a city with a predominantly Muslim population 
in the southern island of Mindanao, where 65%-71% are Catholic. Given the aims 
of these schools, priority is also explicitly given to Catholics in the hiring of staff. 
Philippine Catholic religious education  
 
Religious education programmes in Philippine Catholic schools are 
explicitly confessional by nature. Its goal is the socialization of students, the vast 
majority of whom, as mentioned, are Catholic, into the Church. Religious 
education is considered by John Paul II as the defining character of Catholic 
schools (John Paul II, 1979, §69) and identified as a central dimension in the 
holistic development of students (CCE, 1977, §19). In the Philippines, RE is 
named ‘Christian Living’, a core subject offered from primary to secondary 
schools. As implied by its name, it is not limited to the intellectual dimension 
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(defined operationally as ‘doctrinal’), but includes the interpersonal (moral), the 
contemplative (sacramental/worship), and the social (service to society). With 
content drawn from the Catechism for Filipino Catholics (CBCP, 1997), the 
programme is largely based on Scripture and Church teachings, and 
contextualized within the students’ life (NCDP, 1985). 
Table 2: Student population and percentage of Catholics in JBEC schools 
Schools/Units  
(Primary/Secondary) 
Academic Year 2014-15 Academic Year 2013-14 
Total Number % Catholic Total 
Number 
% 
Catholic 
Ateneo de Manila Primary 4,262 95% 4,226 95% 
Ateneo de Manila Secondary 2,371 90% 2,427 94% 
Xavier School Primary 2,385 91% 2,401 91% 
Xavier School Secondary 1,953 91% 1,839 89% 
Ateneo de Naga Secondary 1,421 94% 1,544 97% 
Ateneo de Cebu Primary 1,543 90% 1,571 89% 
Ateneo de Cebu Secondary 1,253 90% 1,301 90% 
Ateneo de Iloilo Primary 848 97% 863 97% 
Ateneo de Iloilo Secondary 787 93% 700 93% 
Ateneo de Davao Primary 3,043 86% 3,086 86% 
Ateneo de Davao Secondary 1,882 85% 2,016 89% 
Xavier University Primary 2,544 88% 2,587 89% 
Xavier University Secondary 1,792 92% 1,864 88% 
Ateneo de Zamboanga Primary 1,349 68% 1,408 71% 
Ateneo de Zamboanga Secondary 1,087 68% 1,107 65% 
JBEC unpublished raw data (Academic Years 2013-14 and 2014-15) 
 
Given its specific context, therefore, Catholic religious education in the 
Philippines retains a confessional character in a way neither possible nor 
desirable in most other contexts. ‘Gospel-teaching as transmitted through the 
Catholic Church’, therefore, remains a fundamental element in the educative 
process of Philippine Catholic schools (CCE, 1977, §49). 
 
THE NATURE OF CATHOLIC EDUCATION 
 
          The principal references for Catholic education and religious education in 
particular are the Catholic Church’s official documents that include papal 
encyclicals on Christian education—from Pope Leo XIII in 1885 and Pius XI in 
1929, the conciliar document Gravissimum Educationis (henceforth, GE), and 
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documents from the pontifical congregation responsible for Catholic educational 
institutions called the Congregation for Catholic Education (Fleming, 2006). 
          A constant theme in the official pronouncements issued by the Catholic 
Church in this last century has been the beneficial work of Catholic schools for 
both the Church and society, as well as the rights of parents to school choice and 
the state's duty to guarantee this right.9 Of particular relevance here is the 
pastoral letter from the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) 
celebrating 400 years of Catholic education, which states that 'it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the establishment of schools in [the] country has laid the 
foundations of education in [the Philippines]' (CBCP, 2011). 
Critical openness to the world 
 
Among the Church documents on education, Gravissimum educationis 
(1965) is considered the most foundational and authoritative, having been 
promulgated by the Second Vatican Council. Vatican II called for a new way of 
being Church, shifting from a hierarchical ecclesiology to an ecclesiology of 
communion that depicted the entire Church as the People of God (LG §9ff). 
Vatican II likewise signaled a new mode of Catholic schooling that would enable 
the school to face contemporary challenges and to respond to the needs of the 
youth. It encouraged schools to be critically open to society, while nurturing an 
atmosphere animated by a spirit of liberty and charity (GE).  
 
In what Grace (2002, p. 7) called the ‘dialectic of retreat and mission’, 
Catholic schools were now expected to change their previously dominant stance 
of a retreat from the world to one best described as an ‘openness with roots’ 
(Bryk et al., 1993, p. 334): a critical engagement with the world in order to be of 
                                            
9 Cf. Leo XIII (1885), Pius IX (1929), GE (1965), and documents from the Congregation on 
Catholic Education (CCE) from 1977 to 2014. 
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service to it while simultaneously preserving the integrity of its own culture (CCE, 
1997, §43-46).  
Lack of a contemporary Catholic philosophy of education 
 
The conciliar document, Gravissium educationis, has been criticized for 
lacking philosophical base and failing to spell out the educational implications of 
the changes initiated by Vatican II (Joseph, 2001; McDonough, 2012). In focusing 
primarily on the role and characteristics of Catholic schools, the document does 
not tackle educational goals and pedagogical approaches and does not advance 
Catholic educational theory and practice.  
Contrary to expectation, a comprehensive post-Vatican II philosophy of 
Catholic education, which would have provided a defense of Catholic schooling 
against secularist attacks, has not developed (Grace, 2002). The lack of such a 
fully articulated contemporary educational theory has been attributed largely to 
the absence of competing claims regarding the nature and goals of Catholic 
education, with the scholastic theology exemplified by Thomism enduring as its 
default philosophy (Beck, 1964; Meehan, 2002).10 
In the absence of a contemporary Catholic philosophy of education, the 
Church’s declarations on Catholic education have served as the primary source 
for providing educators with theological, philosophical, and educational guidance 
(Grace, 2002). But they have also generated what McLaughin (1996, p. 137) has 
called ‘platitudinous rhetoric and edubabble’—i.e., facile, shallow, and distorted 
interpretations of the documents, resulting in ambiguities about the nature and 
purpose of Catholic religious education (Halstead & McLaughlin, 2005). 
                                            
10 For examples of proposed contemporary theories of Catholic education, see Carmody (2011) 
and Whittle (2014).  
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TENSIONS IN THE MISSION OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS 
 
The ambiguities and tensions experienced by Catholic schools as they 
carry out their mission have three related sources: (a) the complementary—but 
occasionally contradictory—roles of the Catholic school as educator and 
evangelizer, (b) the inadequate distinction between catechetical instruction and 
religious education, especially in the case of confessional religious education, 
and (c) the dual nature of the Catholic school as an academic and ecclesial 
institution. 
Tension 1: The mission of education and evangelization 
 
Two distinct but interconnected roles are envisioned for the Catholic 
school: education and evangelization. Tension inherent in this two-fold mission, 
however, raises some fundamental questions on how the school can concretely 
fulfill these roles—specifically in relation to the development of critical rationality 
and confessional religious teaching. Church pronouncements on this matter tend 
to be general, ambiguous, and sometimes misconstrued as inconsistent, hence, 
offering little assistance to practitioners who seek greater clarity and guidance. 
Education 
 
The Catholic school aims to form its students into rational and responsible 
citizens who are expected eventually to make a contribution to the world. This 
holistic formation of students, which aims to 'develop harmoniously their physical, 
moral, and intellectual and spiritual gifts', is a defining feature of Catholic 
education (GE; CCL §795). The formation of the human person ‘in its totality’ 
includes particular regard for the religious and spiritual dimension (CCE, 2009). 
Promoting the student's intellectual growth is given special mention in the 
documents: To ‘stimulate the pupil to exercise his intelligence through the 
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dynamics of understanding to attain clarity and inventiveness' (SCCE, 1977, 
§27). The purpose of nursing the intellectual faculties goes beyond preparing 
students for professional life, but includes fostering a sense of values and 
developing a critical sense, so that students can judge rightly and become free 
and fully integrated human beings. The school must be a place where students 
learn culture not only systematically and rigorously, but also critically, where the 
autonomy of human knowledge and the rules and methods proper to each 
discipline are respected (GE; SCCE, 1977; CCE, 1988). 
However, this critical sense can only be nursed within the context of faith 
and its development as guided by the Christian vision of reality (SCCE, 1977, 
§36). Faith breeds our desire to know the created universe and stimulates a 
critical sense. Moreover, it is faith that stimulates a critical sense that is 
dissatisfied with superficial knowledge and judgements (CCE, 1988, §49).  
Evangelization 
 
The Catholic school’s work of education is, however, explicitly 
contextualized in the saving mission of the Church (SCCE, 1977, §13).  The 
Catholic school is distinctly identified as an apostolic instrument of the Church. 
More than just technical and scientific education, it imparts a sound Christian 
formation (CCE, 1997, §8): 'that the baptized, while they are gradually introduced 
to the knowledge of the mystery of salvation, become ever more aware of the gift 
of faith they have received' (GE).  
The school’s mission of evangelization should penetrate and inform every 
moment of its educational activity (CCE, 1988, §11). The fundamental identity of 
the Catholic school derives from its participation in the Church's mission of 
evangelization; and as such, it is part of the local Church (CCE, 1988). This 
ecclesial nature of the Catholic school is not a mere adjunct, but a distinctive and 
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defining element of its identity and mission (CCE, 1997). Contemporary Catholic 
schooling cannot be fully appreciated apart from this theological-social rationale 
for its existence (Grace, 2002). 
Difficulties, however, surface as the Catholic school carries out its role as 
both educator and evangelizer. The school’s aim of education, which explicitly 
includes the development of intellectual enquiry and critical judgement, is 
complicated by the school’s more fundamental mandate to transmit the Christian 
message and its identification as an arm of the magisterium (CCE, 2007, §26). 
On the one hand, the Catholic school seeks the holistic development of the 
person, preparing students to be rational and responsible citizens in society. But 
on the other hand, what it offers is a distinctly Christian formation, with an 
essential religious dimension and confessional purpose. This tension becomes 
clearer in the discussion of the religious education programme of the Catholic 
school. 
Tension 2: Religious formation as catechetical instruction                           
 
and religious education 
 
What distinguishes a school as Catholic is its mission of education in the 
faith. Religious education is considered an ‘inalienable characteristic of [the] 
educational goal [of Catholic schools]’ (CCE, 2009, §10, 18). It is so important, in 
fact, that to marginalize the moral and religious dimension in Catholic education 
is considered a hindrance to full education (CCE, 2009, §1), and its neglect would 
provide sufficient reason to strip the Catholic school of its title regardless of its 
reputation (CCE, 1988, §66).   
The Catholic school is expected to transmit the faith primarily—but not 
exclusively—through its religious programme. Just as crucial is the school’s 
religious culture and ethos, ‘a special atmosphere animated by the Gospel spirit 
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of freedom and charity’ (GE §8). Essential in the overall religious education of the 
students is a strong and distinct religious dimension in the life of the school (CCE, 
1988). Religious education, both inside the classroom and beyond, therefore, is a 
principal element in the integral formation of the student of a Catholic school. 
Religious education has a special place in the school’s programme. Its 
integration into the students’ general education is a directive from the Church 
(John Paul II, 2009). Like other academic subjects, it is expected to have a 
syllabus, a regular place in the weekly order, and even required examinations. At 
the same time, however, its distinctive characteristics also need to be 
respected—including the required approval of its content by Church authorities 
(SCCE, 1977 §52; CCE, 1988, §70).    
Catholic religious education is also intended to be an instrument for 
interdisciplinary dialogue to achieve the integration of faith and culture (SCCE, 
1982, §56; CCE, 2009, §17). Its aim includes the ‘enlargement of rationality’, 
which entails the task ‘to reopen [rationality] to the larger questions of the truth 
and the good, to link theology, philosophy and science between them in full 
respect for the methods proper to them and for their reciprocal autonomy, but 
also in the awareness of the intrinsic unity that holds them together’ (Benedict 
XVI, 2009, §3). 
Distinction between religious education and catechesis 
 
The often-reiterated difference between religious education and 
catechetical instruction lies in their setting and purpose. While it is to the school 
that religious education has been entrusted, the responsibility for catechesis 
belongs primarily to the family with assistance from the parish. However, while 
the family and the local parish have been identified as the proper locus for it, the 
 39 
Catholic school is nevertheless expected to offer catechetical instruction to its 
students (SCCE, 1977, §51; DGC, 1997, §260). 
The goal of catechesis is to teach the Christian message and doctrine and 
to initiate an individual into the Church. It is designed chiefly to promote a 
personal relationship with Christ and to foster maturity in the faith, as manifested 
in one’s liturgical and sacramental participation as well as apostolic involvement. 
Through catechetical instruction, new members are formed as they are taught the 
practices, conduct, and ritual in the Church (CCE, 1988, §68; DGC, 1997, §74; 
GE).  
The purpose of religious education, on the other hand, is to provide 
knowledge about the nature of the Christian faith, identity, and the living out of 
this faith (CCE, 1988, §68; CCE, 2009, §17). It must, first of all, be treated as ‘a 
scholastic discipline with the same systematic demands and the same rigour as 
other disciplines. It must present the Christian message and the Christian event 
with the same seriousness and the same depth with which other disciplines 
present their knowledge’ (DGC, 1997, §73; CCE, 2009). 
While differing in their primary aims, religious education and catechesis 
are complementary since one without the other renders the faith immature. 
Practice without understanding is blind, while understanding without practice 
lacks seriousness. Knowledge about the faith can itself promote spiritual maturity 
just as growth in one’s faith can generate a deeper understanding of the faith 
(CCE, 1988, §68; CCE, 2009, §17). In fact, the aim of religious education goes 
beyond mere intellectual assent to truths, but includes ‘a total commitment of 
one’s whole being to the Person of Christ’ (SCCE, 1977, §50). 
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Whatever distinction is attempted between religious education and 
catechesis is blurred by the qualifications that create overlaps between the two in 
terms of both their settings and goals. For this reason, Scott (2001) refers to the 
‘Janus face’ of religious education, one side facing the practice of faith, the other 
one its understanding, representing the two general—sharply contrasting, but 
interrelated—goals of religious education. These two ingredients of religious 
education are: (a) teaching a way of being religious in a particular religious 
tradition (i.e., the living out of faith and the set of practices in a given faith 
community), and (b) teaching about religion (religion as an object of scholarly 
investigation). While the first goal, strictly speaking, belongs to the work of 
catechesis, Catholic religious education aims to do both: As catechesis, it inducts 
students into the practices and mission of the Church. As an academic subject, it 
invites students to step back from the practices of their faith to understand it and 
even compare it to other religious traditions (Scott, 2001). 
The weak distinction between catechesis and religious education is 
already problematic in Catholic schools where a significant percentage of the 
students are not Catholic (Meehan, 2006). But the challenge grows more serious 
for schools such as those in the Philippines, where the majority of the students 
are Catholic and the religious education programme is confessional.  
 
Confessional religious education 
 
While a Catholic school is the Church’s instrument of evangelization and 
the education it offers is incomplete without a religious dimension, its purpose is 
not to proselytize or convert non-Catholic pupils, whose religious freedom ought 
to be respected (SCCE, 1977). The Church, however, is quick to assert its right 
‘in spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices’ as long as it 
refrains from coercive forms of persuasion (CCE, 2009, §16; DH, 1965, §2). 
 41 
Hence, while respect for the religious freedom of non-Catholic students is 
conceded, the role of the Catholic school as an evangelizing instrument of the 
Church is nevertheless asserted (CCE, 1988). 
Due to the rise of religious pluralism and cultural diversity both in society 
and in schools themselves, many schools, especially in compliance with 
government prescriptions, have adopted a more anthropological and 
interreligious approach in religious education—concerned with educating 
students about religious phenomena through a number of religious traditions and 
fostering tolerance and respect for diversity. In principle, however, the Church 
remains opposed to the reduction of Catholic religious education to a ‘neutral and 
comparative’ study of different religions because of the confusion or religious 
indifference that such an approach may generate (CCE, 2009, §12). Given its 
goals, Catholic religious education is, ideally and whenever possible, 
confessional. The confessional character of religious education in Catholic 
schools is considered ‘an indispensable guarantee offered to families and 
students who choose such an education’ (John Paul II, 1991). Religious freedom 
is defined precisely as the freedom to receive confessional religious education 
(CCE, 2009, §19)—i.e., ‘the right to learn with truth and certainty the religion to 
which [students] belong’.  
Due to their conceptual overlaps in Church documents, catechesis and 
religious education—especially in confessional Catholic religious education—end 
up being used interchangeably. The goals of Catholic religious education 
understandably become ambiguous and contested especially in Philippine 
Catholic schools, whose context—specifically, their predominantly Catholic 
student populations—warrants a confessional approach. In the Philippines, where 
81% of the population are Roman Catholic, primary and secondary Catholic 
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religious education is inherently confessional in nature and goal: Its primary aim 
is to induct students into the Catholic Church, teaching them what McDonough 
(2009) calls ‘ecclesial facts’ and preparing them for participation in the 
sacraments, such as the Eucharist and Confirmation. 
A much-needed conceptual clarification is essential if a clearly defined 
purpose for Catholic religious education is desired (Scott, 1982). Bewailing its 
longstanding depiction as an education in faith and the need for an independent 
theory for Catholic religious education, Rossiter (1982) has called for a ‘creative 
divorce’ of religious education from catechesis.  
The distinction between catechesis and religious education may be refined 
in terms of (a) the tradition of religious education being followed (Scott, 1984), 
and (b) the predominant language being used (Moran, 1997). 
Models of religious education 
  
A framework for theorizing religious education suggests three approaches 
to religious education classified in terms of their goals: (a) ecclesial enculturation 
tradition, (b) revisionist tradition, and (c) reconceptualist tradition (Scott 1984).  
The ecclesial enculturation tradition refers to the traditional form of 
religious education as the transmission of faith. Given its confessional approach, 
it aims to develop personal belief, to hand on tradition, to build religious identity, 
and to build up the Church. It is called ecclesial enculturation precisely because 
its goal is the enculturation of students into the faith community, so that they 
identify themselves as members of the Church and adopt its values and meaning 
system (Scott, 1980).  
Catechesis clearly belongs to this model of religious education. With its 
explicit goal of religious nurture and socialization, catechesis and its principles 
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are generally considered incompatible with openness, inquiry, and critical spirit, 
as well as modernity in general (Scott, 1984). 
The second tradition of religious education is often referred to as ‘Christian 
religious education’. This revisionist model retains the ecclesial nature of religious 
education: As the Church’s educational ministry, its aim is to ‘inform, form, and 
transform people in Christian identity and agency’. But its Christian particularity is 
by no means considered mutually exclusive with the educational aim of 
promoting students’ personal and critical appropriation of their Christian heritage 
so that they may engage in intelligent participation in the Church (Groome, 1991). 
Its starting point is the intersection of the religious tradition with contemporary 
human experience and culture, and its goal is a deeper appreciation of the 
Christian tradition, which involves: (a) reflective knowledge and understanding of 
the tradition, (b) the recreation of personal beliefs, values, and actions, and (c) 
the transformation of the social and public world. 
What distinguishes the revisionist tradition from the ecclesial enculturation 
model is that it is both confessional and critical. Students are encouraged to 
apply critical reason to the beliefs, symbols, texts, and the lived life of the 
Christian tradition, examining even the historical and conditioning forces in the 
Church, interpreting the meaning of their experience, and growing open to the 
possibility of transforming themselves, the tradition, and the community. Christian 
religious education is the ‘Christian tradition becoming self conscious’ (Scott, 
1984, p. 330).  
However, catechesis remains an explicit goal of Christian religious 
education (Groome, 1996). Hence, for Scott (1984), the revisionist approach is 
still inadequately educative, criticizing it as ‘a delivery system for the prevailing 
theology’ (p. 331). Students remain bound to confessional and denominational 
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interests; they can at best assume a stance of critical affirmation towards 
Christian tradition.  
A third ‘reconceptualist model’ is proposed, one that is stripped of any form 
of proselytizing or evangelizing. Under this model, the religious education class 
becomes the venue for examining the meaning of one’s religious life vis-à-vis 
both those who share it and those who do not. One achieves both a critical 
appreciation of one’s religious tradition, as well as an empathetic understanding 
of other traditions (Scott, 1984).  
Only this reconceptualized religious education, according to Scott (1984), 
succeeds in reversing the traditional form of Church education, about which Miller 
(1980, p. 279) writes: ‘No church ever teaches in a completely open-minded 
manner, and its educational theory has been mixed with indoctrination so that the 
desired result is predetermined’.11  
Teaching discourses    
 
While the three models of religious education are helpful, analyzing the 
program in terms of its teaching discourse can also shed light on the nature of the 
program. Moran (1989) speaks of three languages used in teaching, each with its 
own purpose and proper setting: (a) homiletic, (b) therapeutic, and (c) academic. 
The homiletic discourse reminds the community of the convictions and texts that 
it has accepted and aims to persuade the listeners to believe and act upon these 
convictions and texts. Homiletic speech is necessary in education, but as a stand 
alone, it leaves little room for critical thinking. An example of a suitable venue for 
homiletic speech is the pulpit. 
The second language is therapeutic, which, far from reinforcing what a 
community has agreed on, attempts to subvert it in order to liberate the listeners 
                                            
11 Miller’s (1980) underlying—but questionable—assumption in making such a claim, however, is 
that complete open-mindedness is a condition for critical rationality. 
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from what has been imposed upon them and may be dominating them against 
their will. The clinic is clearly a proper locus of therapeutic language. 
The third type of discourse is academic, which one expects in the 
classroom. Unlike the previous two languages, its purpose is neither the 
reinforcement nor the subversion of a text, but its critical examination. The 
message of the teacher is: ‘Accept no text uncritically; it might be false. Reject no 
text uncritically; it might be true’ (Moran, 1989, p. 78). 
Teaching academically does not aim at student assent to—or dissent 
from—the text per se; rather, its goal is the critical understanding of the text and 
its discourse. It presupposes homiletic and therapeutic discourse, but goes on to 
ask: ‘What is the nature and meaning of texts?’ As the discourse for critical 
understanding, its form is chiefly interrogative. It questions the adequacy of every 
form of expression so that new meanings may emerge. The students' words, the 
words of the text, and even the teacher's words are all subject to public scrutiny. 
As academic criticism, it keeps the meaning of words open. The purpose is to 
move closer to the truth but ‘without fixity, finality or absolutizing’. The assumption 
is every statement can be critiqued and improved on, which ought to be its own 
guarantee against authoritarianism and indoctrination (Scott, 2001). 
Philippine confessional Catholic religious education 
 
The confessional religious education in our schools would properly be 
classified under the revisionist tradition (or Christian religious education). The 
program is still fundamentally designed for ecclesial aims—but at the same time, 
recognizes critical rationality as a constitutive dimension. This conforms to the 
espoused mission of Catholic education as clearly to ‘foster a religious 
conversion through schools that are inclusive but are also distinctive, where faith, 
 46 
reason and life are brought into an integrated relationship as a holistic education 
experience’ (Carmody 2011, p. 113).  
The language in our religious education classrooms, however, can be 
characterized as primarily a homiletic one with only occasional attempts at 
academic discourse. For this reason, the programme falls short of the ideal of 
critical interrogation that academic language facilitates. One wonders as a result 
whether sufficient room is created for critical thinking in such a programme, which 
purports to promote a stance of critical affirmation, but remains tied to a largely 
homiletic teaching discourse. 
It is significant that the 2011 pastoral letter on education issued by the 
Philippine bishops summarizes the mission of the Catholic schools in the country 
with Jesus’ command to ‘go…and make disciples of all the nations’ (Matthew 
28:19). This mandate to ‘preach and teach’ sums up what the bishops consider 
the primary aim of Philippine Catholic schools: the confessional teaching of 
religion, which consists of instruction in matters of faith and morals, as well as 
socialization into its liturgical and sacramental practices for eventual participation 
in the Church’s mission of evangelization. 
 
Tension 3: The Catholic school as an academic and ecclesial institution 
 
Another complicating factor in the educational work of the Catholic school 
is its dual nature as academic and ecclesial institution. As ‘a place of 
evangelization’, the Catholic school does not only represent the Church in 
society, but more importantly, acts as its instrument of evangelization in its very 
work of educating the Christian person (CCE, 1988, §33). More importantly, as 
an ecclesial institution, the Catholic school acts as the arm of the hierarchical 
magisterium, and is therefore, placed directly under the supervision of the local 
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bishop (CCE, 1988, §70). The bishop is ‘the main teacher of the local Church’ 
who determines the content and pedagogy in the school’s religious education 
program (Pilarczyk, 1998, p. 408).  
Recognizing the decline in religious vocations and in the involvement of 
religious men and women in Catholic schools, the Congregation on Catholic 
Education released a document in recognition of the increasingly important role 
played by lay people in Catholic religious education. Yet these educators are 
reminded that in carrying out their role, they are expected not only to learn from 
theological research, but also to make sure to rely on the magisterium for ‘the 
proper fulfillment of their role’ (SCCE, 1982, §59). 
Hence, students are expected to learn ‘not opinion, speculation, not the 
teacher’s private insights or preferences, but all and only that which is 
guaranteed by the Church to be sound doctrine’ (Pilarczyk, 1998, p. 407). Such 
hierarchical control over content raises questions about both the possibility and 
necessity of critical thinking in the classroom because such dependence on the 
ecclesial and epistemic authority of the bishop reveals the inferior ecclesial status 
and agency of lay people vis-à-vis the ordained, casting doubt on the laity’s 
capacity for autonomous thought in matters of faith and morals (McDonough, 
2011).  
McDonough (2011) draws our attention to the use of ‘transmission’ to refer 
to the method of religious education particularly in the 2007 CCE document, 
‘Educating Together in Catholic Schools’, noting that such language is 
incongruent with contemporary progressive teaching methods such as the 
‘discovery’ method. The term ‘transmission’ also implies that students are at best 
passive recipients with no reference at all to any capacity for critical reception.  
Another term that occurs a lot more frequently than ‘transmission’ in 
Church education documents is ‘formation’, which Scott (2001) identifies as the 
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chief Catholic metaphor for education. Like ‘transmission’, ‘formation’ is telling 
because it also attributes agency not to the learner, but to the teacher. The 
learner is portrayed as a passive recipient who is formed by the teacher. This 
unequal relationship between the student and teacher is reflective of the 
unbalanced relationship between the lay and the ordained—especially the 
bishop. This inequality generates a dependence on authority that does not tend 
to foster critical thinking. 
Although Vatican II explicitly includes the laity in a revised ecclesiology 
that understands the Church as fundamentally the People of God, the 
hierarchical system of governance in the Church has persisted, and the lay 
faithful have largely remained confined to a passively dependent role in the 
doctrinal expression of the faith (Duquoc, 1985).  
My hypothesis is that this passivity has bred a religious epistemology that 
tends to be incompatible with critical thinking. Hence, the problem of Catholic 
religious critical thinking in the context of our schools is fundamentally 
epistemological, and to move forward, we need to look at Catholic believers’ tacit 
assumptions about knowledge about God and the ultimate nature of reality—its 
possibility and limits. This hypothesis is confirmed by the findings of a survey 
conducted among teachers belonging to our network of Philippine Catholic 
primary and secondary schools. The survey and its results will be discussed in 
the next chapter after a review of the literature on critical thinking. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CRITICAL THINKING 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that precisely on account of its 
value in Catholic education, critical thinking in Catholic religious education cannot 
be presumed, but ought to be problematized, given the tensions inherent in a 
Catholic school’s identity and mission, especially in its religious formation of 
students. In this chapter, I define that problem as partly—if not fundamentally—
epistemological in nature. 
In lieu of the prevalent descriptive conceptions of critical thinking, I adopt a 
more adequately normative approach. As recommended by Bailin and colleagues 
(1999a), a normative account focuses on the standards that distinguish genuine 
critical thinking from alleged thinking skills, processes, and procedures that do 
not assure the attainment of critical thinking standards.  Moreover, I propose a 
specifically epistemological approach to link the disposition for critical thinking to 
our often-tacit assumptions about knowledge and its justification, which, 
depending on the level of epistemic development, may facilitate or inhibit critical 
thinking in a given domain (Kuhn, 1999; Moshman, 2015). 
An empirical study conducted to diagnose our teachers’ epistemic 
development reveals a pervasiveness—especially among religious educators—of 
an epistemic level in the domain of religious beliefs that impedes critical thinking. 
The findings support the hypothesis that the problem of Catholic religious critical 
thinking may be epistemological and raise questions about the prevailing 
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religious epistemology among religious educators in our network of Catholic 
schools.  
TOWARDS A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF CRITICAL THINKING 
 
If the primary goal of education is, as John Dewey (1986, p. 181) suggests, 
the fostering of ‘attitudes of alert, cautious, and thorough inquiry’, then given its 
numerous laudatory definitions in the literature, there ought to be no doubt about 
the fundamental place of critical thinking in the heart of education (Scheffler, 
1973). However, the worth and feasibility of critical thinking as an educational 
goal suffers from its contested and confusing conceptualizations.  
The two-components conception of critical thinking 
 
Critical thinking has been defined as simply as the correct assessment of 
statements and reasons (Ennis, 1962) or as ‘reasonable reflective thinking that is 
focused on deciding what to believe or do’—i.e., whether beliefs, actions, and 
their underlying assumptions warrant justification and acceptance (Ennis, 1993, p. 
180; Paul, 1990). Critical thinking has also been defined in terms of a 
commitment to rationality that serves as the basis for independent thought, 
reasoned judgement, and responsible action (Siegel, 1988).  
One way of extending these definitions is through the generally accepted 
conception of critical thinking as having the two components of competence and 
disposition. Critical thinking requires the ability to evaluate reasons and to justify 
claims and actions, employing such skills as questioning, clarification, citation of 
sources and evidences, as well as proficiency in such types of reasoning as 
induction and deduction (Bailin et al., 1999b). 
However, competence at critical thinking, albeit necessary, requires the 
disposition to put it into habitual practice. Critical thinking also demands what 
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Siegel (1988) calls the ‘critical spirit’: a premium on rationality that leads to a 
basic commitment to evaluate reasons and to base one’s decisions and actions 
on them (Bailin & Siegel, 2007; Passmore, 1967). This disposition for critical 
thinking includes attitudes, habits of mind, dispositions, and character traits—e.g., 
desire for truth, respect for reason, appreciation of high-quality products and 
performance, an inquiring attitude, open-mindedness, independent-mindedness, 
respect for others and especially for legitimate intellectual authority (Bailin et al., 
1999b; Bailin & Siegel, 2007; Hare, 1979, 1985). Ennis’ (1985) list goes beyond 
dispositions to include the discipline related to orderliness, precision, and 
sensitivity to the feelings and knowledge of others.  
Just as essential, therefore, as the ‘how’ of critical thinking (the abilities 
component), is its ‘why’ (the disposition component). This conventional two-
components conception of critical thinking, however, tends to remain merely 
descriptive and neglects the essentially normative character of critical thinking. 
What defines critical thinking, after all, is its actual attainment of the standards of 
rationality.  
Two misconceptions about critical thinking 
 
Two misconceptions about critical thinking have resulted from its merely 
descriptive accounts: (a) a rigid dichotomy between critical thinking and creative 
thinking; and (b) the ambiguous operationalization of critical thinking as a set of 
generic thinking skills or discrete mental operations and procedures. 
 
Critical thinking as dichotomous from creative thinking 
 
A common stereotype of critical thinking sets it in sharp contrast to 
creative thinking, overemphasizing their difference as different forms of thinking 
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that are at best complementary (Glaser, 1984) or worse, opposed to each other 
(de Bono, 1976). According to this stereotype, critical thinking is a highly 
disciplined, rule-bound, and almost algorithmic reasoning process reserved 
exclusively for the tasks of analysis and evaluation. Creative thinking, on the 
other hand, refers to a more intuitive, imaginative, or even irrational process used 
for ‘an unconstrained generation of ideas’ (Bailin & Siegel, 2007, p. 186). 
The distinction between critical thinking and creative thinking is further 
exaggerated by their identification with separate hemispheres of the brain: Critical 
thinking has been labeled ‘left-brain thinking’ and creative thinking ‘right-brain’. 
Such a dichotomy results in the reduction of critical thinking into purely linear and 
deductive thought stripped of the inductive, analogical, and abductive processes 
more conventionally associated with creative thinking (Bailin, 1995). 
Table 3: Critical thinking and creative thinking 
Critical Thinking Creative Thinking 
left-brain rational, deductive, linear, analytic thinking right-brain intuitive thinking 
thinking emotion 
aggressiveness and confrontation collegiality and collaboration 
personal autonomy and individualism community and relationship 
abstraction concrete lived experience  
objectivity context 
Based on Bailin, 1995 
This reductionist conception, which depicts critical thinking and creative 
thinking as mutually exclusive, is far from accurate. Creativity and imagination are 
valuable in critical thinking just as logical and analytic assessment is useful in 
creative thinking. The ‘left-brain thinking’ used for analysis, argument, and 
problem-solving also involves creativity; critical thinking needs to anticipate 
consequences, imagine innovative solutions, explore creative alternatives, and 
even frame a problem in the first place. Likewise, creative thinking requires the 
logic and evaluation more typically identified with critical thinking, particularly in 
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terms of generating ideas that are valuable and feasible (Bailin, 1987; Bailin et al., 
1999b; Bailin & Siegel, 2007). 
While critical thinking and creative thinking are distinct, this binary 
opposition leads to a parallel dichotomy in education: Critical thinking is taught 
exclusively for the tasks of analysis, argument, and problem solving without 
providing opportunities to nurture the creativity that is also required by such tasks. 
Creative thinking, on the other hand, is reduced to mere intuition, neglecting the 
essential skills and knowledge that are also valuable in creativity. The result is an 
impoverishment of the conception of knowledge as merely a disciplined and 
critical process when it is, in fact, also a dynamic and creative one (Bailin, 1987). 
A reductionist notion of rationality is likewise unwittingly generated when it is 
pigeonholed to the type of rationality used in analysis and argument.12  
Critical thinking as generalizable thinking skills  
 
A second misconception about critical thinking exaggerates its 
generalizability across contexts and domains. This misapprehension, which is 
understandably appealing because of its implied cross-disciplinary transferability 
of critical thinking, can be classified into three groups: (a) the ‘generic skills’ 
concept, (b) the ‘process’ concept, and (c) the ‘procedures’ concept (Bailin, et al. 
1999a).  
Generic skills  
 
Critical thinking is defined as a set of identifiable domain-independent 
thinking skills such as analysis, prediction, and interpretation. In the traditional 
division of learning goals into knowledge, skills, and attitudes, critical thinking 
                                            
12 The critical realist account of critical thinking that I will propose later will precisely prevent such 
a reductionist notion of rationality. 
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would be classified as skills that are distinct from knowledge and attitudes, and 
can be learned and applied across any knowledge domain (Bailin, et al. 1999a). 
The problem with this conception is that these thinking skills are separated 
from the knowledge and attitude necessary for their successful practice. Critical 
thinking is inherently context-bound, requiring the background content knowledge 
and understanding pertinent to a discipline. ‘What is clear, what is contradictory, 
what is logical, and so forth depends upon the particular context’ (Barrow, 1991, 
p.12). Such allegedly generic thinking skills as analysis, interpretation, and 
prediction, therefore, cannot be performed correctly without the domain-specific 
knowledge and conventions they require. (Facione, 1990).  
This ‘generic skills’ conceptualization of critical thinking fails to account not 
only for its reliance on domain-specific knowledge, but also for the equally 
essential motivating disposition for critical thinking in the first place (Bailin et al., 
1999a). 
Discrete processes or procedures 
 
Critical thinking has also been misconstrued either as mental processes or 
a set of procedures required for the practice of critical thinking. Critical thinking 
has been inadequately defined as proficiency at a repertoire of discrete mental 
operations that includes observation, inference, evaluation, synthesis, and 
hypothesis. This ‘process’ conception of critical thinking is misleading because 
processes refer not so much to actual mental operations, but merely to tasks 
from which these so-called thinking processes have been gratuitously inferred. 
Performing these mental processes does not guarantee that the thinking they 
lead to qualifies as critical (Bailin et al., 1999a).  
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Critical thinking has also been miscast as a general procedure consisting 
of concrete steps prescribed for critical thinking. Various sets of procedures have 
been proposed, from a set of three steps (inquiry, problem solving, and decision 
making) (Wright, 1993) to as many as eight (concept formation, principle 
formation, comprehension, problem solving, decision making, research, 
composition, and oral discourse). Most advocates of this ‘procedures’ concept 
like Marzano and colleagues (1988, p. 34) prefer the less stringent heuristic 
interpretation to the strict algorithmic step-by-step interpretation: The procedures 
are to be taught as ‘arrays of alternatives’ to be used flexibly by teachers and 
students. Nevertheless, whether the focus is on general procedures and 
heuristics or rules for reasoning and problem solving, this conception also loses 
sight of the contextual factors that shape critical thinking and the standards of 
good thinking that define it (Bailin et al., 1999a; Glaser, 1984). 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of such generic procedures is bound to be 
limited: The more general the procedures are claimed to be, the more vague they 
tend to be, and the more specific they are, the less useful they become. What is 
essential to learning critical thinking is not proficiency at pre-programmed thinking 
procedures with at best questionable applicability, but the mastery of the 
standards that will guide the solution of a given problem (Bailin et al., 1999a). 
Descriptive approaches to critical thinking typically neglect both the 
contextual and normative quality of critical thinking. First of all, these alleged 
discipline-independent critical thinking skills, processes, and procedures are, 
contrary to their labels, not generalizable because of the far-ranging problems 
and contexts that both determine the standards of critical thinking and define its 
practice. Secondly, these skills, processes, and procedures fail to consider what 
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is actually required to fulfill the criteria that distinguish thinking as critical—so their 
employment does not necessarily lead to critical thinking.  
The contextual nature of critical thinking  
 
An important feature of critical thinking that emerges from the literature is 
its inherently contextual character. There are two opposing views: (a) the 
generalist view, which considers critical thinking abilities as applicable across 
contexts; and (b) the specificist view, which insists on the domain-dependence of 
critical thinking (Bailin & Siegel, 2007). 
According to the generalist view, abilities such as detecting a fallacy, 
basing a generalization on a sample, or appealing to a legitimate authority are 
equally applicable and useful in different disciplines (Paul, 1990). The specificist 
school of thought, on the other hand, rejects the use of ‘minimal, arbitrary, and 
even meaningless content’ in learning research because it recognizes the 
intrinsic role played by discipline-specific content knowledge in critical thinking 
(McPeck, 1981, p. 3; Perkins & Salomon, 1989; Kuhn, 1999). 
Critical thinking is always contextual, but it is neither unconditionally 
generalizable nor completely discipline-specific. While critical thinking necessarily 
entails discipline-specific content knowledge, some general thinking skills or 
abilities are also, to some extent, applicable to a range of domains (Bailin & 
Siegel, 2007). The intellectual resources identified by Bailin and colleagues 
(1999b) as essential for the aspiring critical thinker range from the domain-
specific to the partially and completely generalizable: (a) domain-specific 
background content knowledge, (b) knowledge of relevant domain-specific 
strategies and heuristics, (c) partially generalizable operational knowledge of the 
principles and standards of argumentation and inquiry, (d) knowledge of general 
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key critical concepts (e.g., literal vs. metaphorical language, necessary and 
sufficient conditions, etc.), and (e) generalizable dispositions and habits of mind. 
Hence, background content knowledge and certain criteria for reason-
assessment are also peculiar to a domain, while others remain generalizable 
(e.g., what constitutes a valid or fallacious form of reasoning). On the other hand, 
some epistemological assumptions underlying critical thinking are fully 
generalizable—e.g., the distinction between truth and rational justification and the 
recognition that rational justification is a fallible indicator of truth. The disposition 
component of critical thinking—i.e., the habits of mind that underlie a commitment 
to critical thinking—is also fully generalizable (Bailin & Siegel, 2007).  
The normative nature of critical thinking 
 
Aside from due consideration of its contextuality, a proper conception of 
critical thinking ought to focus on its normative nature, shifting the talk from 
‘critical thinking skills’ to ‘skilled thinking’. Proposed in place of the prevailing 
misleading conceptions of critical thinking is a stronger normative account with an 
emphasis on the standards of good thinking as demanded in a given context 
(Bailin et al., 1999b). As Bailin and colleagues (1999a) write: ‘[The] educational 
goal must be to teach [students] to do such tasks well by increasing their capacity 
and inclination to make judgements by reference to criteria and standards that 
distinguish thoughtful evaluations from sloppy ones, fruitful classification 
schemes from trivial ones, and so on’ (p. 279). 
Critical thinking is primarily a normative enterprise, defined by both general 
and context-specific criteria and standards that qualify it precisely as critical. This 
normative conception of critical thinking is more useful in understanding and 
teaching critical thinking than the more problematic accounts of it as a set of 
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psychological skills, processes, or procedures. These alleged critical thinking 
skills and prescribed mental operations or procedures do not necessarily enable 
one to meet the standards that define critical thinking (Bailin et al., 1999b; Bailin 
& Siegel, 2007). Critical thinking should instead serve as an umbrella normative 
term that refers to a variety of kinds of thinking that involve judgement and fulfills 
particular standards of rationality.  
 
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CRITICAL THINKING 
 
 
The normative character of critical thinking is foregrounded by an 
epistemological approach. According to this approach, it is our underlying 
assumptions about knowledge and its justification that facilitate or impede the 
exercise of critical thinking. 
In her study, Bailin (1999) diagnosed the problem of critical thinking most 
common among students as not so much a question of competence, but as one 
of disposition. The observed lack of a critical spirit, however, is due neither to 
self-interest nor prejudice, but to the students’ failure to grasp the critical role of 
reason in the enterprise of knowledge. Critical thinking presupposes a sufficient 
understanding of such interrelated concepts as reason, evidence, opinion, and 
argument. Without an appreciation of the ‘evolution and evaluation of knowledge’, 
critical thinking will not be valued, much less put into practice  (Bailin, 1999, p. 
167). 
This access to the ‘larger epistemological picture’—so crucial in the 
exercise of critical thinking—is a matter of an individual’s level of epistemic 
cognition (King & Kitchener, 2002; Kuhn, 2000). Epistemic cognition refers to our 
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beliefs about the nature of knowledge, especially the justification and truth of 
beliefs, and provides the basis for critical thinking (Moshman, 2015).   
Epistemic cognition 
  
A helpful way of clarifying the normative conception of critical thinking is by 
distinguishing three levels of cognitive activities: inferences, thinking, and 
reasoning, where reasoning corresponds to critical thinking (Moshman, 2015). 
‘Inferences’ is the most generic of the three terms, referring to all cognitive 
processes such as perception, interpretation, explanation, including thinking and 
reasoning. To qualify as thinking, however, inferences must be applied and 
coordinated in order to achieve a purpose—e.g., problem solving, decision 
making, planning. However, for thinking to qualify as critical thinking—i.e., 
reasoning—it requires epistemological self-regulation so that it is aimed at true or 
justifiable reason (Moshman, 1995). In other words, while thinking is defined by 
its purpose, reasoning—or critical thinking—is distinguished by the success with 
which it meets the standards of rationality. 
Inferences, thinking, and reasoning correspond to the levels of cognition, 
metacognition, and epistemic cognition, respectively, first proposed in a model by 
Kitchener13 (1983). Cognition refers to activities such as perceiving, computing, 
and memorizing. Once we consciously monitor our progress while engaged in 
such cognitive tasks, we reach the metacognitive level, ‘thinking about our 
thinking’. When we begin to consider our underlying assumptions about knowing 
(its limits, certainty, and criteria), we have attained the level of epistemic cognition 
                                            
13 Kuhn (2000) has a similar tripartite model of cognitive processing—later synthesized by Hofer 
(2001, 364) with Kitchener’s—which identifies what she calls ‘epistemic meta-knowing’ as 
providing the rationale for the practice and valuing of critical thinking. She also distinguishes two 
types of metacognition: (a) metacognitive knowing (pertaining to declarative knowing), which 
refers to the executive management of one’s base of declarative knowledge (one’s ability to 
monitor what one knows and how one knows it), (b) metastrategic knowing (pertaining to 
procedural knowing), which refers to one’s management of available strategies applied in 
knowing (Kuhn, 1999). 
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(Kitchener, 1983, p. 222). It is epistemic cognition, therefore, that serves as the 
basis for reasoning; it is what transforms thinking into critical thinking.14 It is not 
simply ‘thinking about thinking’ (metacognition). Rather, epistemic cognition is 
knowledge about the normative nature of knowledge, particularly, issues of 
justification and truth (Moshman, 2015).  
A similar epistemological approach to critical thinking has been adopted by 
Kuhn (1999), who defines the dispositional component of critical thinking not in its 
conventional sense of habits of mind, but in the more fundamental sense of 
epistemological assumptions and intellectual values. Our ‘epistemological 
understanding’—i.e., our beliefs about knowledge and knowing, and the 
possibility or necessity of justification—provides the reason for valuing intellectual 
endeavors. Our intellectual values, in turn, predispose us whether or not to exert 
the required effort to engage in the intellectual enterprise. Hence, Kuhn (2001) 
traces a ‘path from epistemological conceptions to intellectual values to 
disposition’: It is our epistemological understanding that nurtures our intellectual 
values that serve to motivate us to practice critical thinking. 
Hence, epistemic cognition, regardless of label,15 plays a pivotal role in 
critical thinking. The only way to understand epistemic cognition, however, is 
developmentally (Moshman, 2015). 
                                            
14 King and Kitchener (2002) identified epistemic cognition as the foundation of critical thinking 
although the term in their research is restricted to refer to the self-monitoring process involved in 
the solution of ill-structured problems (‘problems that reasonable people can reasonably disagree 
about’). 
15 Other terms used for epistemic cognition are: epistemic understanding (Kuhn et. al., 2000), 
epistemic reflection (Baxter Magolda, 2004), epistemic postures (Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990), 
epistemological worldviews (Schraw & Olafson, 2002), epistemological positions (Mansfield & 
Clinchy, 2002), and epistemic orientations (Gottlieb, 2007). I have selected ‘epistemic cognition’ 
because the label clarifies that epistemic cognition is a subset of metacognition. 
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Epistemic development  
 
The development of critical thinking is tied to the development of one’s 
epistemic cognition, on which there has been a wealth of research. In his review 
of the literature, Moshman (2015) identifies five major studies and research 
programmes devoted to epistemic development, starting with the pioneering and 
seminal work of Perry and his colleagues (1968) on volunteer U.S. Harvard 
undergraduate students. 
Models of epistemic development  
 
Perry and his colleagues (1968) are credited with the earliest efforts of 
assessing epistemologies and developing a typology of their development 
although he called his subject matter ‘intellectual and ethical development’. The 
research consisted of two longitudinal studies that used a combination of the 
Checklist of Educational Views (CLEV), an instrument he designed, and follow-up 
interviews, whose transcripts were submitted for rating by a panel of six judges. 
The analysis of the data yielded a scheme of intellectual development of one’s 
beliefs about the nature of knowledge. This schema of so-called ‘epistemological 
positions’—where the initial number of nine was trimmed down to four sequential 
categories—theorizes how one moves from one position to the next: (a) Dualism 
(positions 1 to 2): an absolutist ‘right or wrong’ view of knowledge characterized 
by a heavy reliance on authority, (b) Multiplicity (positions 3 to 4): a breakdown of 
the previous dualist view and a recognition of multiple perspectives possibly of 
more or less equal validity, (c) Relativism (positions 5 to 6): initial realizations 
about one’s role as active meaning-maker, and (d) Commitment within relativism 
(positions 7 to 9): the acceptance of one’s responsibility to make, given one’s 
best lights, a firm, albeit tentative, commitment to one particular view among 
many. 
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Succeeding research on epistemic development extended beyond Perry’s 
(1968) initial sample of American male college students to include exclusively 
female students (Belenky, et. al., 1986), students at different educational levels 
(Baxter Magolda, 1987, 2004; King, 1992; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991; 
Ryan, 1984), as well as teachers (Schraw & Olafson, 2002; White, 2000). These 
studies employed a variety of methodologies from scales similar to Perry’s (1968) 
CLEV, Ryan’s (1984) dualist scale, and Baxter Magolda’s (1987) Measure of 
Epistemological Reflection (MER) to a combination of qualitative and structured 
interviews (Belenky, et al., 1986; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991). 
These diverse investigations proposed different, but related models of 
epistemic development, with various refinements and revisions on Perry’s (1968) 
initial framework (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002; King & Kitchener, 2004). There is a 
general consensus that beliefs of adults about the certainty of knowledge and the 
process of knowing lie on a continuum: On one end is the view that knowledge is 
certain and comes primarily, if not exclusively, from authority. On the opposite 
extreme is the view that knowledge is uncertain and is formed based on the 
knower’s evaluation of available evidence. Between these two extremes is the 
belief that knowledge is uncertain, but relative to the knower (White, 2000; Perry 
et. al., 1968; King & Kitchener, 2004). Table 4 shows a comparative summary of 
the different models highlighting these approximate points of agreement. 
While some researchers are averse to the deterministic connotations of 
‘stages’, preferring labels like ‘positions’, ‘levels’, and ‘perspectives’, there 
remains a general agreement that a hierarchy exists among the epistemic levels 
with some levels considered more mature than others. Epistemic development, 
therefore, occurs as one moves from what is considered a more naïve level of 
epistemic cognition to more sophisticated ones although caution has been raised 
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against uncritically accepting such a hierarchy without consideration to cultural 
differences (Gottlieb, 2006). Moreover, regardless of one’s preferred model, 
researchers agree that epistemic development generally consists of three levels 
that occur in two shifts (Chai, 2006; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Moshman, 2015). 
 
Three levels of epistemic development 
 
In his comprehensive study on epistemic cognition, Moshman (2015) 
notes the substantial consensus in the literature about the basic course of 
epistemic development and the process it entails. Epistemic development—which 
is, to some extent, related to age and education level, though by no means 
occurring in a linear fashion—involves two major shifts that lead to three distinct 
levels, resulting from an increasingly active process of reflection and coordination 
by the individual. 
Absolutist epistemology 
 
The first epistemological level—labeled here as ‘absolutist’ (also, 
‘objectivist’, ‘realist’, and ‘dualist’)—is characterized by a heavy reliance on 
authority and the view that every question has a single correct answer. On this 
level, assertions are regarded not simply as mental copies of reality, but as 
beliefs generated by the human activity of knowing. 16 One no longer simply 
‘knows’ that something is true, accepting assertions at face value; one needs to 
evaluate whether or not a belief is true either directly or vicariously—i.e., through 
direct observation or more likely, the judgements of those who are considered 
experts (Kuhn, 1999).  
                                            
16 Kuhn (1999) adds a pre-epistemological level labeled ‘realist’ found among children below the 
age of 4, for whom assertions are considered mere representations of realities, neither generated 
by human activity nor requiring evaluation. Only beginning with the absolutist level is there an 
insight into the interpretive role of knowers in the creation of assertions and consequently, the 
nature of assertion as beliefs (be they facts, opinion, or judgements). 
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The development of critical thinking ends up significantly constrained if 
one remains restricted by this absolutist epistemology. Assertions are primarily 
treated as facts that simply need to be verified as true or false. Truth consists in a 
correspondence with an external reality, which dictates the criterion for truth or 
falsehood. The nature of knowledge is believed to be certain and simple, leading 
to the simplistic conclusion that disagreements are all ultimately resolvable given 
that there is only one possible correct answer to every question. This often 
breeds an uncritical reliance on authority. The role of the knower, which is 
confined to seeking the necessary information, is far from pivotal. Critical thinking, 
which consists primarily of a search for this information and occasionally the 
assessment of the reliability of authority, consequently ends up stunted (Kuhn, 
1999; Kuhn &Weinstock, 2002). 
Multiplist epistemology  
 
The transition to the second level, called ‘multiplist’ (or ‘subjectivist’ or 
‘relativist’) is prompted by a perspectivist shift, which involves a revision in one’s 
notion of the nature of knowledge—from knowledge as certain and simple to 
knowledge as tentative and complex. This shift constitutes the first prerequisite to 
epistemic development: a recognition of the possibility and legitimacy of diverse 
knowledge claims and even opposing viewpoints, and the relocation of the 
source of knowledge from the external object to the knower. 
The catalyst for this shift is usually a disillusionment from one’s inability to 
resolve conflicting assertions through either observation or appeal to authority, 
especially given numerous and significant disagreements among experts. Often 
accompanied by a rebellion against authority, especially among adolescents, this  
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Table 4: Models of epistemic developmenta 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Intellectual and 
ethical 
development  
(Perry 1970) 
 
Dualism 
(Positions 1-2) 
Multiplicity 
(Positions 3-4) 
Relativism 
(Positions 5-
6) 
Commitment 
within 
Relativism 
(Positions 7-9) 
Women’s ways 
of knowing 
(Belenky et al., 
1986) 
Silence Received Knowledge 
Subjective 
Knowledge 
Procedural 
Knowledge 
Constructed 
Knowledge 
 
Epistemological 
Reflection  
(Baxter 
Magolda, 1987) 
Absolute  
Knowing 
Transitional 
Knowing 
Independent 
Knowing 
Contextual 
Knowing 
     
Epistemic 
Postures 
(Chandler, 
Boyes, & Ball, 
1990) 
 
Absolutism              Defended Realism Skepticism Dogmatism 
Postskeptical 
Rationalism 
Reflective 
Judgement 
(King & 
Kitchener, 
1994) 
Pre-Reflective   
(Stages 1-3) 
Quasi-Reflective 
(Stages 4 – 6) 
Reflective 
(Stages 7 – 8) 
 
Argumentative 
Reasoning 
(Kuhn, 1991; 
2002) 
Realist  
Absolutist 
Simple          
Dual 
Multiplist 
Evaluativist 
Objective     
Conceptual 
 
Epistemological 
Worldviews 
(Schraw & 
Olafson, 2002) 
Realist Relativist Contextualist 
 
Epistemological 
Positions 
(Mansfield & 
Clinchy, 2002) 
Objective Subjective Integrated 
 
Epistemic 
Cognition 
(Moshman, 
2007) 
Objectivist Subjectivist Rationalist 
 
Epistemic 
Orientations  
(Gottlieb, 2007) 
Realist Perspectivist 
Adapted and expanded from Hofer & Pintrich, 1997 
a While some researchers identify more than three categories, they nevertheless generally 
conform to the three main categories. 
 
shift can lead one down the ‘slippery slope of multiplism’ producing an epistemic 
skepticism that abandons not only the absolutist idea of certainty, but also the 
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responsibility towards any evaluative task—i.e., any form of critical thinking. If 
disputes cannot readily be resolved, then assertions are but a matter of opinion 
or individual preferences, all of which are to be equally accepted as valid. 
Compared to an absolutist, who at least subscribes to a criterion of truth, albeit 
simplistic and inadequate, a multiplist has minimal, if any reason at all, to engage 
in critical thinking (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). 
Evaluativist epistemology 
 
A second—but seldom attained—shift is required to achieve the highest 
level of epistemic cognition: an ‘evaluativist’ epistemology (also, ‘rationalist’ or 
‘contextualist’), which accepts the complex and uncertain nature of knowledge, 
but does not abandon the evaluative task, but on the contrary, embraces the 
responsibility to assess different assertions based on both evidence and other 
people’s judgements, especially experts (Gottlieb, 2007; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; 
Kuhn et al., 2000). The knower does not reserve an unconditional infallibility for 
authority, but neither does one skeptically reject whatever authority claims. While 
authority is given due respect, its expert opinions are subjected to rational 
scrutiny, so that all available evidence is examined before one makes a choice 
from among the multiple assertions available (Baxter Magolda, 2004; King & 
Kitchener, 2004; Gottlieb, 2007). 
Only on this level of epistemic cognition is knowing grasped as a process 
that entails judgement. While people’s views ought to be respected, not all 
opinions are considered equal. Assertions are neither fact nor opinion, but 
judgements that require rational assessment. Compared to a multiplist, an 
evaluativist believes that there exist legitimate criteria for making these 
judgements. In contrast to an absolutist epistemology, these criteria need to be 
sought and are not always readily available (Kuhn, 1999). 
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Table 5: Levels and shifts of epistemic cognition 
 Perspectivist shift Evaluativist shift 
Absolutist epistemology No No 
Multiplist epistemology Yes No 
Evaluativist epistemology Yes Yes 
 
The second evaluativist shift can occur only if one moves away from an 
uncritical stance towards authority as a source of knowledge to a critical one, 
where the self takes on a more active role in the justification of knowledge vis-à-
vis the external sources of knowledge (Chai, 2006). Justification of knowledge 
ranges from the purely external to the internal, from passive and uncritical 
reliance on authority in the absolutist level to a more independent use of one’s 
own judgement, whether this judgement is based merely on one’s opinion 
(multiplist) or on a careful consideration of evidence and argument (evaluativist). 
As one grows epistemically, the self becomes a progressively more active and 
independent knower. 
Substantial epistemological differences remain even among adults, with 
relatively few attaining the most sophisticated evaluativist level. While maturity 
and educational experiences are most likely contributors to epistemic growth, 
comparative studies between undergraduates and mature adult groups show 
negligible progression to the evaluativist level despite the increase in age and 
experience (Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn 2001).17 Most adults encounter difficulty in 
clambering out of the ‘multiplist poisoned well of doubt’ (Chandler et al., 2003) 
and end up remaining multiplist for life (Kuhn, 1999).  
                                            
17 Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) cite how the values of social tolerance and acceptance (‘Live and 
let live’, ‘To each his own’) prevalent in contemporary society eclipse the value of reasoned 
argument and informed understanding and are detrimental to full epistemic development. With the 
identification of pluralism with relativism, social tolerance and reasoned argument are considered 
mutually exclusive. 
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Hence, an evaluativist epistemology succeeds in acknowledging 
uncertainty—which the absolutist epistemology fails to do—and at the same time 
refuses to forsake evaluation—of which a multiplist epistemology is culpable 
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn, 1999). 
The coordination of the subjective and objective poles of knowing 
 
Epistemic growth is driven by the progressive coordination and balancing 
of the subjective and objective components of knowing. As one transitions from 
one level of epistemic cognition to another, the objective and subjective 
dimensions of knowing grow increasingly integrated (Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002; 
Kuhn et al., 2000). 
In the absolutist level, where one views knowledge as facts and relies 
heavily on external sources of knowledge, the objective dimension dominates 
over the subjective. Knowledge is located in the external world and can be known 
with certainty. The next multiplist level, with its recognition of the complexity and 
uncertainty of knowledge, goes to the opposite extreme, where the subjective 
dimension prevails at the cost of the objective, resulting in the obliteration of any 
objective standard for evaluating competing truth claims and eventually, the 
absence of discriminability among them. It is only in the evaluativist stage, as one 
begins to move out of the intellectually undemanding multiplist level to a level 
where one undertakes the task of assessing uncertain and complex knowledge 
that an integration between the subjective and objective dimensions begins to be 
achieved18 (Kuhn & Park, 2005; Mansfield and Clinchy, 2002; Moshman, 2015). 
                                            
18  Based on findings from a traditional extended interview, this three-level scheme can be 
expanded to include a pre-absolutist (‘Realist’) level, as well as two sub-levels each for absolutist 
and evaluativist epistemologies: (a) Dual absolutist is distinguished from simple absolutist in the 
former’s acknowledgement of subjective bias and interpretation—and not mere incompleteness 
as in the latter—as a source of discrepancy from reality; (b) Conceptual evaluativist, in contrast to 
objective evaluativist, attributes discrepancies between claims to the knowers’ frames of 
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The full development of epistemic cognition is characterized by the 
balanced coordination between the subjective and objective dimensions of 
knowing, requiring first of all the integration of the subjective component in a 
multiplist epistemology through the acknowledgement of the plurality of possibly 
correct and even conflicting views about reality, followed by the reintegration of 
the objective dimension, resulting in an epistemic cognition that is characterized 
by a commitment to the rational assessment of these views.  
In summary, there are two contrary beliefs about knowledge that are 
incompatible with critical thinking, each one represented by a rudimentary level of 
epistemic cognition. Critical thinking is devalued if knowledge is believed to be 
entirely objective and certain, and is simply accumulated primarily through 
authority, rather than constructed by the knower, which is the case in a non-
perspectivist—i.e., absolutist—epistemology. At the other extreme, critical 
thinking becomes irrelevant when knowledge is regarded as entirely subjective 
and subject only to the knower’s personal preferences as in a perspectivist but 
non-evaluativist—i.e., multiplist epistemology (Bailin, 1999; Kuhn, 2001).19  
In contrast to them, the most advanced level of epistemic cognition, one 
that is both perspectivist and evaluativist, provides a sufficient rationale for the 
exercise of critical thinking. Only with such an evaluativist epistemology is 
argument—along with the critical thinking that it requires—considered valuable 
(Kuhn, 2000; 2001; Kuhn & Park, 2005). Along with the evaluativist epistemology 
comes a whole range of beliefs about knowledge and knowing that are 
compatible with critical thinking: a fundamental belief in reason and rationality, a 
                                                                                                                                  
reference so that differences cannot be resolved by mere comparison and evaluation of 
consistencies (as held by the objective evaluativist) (Kuhn &Weinstock, 2002). 
 
19 Bailin (1999) notes a variety that blends the two: For certain domains, knowledge is believed to 
be certain and authority its chief source, for others, claims are totally a matter of opinion. Kuhn 
(2000), on the other hand, acknowledges the domain specificities of epistemic cognitions.  
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belief in the possibility of justifying knowledge claims, a belief in the desirability of 
acting on the basis of rationally justified beliefs, and the recognition of one’s own 
fallibility (Bailin, 1999). 
Table 6 below provides a summary of the salient differences between the 
three levels of epistemic cognition. 
Table 6: Epistemological beliefs and the three levels of epistemic cognition 
Characteristics Absolutist Multiplist Evaluativist 
Perspectivist No Yes Yes 
Evaluativist Limited No Yes 
Nature of knowledge: 
‘Knowledge’ as 
complex, uncertain, 
mutable 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Assertions Facts that are either 
correct or incorrect  
in their representation  
of reality 
Opinions are freely 
chosen by—and 
accountable only to—
their owners. 
Judgements can be 
evaluated and 
compared according 
to criteria of argument 
and evidence. 
Reliance on authority: 
Knowledge has an 
external source. 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Agency of the knower: 
Knowledge is 
generated by the 
human mind. 
Limited: 
Comes from an 
external source and is 
certain, but not 
directly accessible. 
Yes: 
Generated by the 
human minds and, 
therefore, uncertain. 
Yes: 
Generated by the 
human minds and is 
uncertain but 
susceptible to 
evaluation. 
Decidability of 
assertions 
Yes No Yes 
Critical Thinking Limited 
Critical thinking is 
limited to the purpose 
of comparing 
assertions to reality 
and determining their 
truth or falsehood. 
No 
Critical thinking is 
neither necessary nor 
relevant. 
Yes 
Critical thinking is an 
important means of 
promoting valid 
assertions and 
enhancing 
understanding. 
Adapted from Kuhn & Park (2005); Gottlieb (2006) 
 
The domain-specificity of epistemic development 
 
A question pertaining to epistemic development is whether it occurs as a 
single evolution or as distinct processes in different domains (Hofer & Pintrich, 
2002). While a number of studies have been devoted to discipline-specific 
epistemological beliefs, relatively scant interest has been paid to the domain-
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dependence of epistemic cognition (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer 1990; 
Hofer, 2001). 
Several studies, however, support the hypothesis that epistemic 
development happens in a domain-dependent manner: The judgements we make 
in knowing vary across different domains. Every domain entails a different type of 
judgement (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). In their studies of epistemological 
understanding, Kuhn et al. (2000; 2005) confirmed that epistemic development 
varied across the five judgement domains investigated: personal tastes, aesthetic 
judgements, value judgements, truth judgements about the social world and 
about the physical world. Just as importantly, they hypothesized that epistemic 
development progressed in a systematic order: The perspectivist shift with its 
acknowledgement of the subjective dimension of knowing would occur earlier in 
the domains where subjectivity is more evident—namely, the domains of 
personal tastes, aesthetic judgements, and value judgements. The reverse order 
is true for the evaluativist shift if it is to happen at all: The reintegration of the 
objective aspect of knowing would first materialize in the domains where 
objectivity is more evident: in the domain of physical truth judgements first, 
followed by that of social truth judgements before the rest. 
Every precaution ought to be taken to prevent an unnecessary proliferation 
of domains, especially given the increasing number—and increasing 
incoherence—of research on domain-specificity, not all of which employ 
epistemological terminology or are specifically focused on epistemic cognition. 
Distinctly epistemic domains need to be differentiated from what are merely 
cognitive domains. Cognitive domains refer to the multiplicity of fields and 
disciplines, which are demarcated by their content and subject matter. Epistemic 
domains, on the other hand, are defined on epistemological grounds, each with a 
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distinct conception of truth or justification and a corresponding model of 
reasoning specific to that domain (Moshman, 2014). In his analysis of different 
epistemic domains, 20  Moshman (2015) notes that development generally 
conforms to the three epistemic levels characterized by the same two shifts that 
culminate in the reintegration of the objective aspect in the most developed level 
of epistemic cognition. 
I will now discuss the findings of an investigation of teachers’ epistemic 
cognition in our Philippine network of schools. 
 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF TEACHER EPISTEMOLOGIES 
 
A survey was conducted to investigate the epistemic cognition of 1,127 
teachers in Philippine Catholic primary and secondary schools. Its aim was to 
identify the teachers' levels of epistemology in different domains, to determine 
differences—if any—across these domains, and to ascertain any possible impact 
that the discipline may have. Unlike other studies on teacher epistemologies, my 
research is focused on actual practitioners, and not on student teachers. 
The survey instrument was adapted from a 15-item instrument designed 
by D. Kuhn and colleagues (2000) to identify the respondents’ epistemologies 
across five domains: aesthetic judgements, value judgements, truth judgements 
about the physical world, truth judgements about the social world, and truth 
judgements about religious beliefs. The respondents’ epistemologies in the 
different domains were classified as one of the following: (a) absolutist (only one 
possible correct answer); (b) multiplist (more than one possible correct answer, 
but equally valid); and (c) evaluativist (more than one possible correct answer, 
                                            
20 Moshman (2015) proposes at least five such epistemic domains: logic and math, the empirical 
sciences (natural and social), morality, social conventions, history, and identity. 
 73 
but one is more correct than others).21 The study also aims to test whether or not 
an epistemology and its development are domain-dependent.  
This instrument was selected because of its simplicity and theoretical 
clarity in assessing respondents’ epistemologies across different domains. While 
it leaves out the nuances of epistemological issues, it is able to generate enough 
data for possible in-depth examination through follow-up interviews, if needed. 
Research purpose and questions 
 
The initial research questions are:  
 
(a) What is the epistemological profile of these practising teachers across the 
different judgement domains? Are there significant differences across the 
judgement domains, confirming the domain-dependency of epistemic 
cognitions?  
 
(b) How do teacher epistemologies in the domains of value judgements and 
especially religious beliefs (the two domains taught in Catholic religious 
education) compare with those in other domains?  
(c) How do religious and values education teachers differ, if at all, in their 
epistemologies in comparison to their colleagues in the other subjects—
particularly in value judgements and religious beliefs?22 
 
The expected result is that teachers in Philippine Catholic schools, in 
general—and religious education teachers in particular—would tend to exhibit 
absolutist epistemologies in the domains of religious beliefs and value 
                                            
21  As discussed in the previous section, a perspectivist and evaluativist (‘evaluativist) 
epistemology is considered more advanced than a merely perspectivist one (‘multiplist’) or a non-
perspectivist one (‘absolutist’) (Kuhn et al., 2000). 
 
22 Two other questions that the data can answer but are beyond the scope of the present study 
are: (a) Do the variables age, gender, teaching experience, and grade level taught have any 
impact on teacher epistemologies?  Is there a significant relationship between these variables 
and their epistemological understandings? (ii) Do the patterns of epistemological understanding 
support Kuhn et al.'s (2000) hypothesized and predicted pattern in terms of age?   
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judgements, which are the two domains relevant to Catholic religious education. 
This predicted preponderance of absolutist epistemology in these domains is 
based on the hypothesis that the dependence on authoritative teachings 
characteristic of confessional Catholic religious education may have the 
unintended consequence of impeding the epistemic development required for the 
practice of both religious and moral critical thinking. 
Moreover, if religious educators manifest epistemologies that are less 
perspectivist and evaluativist than their colleagues—particularly in these two 
domains—then such a finding could help define the problem involved in the 
promotion and practice of critical thinking in Catholic religious education.  
The value and impact of teacher epistemologies 
 
A study of teacher epistemologies is important because they shape their 
students’ epistemic development, which in turn are important determinants of 
their own learning and performance (Chan & Elliott, 2000; Kuhn et al. 2000; 
Ryan, 1984; Schommer, 1994). Teaching strategies have underlying 
epistemological assumptions that are unwittingly communicated to 
students.  Investigating epistemological differences among students in different 
fields of study, Jehng et al. (1993) described epistemological development as a 
process of enculturation, where the surrounding culture in a particular discipline 
influences individual epistemological beliefs. 
Investigating the impact of students’ epistemological beliefs on their 
performance, Schommer (1990, 1993) conducted separate studies of college and 
secondary students and cited four ways in which personal epistemologies 
influence learning—specifically, in terms of students’ engagement, persistence in 
difficult tasks, comprehension of academic texts, and manner of dealing with ill-
structured questions (Schommer, 1994).   
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As mediators of this instructional environment, teachers send subtle 
epistemological messages to their students about what knowledge consists of 
and what procedures we ought to follow to obtain and assess knowledge 
(Schommer, 1994; Brownlee, 2004).  While some teachers have been observed 
to make deliberate use of particular types of instruction and assessment to foster 
more sophisticated epistemological beliefs in their class, other teachers 
unconsciously promote more naïve epistemological beliefs that are not helpful 
and even detrimental to critical thinking and student learning (Schommer, 1998). 
The home and especially formal education have both been identified as 
playing key roles in inculcating disabling epistemological beliefs—i.e., 
assumptions about knowledge that do not promote learning.  Evidence has 
pointed to students’ ‘self-defeating’ epistemological beliefs as one reason why 
students fail to integrate information and monitor their comprehension 
(Schommer 1990; 1994).  Based on anecdotal evidence, many of these beliefs 
that hamper learning are obtained in high school (Schoenfeld, 1983). 
An investigation into teacher epistemologies, therefore, is valuable 
because of their crucial impact on students’ learning and epistemic development. 
The research design 
 
The section on research design has two parts: (a) a description of the 
research participants and the process of their recruitment, and (b) the generation 
of data.  
Research participants 
 
Teachers from seven primary schools and eight secondary religious 
schools in the Philippines were invited to participate in this project.  The schools, 
which are located in different parts of the country, all belong to a network owned 
and managed by a Catholic religious congregation. They have been selected 
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because these are the schools that I collaborate with in my professional practice, 
and for whom the results of this study are primarily—but by no means 
exclusively—intended.   
Two primary schools and two secondary schools are located in Metro 
Manila, the National Capital Region; one secondary school in Southern Luzon. 
Two primary schools and two secondary schools are in the Visayas, and three 
primary schools and three secondary schools are found in Mindanao (Table 7).  
While all schools are from the same religious congregation, the schools vary in 
terms of the size and demographic profile of the student population and the 
tuition fees that they charge. 
Table 7: Location of participating schools 
Regions Primary schools Secondary schools TOTAL 
Metro Manila (NCR) 2 2 4 
South Luzon 0 1 1 
Visayas 2 2 4 
Mindanao 3 3 6 
TOTAL 7 8 15 
 
Recruitment of participants 
 
A letter of request, which explained the goals and nature of the research, 
was sent to the school principals, along with an information sheet and an 
informed consent form to be signed on behalf of their organizations. The school 
leaders were duly informed of the rights and procedures that concerned them, the 
school, and the participating teachers. They were also invited to relay any 
question that they might have. If they agreed to the provisions in writing, they 
were asked to set the date of the administration of the survey. 
The administrators of the participating schools were requested to invite 
their teachers to take part in the survey, and to assure them that participation 
would be strictly voluntary and would not be used for their performance 
evaluation. For the sake of true and informed consent, participation was strictly 
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voluntary, and the informants’ responses were kept confidential and anonymous. 
The school leadership was not furnished the names of those who participated in 
the study.   
Out of seven primary schools, six agreed to participate in the study, while 
all eight secondary schools accepted the invitation (Table 8). While the one 
primary school that did not participate in the survey (School 1A) due to 
scheduling difficulties has the largest teacher population (a total of 233 compared 
to 192 in the school with the second largest number of teachers), there is no 
reason to believe that their failure to participate has biased the results since 
School  1A  is  considered similar  to  School 1B  in terms  of  urban  location  and 
annual fees. 
Table 8: Selection table 
School 
Code1 
City 
Population 
Student 
Population 
 
Annual 
fees  
in PhP 
Annual 
fees  
in GBP2 
Total 
participants 
Total  
teachers 
% of 
participants 
1A3 11.8M 4,199 75,346 1044.01 0 233 0% 
1B 11.6M 2,982 73,390 1016.90 165 191 86% 
1C 1.4M 3,583 28,364 393.02 132 192 69% 
1D 0.87M 1,453 32,945 456.49 60 70 86% 
1E  0.81M 1,592 21,876 303.12 61 66 92% 
1F 0.60M 2,702 20,768 287.76 79 103 77% 
1G 0.42M 506 29,549 409.44 29 30 97% 
        
2A 11.8M 2,299 83,104 1150.50 113 141 80% 
2B 11.8M 1,066 69,243 959.44 94 101 93% 
2C 1.4M 2,030 
 
36,727 508.90 120 134 90% 
2D 0.87M 1,108 42,535 589.37 57 66 86% 
2E 0.81M 1,087 26,538 367.72 52 56 93% 
2F 0.60M 1,747 25,111 347.94 73 93 78% 
2G 0.42M 676 29,549 409.44 28 29 97% 
2H 0.17M 1,352 28,057 388.76 64 70 91% 
  28,382   1,127 1,575 72% 
Less     594   
Total     1,068  68% 
1Schools were assigned codes based on city and student populations, and identified as primary 
(1) or secondary (2) schools. 
2Foreign exchange rate: 1 GBP = 72.17 PhP 
3 This is the school that did not participate in the survey due to scheduling difficulty. 
4 This number pertains to the Mainland Chinese teachers who did accomplish the survey, but 
were excluded from the data analysis due to their limited English proficiency.  
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The survey was administered in separate sites on different dates 
designated by each school. The respondents were given a maximum of one hour 
to complete the survey. Those who completed the survey ahead of time 
were instructed to review their responses and to check if all items had been 
answered. The last item in the survey inquired whether or not the respondents 
would agree to take part in a follow-up interview, if deemed necessary. To signify 
their willingness, they were requested for their names and contact information. Of 
all respondents, 41% (or 444) agreed to the interview, while the remaining 58% 
(or 624) declined. 
 
Demographic profile  
 
Out of the 1,341 teachers in the participating schools, 1127—or 84%—
participated in the survey. The 16% who did not participate were either absent for 
various reasons on the day of the administration, or had not volunteered to join 
the survey. Of those who participated, 59 were Chinese language teachers who 
had been recruited from Mainland China and possessed limited English language 
proficiency, so their responses were later excluded from the study. The remaining 
1,068 (80%) constituted the final sample for the study. 
In the survey, the respondents were requested to tick one of the following 
categories for their age: (a) 25 years old and below, (b) 26 to 30 years old, (c) 31 
to 35 years old, (d) 35 to 40 years old, (e) 41 to 50 years old, (f) 51 to 55 years 
old, (g) 56 to 60 years old, and (h) Above 60 years old.23  To classify the 
respondents according to professional experience, the following four categories 
were used: (a) novice teachers (three years of teaching and below), (b) junior 
                                            
23 The categories for age and teaching experience used to classify the respondents are based on 
the official classifications used in the schools. 
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teacher (four to ten years of teaching), (c) senior teachers (11 to 20 years), and 
(d) veteran teachers (more than 20 years of teaching experience)24. 
Table 9: Demographic profile of respondents 
 Number Percent 
Age 25 years old and below 195 18% 
 26 to 30 years old 304 29% 
 31 to 35 years old 181 17% 
 36 to 40 years old 139 13% 
 41 to 45 years old 86 8% 
 46 to 50 years old 59 6% 
 51 to 55 years old 44 4% 
 56 to 60 years old 46 4% 
 Above 60 years old 10 1% 
 No answer 4 .004% 
 Total 1068 100% 
Gender Male 322 30% 
 Female 736 69% 
 No answer 10 1% 
 Total 1068 100% 
Educational level taught Primary school 492 46% 
 Secondary school 576 54% 
 Total 1068 100% 
Teaching experience Novice (1 to 3 years) 196 18% 
 Junior (4 to 10 years) 393 37% 
 Senior (11 to 20 years) 279 26% 
 Veteran (more than 20 
years) 
175 16% 
 No answer 25 2% 
 Total 1068 100% 
Discipline taughta Hard 330 31% 
 Soft 516 48% 
 Religious Values 
Education 
104 10% 
 Non-teaching 118 10% 
 Total 1068 100% 
a Hard disciplines include science, Math, and Computer Education, while the rest were considered 
soft, such as English, Filipino, Social Sciences, etc. Religious and Values Education was 
categorized separately. 
 
The ages of the 1,068 teacher respondents ranged from 19 to 68 years old. 
It is a relatively young workforce, with almost half of them below 30 years of age 
(47%), about a third between 31 to 40 years old (30%).  Very few were in their 
50s (8.4%) and 60's (0.9%) (Table 9). Such an age distribution was expected of 
the sample due to the observed increase in turnover among teachers in the 
                                            
24 A separate category was used for those with three years of experience and below because as 
per the schools’ policy, these teachers were still considered under probation. 
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Philippines in general in the last two decades, source as supported by their 
profile in terms of teaching experience, where more than half of the respondents 
have taught for only ten years or less (18% novice teachers with only one to three 
years of experience; and 37% with four to ten years).  About one-fourth have 
taught for 11 to 20 years (26%), but only 16% are considered veteran teachers 
with more than 20 years of teaching experience.  
Of the total respondents, 46% (or 492) were primary school teachers, 
while 54% (or 576) taught in the secondary school. Among the respondents, 30% 
(or 322) were male teachers, while the majority (69% or 736) were female, a 
distribution that accurately represents the teaching profession in the Philippines, 
which is dominated by female teachers.  
Special characteristics of the sample 
 
As a result of the Philippine educational system, the respondents were 
bilingual in English and Filipino. Given the English proficiency requirement for 
employment in these schools (a requirement imposed on all except for the 59 
Chinese language teachers hired from Mainland China), all the teachers were 
assumed to be adequately proficient in English.  The questionnaires were 
administered in English and not translated into Filipino.  Since Bernardo (2008) 
found in his study of epistemological beliefs of Filipino pre-service teachers that 
results did not differ whether the instrument was in English or Filipino, the present 
study has opted not to develop a Filipino version of the survey. 
As a matter of policy in Catholic schools in the Philippines, students of all 
grade levels are required to take Catholic religious education classes and are, 
along with their teachers, expected to attend occasional Catholic religious 
services. In practice, the teachers undergo regular spiritual retreats and values 
formation seminars as part of their in-service training.  
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Data generation 
  
The empirical study involved the administration of a survey questionnaire 
adapted from an instrument designed by Kuhn and colleagues (2000) to 
determine the epistemic level of development (‘epistemological understanding’) of 
respondents in five different judgement domains. The survey provided the 
respondents with 15 cases of two fictional characters disagreeing on issues from 
the fields of art, morality, social sciences, physical sciences, and religion.  
Their responses were used to determine their epistemic cognition for the 
following five domains: (a) aesthetic judgements, (b) value judgements, and (c) 
truth judgements about the social world, (d) the physical world, and (e) religious 
beliefs (cf. Appendix for survey questionnaire). 
The epistemologies per domain were classified as: 
(a) Absolutist (non-perspectivist): There is only one possibly correct view; 
(b) Multiplist (perspectivist, non-evaluativist): There are several equally 
correct views;  
(c) Evaluativist (perspectivist and evaluativist): There are several possibly 
correct views, but one view can be determined as more correct than 
the others.  
For every item, the respondent was presented with a pair of contrasting 
claims attributed to two fictional characters, Juan and Pablo, and belonging to a 
specific judgement domain. Following each pair of statements were two 
questions. The first question was: ‘Can only one of their views be right, or could 
both have some rightness?’ The two possible response options were: (a) ‘Only 
one of the views is right’, or (b) ‘Both views can be right to some degree’. 
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Selecting the first option was interpreted as indicating an absolutist level of 
epistemic cognition. If the second option was chosen, the respondent was further 
asked a second question: ‘If your answer is (b): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other?’ with two possible responses: (a) ‘Yes, one view can be 
more right than the other’, or (b) ‘No, one view cannot be more right than the 
other’. The respondent’s epistemic cognition was classified as evaluativist if the 
first option was picked and multiplist if the second option was selected.25  
Five judgement domains were included in this study: (a) aesthetic 
judgements (judgements about art); (b) value judgements (judgements about 
moral issues); (c) truth judgements about the social world; (d) truth judgements 
about the physical world; and (e) truth judgements about religious beliefs (Table 
10).26 For a given judgement domain, a participant was categorized as having an 
absolutist, multiplist, or evaluativist level of epistemic cognition if responses to 
two of the three items assessing that judgement domain conformed to the pattern 
characterizing that level. In cases where no pattern was discernible—e.g., when 
all three patterns appeared across the three items, the multiplist level was 
assigned, as per the practice of the instrument designers (Kuhn, et al., 2000). 
Presentation and analysis of data 
 
Two statistical analyses were conducted: (a) a test of proportion to 
determine any significant differences of epistemologies across judgement 
domains; and (b) a Chi-square test to identify the impact, if any, of the type of 
                                            
25 Note that what was solicited was not which specific view the respondents agree with, but their 
views on whether there was only one possibly correct view (absolutist), several equally correct 
views (multipist), or one more correct than several possibly correct views (evaluativist). 
26 The original instrument included the judgement domain was ‘personal taste’, which Kuhn et al. 
(2000) did not analyze. Given the purpose of this study, it has been replaced here with ‘religious 
beliefs’. 
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discipline taught by the teachers on their epistemologies in the different 
judgement domains, with a special focus on religious education teachers. 
Teacher epistemologies per judgement domain 
 
The findings revealed differences in the distribution of epistemologies in 
the five judgement domains, providing empirical support for the theorized 
domain-specificity of epistemic cognition. Since the teachers surveyed 
manifested different epistemologies across domains, beliefs about knowledge 
and knowing may vary from one judgement domain to another, and develop in a 
domain-specific manner. 
Table 10: Assessment items by judgement domain 
Item no. Judgement domain 
Aesthetic judgements 
3 Jose thinks that the first piece of music they listened to is better. 
Pablo thinks the second piece of music they listened to is better. 
7 Jose thinks the first book they both read is better. 
Pablo thinks the second book they both read is better. 
10 Jose thinks the first painting they looked at is beautiful. 
Pablo thinks the second painting they looked at is beautiful. 
Value judgements 
6 Jose thinks lying is wrong. 
Pablo thinks lying is permissible in certain situations. 
9 Jose thinks people should take responsibility for themselves. 
Pablo thinks people should work together to take care of each other. 
11 Jose thinks the government should limit the number of children families are allowed to have to 
keep the population from getting too big. 
Pablo thinks families should have as many children as possible. 
Truth judgements about the social world 
4 Jose has one view of why criminals keep going back to crime. 
Pablo has a different view of why criminals keep going back to crime. 
8 Jose agrees with one book’s explanation of how children learn language. 
Pablo agrees with another book’s explanation of how children learn language. 
12 Jose thinks one books’ explanation of why World War II began is right. 
Pablo thinks another book’s explanation of why World War II began is right. 
Truth judgements about the physical world 
1 Jose believes that one mathematician’s proof of the math formula is right. 
Pablo believes that another mathematician’s proof of the math formula is right. 
5 Jose accepts one book’s explanation of how the brain works. 
Pablo believes another view of how the brain works. 
14 Jose believes one book’s explanation of what atoms are made up of. 
Pablo believes another book’s explanation of what atoms are made up of. 
Religious beliefs 
2 Jose believes that the universe was created by a Supernatural Being or Power. 
Pablo believes that the universe was created out of a purely natural process. 
13 Jose believes in life after death. 
Pablo believes that everything ends in death. 
15 Jose believes that God exists. 
Pablo doesn’t believe that God exists. 
Adapted from Kuhn et al. (2000) 
 
 84 
To determine significant differences in the incidence of epistemologies 
across domains, testing of proportions (p-test) was conducted (p<.05). An 
analysis of the incidence of the different epistemic cognitions per judgement 
domain reveals some significant as well as unexpected patterns. 
As shown in Table 11, these teachers exhibited a degree of 
epistemological sophistication in truth judgements about the social world and the 
physical world. In both domains, the incidences of teachers exhibiting an 
evaluativist epistemology are significantly higher than those with an absolutist or 
multiplist epistemology: 53% evaluativist for social world (vs. 7% absolutist and 
40% multiplist) and 57% for physical world (vs. 15% absolutist and 28% 
multiplist). 
Table 11: Epistemic cognition per judgement domain 
 Absolutist Multiplist Evaluativist TOTAL 
 a b c  
Aesthetic 
judgements 
31 625 405 1061 
3% 59% 38% 100% 
<b <c >a >c >a <b  
Value judgements 313 361 387 1061 
29% 34% 36% 100% 
<b <c >a >a  
Truth judgements  
about the social 
world 
74 422 566 1062 
7% 40% 53% 100% 
<b <c >a <c >a >b  
Truth judgements 
about the physical 
world 
158 299 603 1060 
15% 28% 57% 100% 
<b <c >a <c >a >b  
Religious beliefs 599 253 212 1064 
56% 24% 20% 100% 
>b >c <a >c <a <b  
> Significantly higher proportion at 95% confidence level 
< Significantly lower proportion at 95% confidence level 
A significantly high percentage of respondents manifested a multiplist 
epistemology in aesthetic judgements: 59% in comparison to 38% evaluativist 
and 3% absolutist. This finding is understandable given the common, albeit 
contested notion that appraisals of beauty are not only largely subjective but are 
also all equally valid. While the incidence of evaluativists did not post the highest 
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in aesthetic epistemology, a multiplist epistemology already indicates a shift to a 
perspectival notion of knowledge. 
Such is also the case in the domain of value judgements, where there is a 
statistically equal incidence of evaluativists (36%) and multiplists (34%). The 
relatively low percentage of moral absolutists (29%) is unexpected given the 
strong Catholic opposition to moral relativism. All the schools that participated in 
the survey are Catholic, and prioritize the hiring of staff that profess to be 
Catholic. 
Though expected, the most revealing result is the incidence of absolutist 
epistemology in religious beliefs. While it consistently registered as lowest in all 
other domains, it was significantly high in religious beliefs: 56% compared to 24% 
multiplist and 20% evaluativist. Teachers in the participating schools tend to 
exhibit more sophisticated perspectivist epistemic cognitions in all domains 
except religious beliefs,  raising questions about possible reasons for this 
difference in epistemic development.  
Teacher epistemologies and discipline taught 
 
The profile of epistemic cognition was analyzed according to academic 
discipline.27 The subjects were classified into three categories:  
(a) Soft disciplines: English, Filipino, Chinese, Social Science; 
(b) Hard disciplines: Science, Math, and Computer Technology; and 
(c) Religious and values education.28 
Table 12 below shows the number and percentage of respondents under each 
category: 
 
 
                                            
27 The data were also analyzed in relation to (a) gender; (b) age, (c) teaching experience, (d) 
grade level taught, and (e) subject taught, but this analysis is not within the scope of the present 
study. 
 
28 Although strictly speaking, religious and values education is considered a soft discipline, given 
the specific interest of this study, a separate category was created. 
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Table 12: Number and percentage of respondents per type of discipline 
 Number of respondents Percentage of 
respondents 
Soft discipline 516 48% 
Hard discipline 330 31% 
Religious and values education 104 10% 
Others 118 11% 
Total 1,068 100% 
 
The Chi Square test for independence was conducted to find evidence of 
possible associations of teacher epistemologies with the type of discipline taught, 
with a post-hoc test the critical value at p<.05 to specify what may account for the 
difference. 
Among the five judgement domains, only the domain of religious beliefs 
manifested evidence of an association between teacher epistemologies and the 
nature of the teachers’ discipline—i.e., whether hard, soft, or specifically religious 
and values education (Table 13). In terms of the other judgement domains, 
therefore, epistemic cognition seems to be independent of the teachers’ 
disciplines. The domain for religious beliefs, on the other hand, yielded significant 
results: χ2 = 13.287, df = 4, p<.01, suggesting a possible relationship between 
teacher epistemologies and the academic discipline. 
Table 13: Summary of findings: Teacher epistemologies and type of discipline 
Judgement domains Result Chi Square value 
Truth judgements (Social world) Not significant  
Truth judgements (Physical world) Not significant  
Value judgements Not significant  
Aesthetic judgement Not significant  
Religious beliefs Significant χ2 = 13.287, df = 4 (p<.01) 
 
Based on the z-test and computation of the standardized residual, there 
are significantly more religious absolutists among religious and values education 
teachers (72%) in comparison with teachers in the hard and soft disciplines 
(Table 14). The significant standardized residual of +2.1 indicates that absolutists 
are substantially over-represented among these teachers, confirming the initial 
hypothesis that in comparison to teachers of other disciplines, religious and 
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values educators tend to exhibit non-perspectivist as well as non-evaluativist 
epistemic cognitions in the domain of religious beliefs.  
Although their standard residuals were not significant, there were also less 
multiplists (14%) among religious and values education teachers in the domain of 
religious beliefs relative to teachers of both hard and soft disciplines, and less 
evaluatists compared to teachers teaching the soft disciplines.  
Table 14: Epistemic cognition per discipline taught 
  SOFT HARD RVE TOTAL 
ABSOLUTIST Count 276a 187a 75b 538 
 %  53.5% 56.7% 72.1% 56.6% 
 Std. Residual -.9 .0 +2.11  
MULTIPLIST Count 125a 82a 15b 222 
 %  24.2% 24.8% 14.4% 23.4% 
 Std. Residual .4 .6 -1.9  
EVALUATIVIST Count 115a 61a, b 14b 190 
 %  22.3% 18.5% 13.5% 20.0% 
 Std. Residual 1.2 -.6 -1.5  
TOTAL Count 516 330 104 950 
 %  100% 100% 100% 100% 
1 Significant standard residual vs. the critical value at p<.05 
 
These test results show that among the teachers surveyed, there is a 
significantly higher percentage of religious and values education teachers who, in 
comparison with the teachers who taught in the other disciplines, exhibit an 
absolutist epistemology in the domain of religious beliefs. 
Discussion of findings and implications 
 
The main findings of this diagnostic survey are as follows:  
 
• There are notable differences in teacher epistemologies across judgement 
domains, providing confirmation for the theory of the domain-dependence of 
epistemic development. 
• There is a high incidence of perspectivist epistemologies (multiplist or 
evaluativist) among the teachers in all the judgement domains with the sole 
exception of religious beliefs, as hypothesized. The implication is that teacher 
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epistemologies tend to be more sophisticated in the other domains, 
including—contrary to the initial hypothesis—value judgements.  
• There is a remarkably higher percentage of evaluativist epistemology in truth 
judgements about the physical world and the social world, indicating that most 
teachers have reached the most advanced level of epistemic development in 
natural and social sciences.  
• Contrary to the initial hypothesis, there is a strikingly low percentage of moral 
absolutists in the domain of value judgements, with about the same incidence 
of evaluativists and multiplists. This unexpected finding implies a distinction 
between the domain of value judgements and that of religious beliefs even if 
they are both taught in Catholic religious education.  
• There is a higher incidence of absolutist epistemology among the teachers in 
religious beliefs, which, in the hierarchy of epistemic cognitions, belongs to 
the most basic level. Despite more sophisticated teacher epistemologies 
prevailing in other domains—including value judgements, there remains a 
higher incidence of absolutist epistemology among the teachers in religious 
beliefs, exhibiting what is considered the least developed epistemology.  
• A conspicuously higher percentage of religious and values education teachers 
remains absolutist in the domain of religious beliefs. 29  In confirming my 
hypothesis, this finding, along with the previous one, calls attention to possible 
causes for this relatively retarded development of religious epistemology 
among teachers, such as the focus on Church authority in Catholicism, or 
more specifically, Catholic religious education, as well as about its effect on 
students and the practice of critical thinking in the classroom. 
                                            
29 Significantly, the epistemic cognitions in other domains of these religious educators exhibit no 
difference from their colleagues, indicating that they are no less sophisticated in domains other 
than religious beliefs. 
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I will focus my discussion of the implications on the following: (a) the domain-
dependence of epistemologies; (b) the distinction between the domains of value 
judgements and religious beliefs; and (c) the prevalence of an absolutist 
epistemic cognition in religious beliefs among religious and values education 
teachers.  
Domain dependence of epistemic development 
 
The different epistemic levels that teachers manifest across the five 
judgement domains confirm the view that epistemic development is domain-
specific (Kuhn, 2000; 2005). They also imply that the five judgement domains 
investigated in the survey are distinct epistemic domains. 
Worth noting in the profile of this specific sample of teachers is their 
relatively advanced epistemic cognition: in aesthetic judgements and value 
judgements, where a significant percentage are multiplist; and truth judgements 
about the physical world and the social world, where more than half have attained 
the evaluativist level of epistemic cognition.  
For most of the respondents in the survey, the perspectivist shift has 
occurred in every domain except religious beliefs. A further evaluativist shift has 
occurred for most teachers in the domains of the social world and the physical 
world. This reassertion of the objective aspect of knowing in the sciences has not 
occurred in aesthetic judgements or value judgements. 
The teachers’ relative epistemic sophistication in these domains has 
implications on the practice and the teaching of critical thinking in the classroom. 
Given a predominantly evaluativist epistemology, critical thinking in the natural 
sciences and social sciences is most likely encouraged and valued. In contrast, in 
the domains where the multiplist epistemology prevails, namely, in aesthetic 
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judgements and—disturbingly—in value judgements, there would be no point to 
critical thinking. 
Distinction between value judgement and religious beliefs 
 
Of particular interest to this study is the distinction between the domains of 
value judgements and religious beliefs, both taught in Catholic religious education 
classes. The pre-study expectation was that as a function of the Catholic faith, 
teachers would exhibit the same absolutist level of epistemic cognition for these 
two domains. However, while as expected, absolutists among the teachers were 
the majority in religious beliefs, there were, contrary to expectations, less 
absolutists than both multiplists and evaluativists in value judgements. These 
findings imply that an epistemological distinction between value judgements and 
religious beliefs that impacts the practice of critical thinking in these domains. 
Judgements about religious beliefs seem to belong to an epistemic domain 
distinct from that of value judgements, a distinct religious epistemology with its 
own theory for the justification and truth of religious beliefs and the corresponding 
rationality of action based on religious beliefs. 
The unexpected teacher epistemic profile in the domain of value 
judgements—a higher number of evaluativists and particularly multiplists than 
absolutists—raises interesting questions about teachers’ moral epistemology 
because of the Catholic Church’s condemnation of moral relativism. 
Absolutist epistemology in religious beliefs    
 
A little over half the teachers in Catholic schools—and more starkly, 
almost ¾ of religious and values education teachers—exhibit an absolutist level 
of epistemic cognition in religious beliefs, indicating that not even the first 
perspectivist shift has occurred in their epistemic development in this particular 
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domain. The predominantly absolutist religious epistemologies of teachers in 
general—and even more crucially, of religious and values education teachers in 
particular—provide an initial diagnosis of the problem of critical thinking in 
Catholic religious education. Could one of the factors impeding the practice and 
promotion of religious critical thinking be the fairly underdeveloped epistemic 
cognition of religious educators?  
The results of this empirical study will be used as the springboard for a 
critical realist analysis of critical thinking. Drawing from critical realism in the next 
chapter, I will argue that critical thinking needs to be anchored in an explicit 
ontology and epistemology in order for both teachers and students to appreciate 
what makes it possible and valuable in the first place.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
A CRITICAL REALIST ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL THINKING 
 
In the previous chapter, adopting a normative and epistemological account 
of critical thinking, I hypothesized that epistemic cognition is key to understanding 
the problem of Catholic religious critical thinking in our schools. An empirical 
investigation of teacher epistemologies revealed a significant prevalence of an 
epistemology in the domain of religious beliefs that is not compatible with critical 
thinking. In this chapter, I will draw from critical realism to further analyze these 
findings.  
I will first summarize what I consider the foundational insights of critical 
realism and how they refute contemporary philosophies that could undermine 
Christian truth claims. By exposing the internal inconsistencies and contradictions 
of these counter-Christian philosophies, critical realism ‘clears the ground’ and 
serves as an appropriate under-labouring philosophy for Catholic Christianity.  
A critical realist analysis of critical thinking will follow, using the triad of 
ontological realism, epistemic relativism, and judgemental rationality. I will 
propose a conception of critical thinking as the expression of one’s commitment 
to judgemental rationality—i.e., the belief in the possibility and necessity of 
rationally choosing from among competing claims despite the limits of our 
knowing. Such a conception enables us to analyze a given epistemology in terms 
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of two underlying principles: ontological realism (the belief that reality exists 
independently of our knowing), which makes judgemental rationality possible, 
and epistemic relativism (the recognition that knowing is finite and fallible, which 
renders judgemental rationality necessary. The three levels of epistemic cognition 
and their impact on critical thinking, introduced in the previous chapter, can be 
differentiated in terms of these critical realist concepts. 
WHAT CRITICAL REALISM DOES AS UNDER-LABOURER 
 
As an account of the sciences, critical realism focuses its task on 
analyzing the conditions for the possibility of scientific activities and identifying 
the features of the world that make science possible and intelligible. As under-
labourer, it has appropriately left the specific definition of the structures of that 
world to substantive scientific investigation (RTS).30 
Likewise, to play its under-labouring role in the present study, critical 
realism will limit itself to the task of ‘removing the rubbish’ by refuting what may 
be considered contemporary counter-Christian philosophies. By no means does 
critical realism aspire to conduct substantive theological investigation. In the 
succeeding chapter, however, I will show how critical realism, while refraining 
from making such claims itself, can play the occasional midwife (RR, p. 182) by 
offering fresh perspectives—particularly, by interpreting the Catholic doctrine of 
revelation and demonstrating the philosophical plausibility of the religious 
epistemology emerging from it.31  
THE FOUR CORE INSIGHTS OF CRITICAL REALISM 
 
The four central tenets of critical realism are the following: 
                                            
30 See list of abbreviations for often-cited sources in critical realism. 
 
31 Cf. Wilkinson’s (2013, 2015) work on Islamic critical realism.  
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• the anti-modernist/postmodernist assertion of intransitivity 
• the anti-positivist notion of depth stratification 
• the anti-determinist theory of open-system causality 
• the anti-reductionist idea of ontological emergence 
Each one identifies a distinct feature of reality and serves as the basis for a 
fifth insight: the anti-relativist commitment to judgemental rationality, which I will 
discuss in the following chapter for a critical realist analysis of critical thinking. 
Insight 1: The anti-modernist/postmodernist assertion                                     
 
of existential intransitivity 
 
A defining characteristic of critical realism is its non-negotiable insistence 
on the intransitivity of reality, where intransitivity means that reality exists 
independently of human knowing and agency. Intransitivity applies not only to the 
natural world, but also to the social world: Although by no means exhausted by it, 
social reality includes conceptual reality—a reality produced by and therefore, 
dependent on the human mind. Yet social objects nevertheless exist as distinct 
referents that are relatively autonomous of their investigation (Al-Amoudi et al., 
2011).32  
According to the concept of intransitivity, the world that we strive to 
know—whether in science or any other field of knowledge—abides autonomously 
of our knowing. It is this fundamental insight into the intransitivity of the world that 
enables critical realism, contra empiricism and idealism, to reinstall ontology in its 
rightful place as prior to any epistemology. 
                                            
32 This concept-dependency of social reality is a limit on naturalism that distinguishes the social 
sciences from natural science and qualifies the concept of intransitivity when applied to social 
reality: While a social object is both socially defined and socially produced (e.g., epistemological 
beliefs), it remains existentially intransitive because once produced, it becomes an autonomous 
referent, not simply dependent on the agent or act investigating it. However, its causal 
intransitivity is relatively limited given its internal relationality and causal interdependency with the 
science that investigates it (Bhaskar, 1998, The possibility of naturalism; henceforth, PN).  
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The transcendental analysis of sense perception  
Positing this existential independence of reality is a necessary condition 
for the most fundamental activity of the empirical sciences—namely, observation 
through sense perception. It makes no sense to speak of observation or 
perception if the world were entirely a human fabrication. We perceive the same 
object in different ways at different times and places. If we are to make sense of 
the changes and errors in our perception of the objects in the world, the objects 
of our perception must exist autonomously of our perceiving—or of any human 
agency, for that matter (RTS). 
Without their ontological distinction from our act of perceiving, the objects 
of perception are in danger of being reduced to mere mental products. Without 
the intransitivity of reality, perception would be meaningless, and experience itself 
epistemically insignificant. The intelligibility of sense perception—or of any 
experience—requires that the objects of our perception be intransitive and indeed 
in some sense, intransigent—i.e., neither reducible nor subject to the 
determination of our acts of perception. 
A condition for science 
 
Acknowledging the intransitive nature of the world is a necessary condition 
for the possibility and intelligibility of science and any form of knowing. For 
scientific and other types of knowledge to make sense, objects necessarily have 
to be invariant to our knowledge of them: The objects, structures, and processes 
of the world should endure beyond human knowledge and agency. If reality were 
entirely dependent on the mind, there would be no sense in any form of 
investigation. Intransitivity is, therefore, a condition for the possibility and 
intelligibility of science (RTS). 
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Moreover, this notion of intransitivity also accounts for several other 
aspects vital to the scientific enterprise: scientific change, criticism, and training. 
The self-correction characteristic of the empirical sciences would be unintelligible 
if the objects of their study were dependent on their very processes. Likewise, 
there would be no point to science education and certainly no need for scientific 
training if the world that science scrutinizes is nothing more than its own creation. 
Without an ontology that posits the distinction of the world from human knowing, 
there will remain no criterion for the evaluation of scientific knowledge, no basis 
for its development, and no requirement at all for scientific education and training 
(RTS).  
The transitive dimension of science 
 
Coupled with the intransitive world of science is its essentially transitive 
work. Science has an existing body of knowledge consisting of established facts 
and theories, sets of paradigms and models, and entire arrays of methods and 
techniques available for scientific investigation. These intellectual products 
comprise the transitive dimension of science and are just as indispensable to it as 
its intransitive objects of knowledge (RTS). 
Knowledge also entails social—and, therefore, transitive—production. 
Aside from its obvious dependence on human agency, the process of producing 
scientific and other forms of knowledge is inherently social: Knowledge is 
produced historically and communally, depending on past knowledge in a ‘social 
production of knowledge by means of knowledge (or knowledge-like 
antecedents)' (RTS, p. 176). In contrast to the naïve ‘clean-slate approach’ that 
originated with the Enlightenment, by no means, therefore, does scientific 
knowledge—or any knowledge, for that matter—materialize ex nihilo or tabula 
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rasa. Rather, the production of scientific knowledge requires the transitive objects 
of science as material cause—i.e., the antecedent theories, facts, models, etc. 
that are either reproduced or transformed in the social activity of science (RTS). 
The intransitive character of reality needs to be distinguished from the 
transitive process of knowing, so that its intransitive objects are not reduced to 
the transitive objects of knowledge generated by that process. To reinstall 
ontology in its rightful place, aside from their distinction, the intransitive dimension 
also needs to be prioritized over the transitive. The failure to establish this priority 
of the intransitive has led to what critical realism calls the ‘epistemic fallacy’ 
(RTS). 
The epistemic fallacy: Against modernism/postmodernism 
 
The epistemic fallacy is the tendency to reduce reality into our knowledge 
of it, and to conflate ontology and epistemology (Bhaskar, 2010). The fallacy 
stems from the mistaken supposition that knowledge is prior to being in logic and 
time, and that our means of knowing the world defines the world (RTS). 
Articulating the intransitive and transitive dimensions of science exposes 
this anthropocentric tendency of the classical philosophies of science to confuse 
the ontological order with the epistemic order. As a result, such ontological 
questions as ‘Does something exist? What sort of thing is it that exists?’ morph 
into their epistemological versions: ‘Can we know that it exists? How can we 
know about its nature?’ In the process, the intransitive dimension of science—the 
independent realm of real entities and processes in the world—collapses into the 
transitive (RTS; SRHE). 
Preserving the distinction between the transitive work of science and the 
intransitive world it studies, and insisting on the precedence of ontology over 
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epistemology are the best preventive measures for us from lapsing into the 
epistemic fallacy and the anthropocentricity that is its root.  
Insight 2: The anti-positivist notion of depth stratification  
 
The world that critical realism infers from its transcendental analysis of 
experimental activity is characterized by depth. In contrast to the empirical realist 
vision, the critical realist world is far from exclusively empirical. The intransitivity 
established by Bhaskar’s analysis of perception is now, through his analysis of 
experimental activity, revealed as structured. 
The transcendental analysis of experimental activity 
 
As in the case of perception and experience in general, experimental 
activity would be pointless were the world not intransitive. If the objects of 
experimentation were not autonomous of human agency (perception and 
causation), experimental activity would lose its rationale altogether. Unlike 
observation, however, the goal of experimental activity includes not just the 
description of phenomena, but also its explanation. 
In performing an experiment, the scientist creates a desired sequence of 
events in order to discover causal laws that account for the phenomenon under 
investigation. This conjunction of events has been detected in the world and 
interpreted not to indicate causality, as Humean empiricism assumes, but to 
signify a possible causal law. To verify this, the scientist designs an artificial 
environment in the laboratory in order to produce the phenomenon to be 
investigated (‘experimental production’), and to ‘close’ the system in order to 
isolate factors that normally interfere with—and affect—the phenomenon and to 
prevent them from doing so in the laboratory (‘experimental control’).33  It is 
                                            
33 Reality is here revealed as ‘differentiated’ into artificially closed systems and more prevalent 
spontaneously open systems. This feature of the world as differentiated will be discussed later. 
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through experimental production and control that the causal laws governing a 
given phenomenon become empirically accessible (RTS). 
Contrary to the Humean—and empiricist—notion of causality, causal laws 
are not identical with the constant conjunctions of events. If they were identical, 
scientists who produce the empirical regularities would also be creating the very 
causal laws that they are attempting to discover. Experimental activity is 
intelligible only if we distinguish causal laws from the constant conjunctions of 
events that Humean empiricism reductively identifies with causal laws.  
Hence, while constant conjunctions provide the empirical grounds for 
causal laws, they are by no means identical with them. Causal laws require an 
ontological basis that is independent of the events produced experimentally. For 
critical realism, the basis of causal laws is not the empirical regularity triggered in 
the experiment, but the underlying non-empirical causal structures that are 
distinct from the experimentally generated events. The empirical regularities 
created under experimental conditions enable scientists to discover the 
underlying causal laws, but the causal laws reside in the structures that generate 
and govern the phenomenon under scrutiny. 
A three-tiered stratification of reality 
 
The concept of depth stratification extends our vision of the world beyond 
its empirical tip. As it turns out, our experiences comprise but the tip of the 
iceberg of reality. A distinction between experiences and events has already 
been made in the analysis of perception: Perception is significant in science 
precisely because not every event in the world has been—or can be—
experienced. If all events could be experienced, there would be no reason to 
speak of perception; it would suffice merely to speak of events (RTS). 
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To account for the limits and finitude of perception and human experience, 
we need to acknowledge that the world we experience endures beyond human 
experience and existence. In other words, there must exist a class of unperceived 
(or unperceivable) events. To capture those events that are not necessarily 
experienced, Bhaskar identifies a ‘domain of the actual’ distinct from the ‘domain 
of the empirical’: While the latter is the set of all events that we experience, the 
former encompasses all events in general including those that are, for various 
reasons, not perceived. By explicitly referring to these two domains of reality, 
Bhaskar has already begun sketching the critical realist vision of the world as 
stratified (RTS). 
The analysis of experimental activity, however, identifies a third domain. 
By refusing to define and analyze causal laws as empirical regularities, a further 
distinction is made between the phenomena that we experience and their 
underlying causal structures. This distinction completes the critical realist 
stratification of reality (Table 15): Aside from the surface domain of the empirical 
(the realm of all events accessible to experience), reality is now depicted with two 
additional realms that lie beyond experience, but are no less real: the domain of 
the actual (all events in the world, including those not experienced) and the 
domain of the real (which includes the empirical and actual, but also the 
underlying existing causal mechanisms even when not in operation). 
Table 15: The three domains of reality 
 Domain of the Real Domain of the Actual Domain of the Empirical 
Mechanisms Yes No No 
Events Yes Yes No 
Experiences Yes Yes Yes 
(RTS, p. 47) 
 
What is real is, therefore, irreducible to patterns of events because 
empirical regularities are distinct from their underlying causal laws. By identifying 
the domain of the real as distinct from—and in fact, more significant than—the 
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domains of the actual and the empirical, critical realism has established that 
underlying causal mechanisms remain real even when their powers are not 
exercised or realized (RTS). 
There is, therefore, indeed more to reality than meets the eye: It certainly 
consists of what we experience, but it also includes actual events that may be 
beyond our experience and, even more fundamentally, causes that abide in the 
world even when they produce no outcome (the domain of the real). The critical 
realist idea of depth stratification effectively stretches the horizon of scientific—
and all—investigation to transcend merely empirical events and actual 
phenomena to focus on the real causal powers possessed by underlying 
structures, whether or not they are exercised, and whether or not their outcomes 
are realized or perceived. 
Depth stratification affirms the idea of an intransitive world and the priority 
of ontology over epistemology: Reality is not to be reduced only to what we 
experience or know of it. Our notion of reality should include the non-empirical 
and even non-actual, but no less real, generative mechanisms in the world. 
Critical realism is characterized by a ‘transphenomenality’—subscribing to an 
ontology of depth realism that sees beyond surface phenomena, an ontology that 
acknowledges not only the intransitive character of the world, but also, just as 
importantly, its stratification (Collier, 1994, p. 6). 
The fallacy of the empirical world: Against positivism 
 
The categorical distinctions between experiences, events, and 
mechanisms correct the ‘fallacy of the empirical world’, which effectively reduces 
the three domains of reality into a single empirical domain. Safeguarding the 
distinctions among these three levels of reality prevents us from the danger of 
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positivism, which is to misread the world as primarily or exclusively defined by our 
experience of it.  
In this reductionist concept of the empirical world, the category of 
experience has been mistaken as constituting the world. What results from this 
fallacy is a significant impoverishment of our notion of reality: Excluded from 
reality are all unrealized and unexperienced events, as well as non-empirical 
causal mechanisms that are not in operation. The resulting epistemological 
myopia leads to a denial of the existence of causal powers simply because they 
have not been exercised or have not produced outcomes that can be perceived. 
Reality is thus reduced to perceived reality, and the real is identified with the 
merely empirical (RTS). 
Insight 3: The anti-reductionist idea of emergent stratification 
 
The depth of the world posited by critical realism refers not only to the 
underlying domain of reality beneath experiences and events, but also to a 
hierarchy of causal mechanisms. Not only are there different causes in the world, 
but there also exist different types of causes, each one belonging to a distinct 
stratum of being. Depth stratification also refers to emergent stratification: Reality 
consists of multiple strata of causal mechanisms with varying degrees of 
complexity and properties that are irreducible to one another. 
The number and types of ontological levels vary, but at least four such 
levels are generally accepted: the physical and chemical at the most basic level, 
followed by the biological, the psychological, and the social. The relationship 
across these levels is characterized by rootedness and emergence: A causal 
mechanism belonging to an ontological level of reality is said to be ‘rooted in and 
emergent from’ its lower-order levels. This relationship of rootedness/emergence 
can best be characterized as one of both dependence and irreducibility (RTS). 
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Unilateral dependence 
 
The existence of a particular causal mechanism ontologically presupposes 
the existence of one or two lower-order mechanisms directly below it, so that it 
depends on them for its existence and their laws for its operation. For instance, 
the physical and chemical mechanisms of the brain are a necessary condition for 
the existence of our psychological functions. Furthermore, our mental activities 
are subject to the physical and chemical laws governing the brain. While this 
dependence is usually one of composition—i.e., the more complex entity is 
composed of more basic ones—there are also cases when the dependence is 
more than one way, as in the case of psychological and social mechanisms, 
which presuppose each other (Collier, 1994, pp. 116ff). 
Causal and taxonomic irreducibility 
 
This ontological dependence, however, does not mean that the higher-
order level is completely determined by the lower one. The more complex 
mechanism is said to be ‘emergent from’ the lower-order level precisely because 
its properties are distinct and irreducible to those of the more basic mechanisms; 
its reality is sui generis. While the higher-order level mechanism remains subject 
to the laws of its nature at the lower level, it also follows laws peculiar to its own 
level, so that its behaviors are not completely determined by the lower-order laws 
(RTS). For example, while biological mechanisms are subject to physical and 
chemical laws, their operations are also governed by laws peculiar to the 
biological. 
Moreover, the higher-order level mechanism is capable of acting back on a 
lower-order level mechanism; it can set the boundary conditions for the laws of 
the lower-order level, either enabling or constraining the operations of the lower-
order level mechanisms, thereby changing the course of nature. Even while 
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remaining dependent on the lower-order level for their existence and operations, 
more complex mechanisms can, to a certain extent, determine the conditions 
under which the lower-order laws apply, as illustrated by the capacity of the mind 
to control the body despite its dependence on it. These situations of ‘dual or 
multiple control’ among causal mechanisms have important implications for the 
critical realist notion of causality, which will be discussed in the next section. 
A direct consequence of causal irreducibility is taxonomic irreducibility. 
Less complex mechanisms can account for more complex ones—but only to a 
limited extent. The concepts and principles belonging to a lower-order level 
cannot completely explain more complex mechanisms. For example, concepts 
pertaining to the physical body cannot be used to explain the workings of the 
mind exhaustively. The laws and categories of psychology are taxonomically 
irreducible because biological laws and categories are inadequate in accounting 
for psychological realities. Given this irreducible distinction, each ontological level 
requires an autonomous science that is legitimate entirely in its own right (RTS; 
Collier, 1994). 
In summary, the notion of emergent stratification asserts that lower-order 
causal mechanisms are a condition for the existence and operations of higher-
order mechanisms that are ‘rooted in and emergent from’ them. The higher-order 
mechanisms, however, cannot be reduced to the more basic ones either causally 
or taxonomically because the principles governing the more basic levels cannot 
completely explain or determine the higher-order mechanisms. In this stratified 
hierarchy of reality, each stratum warrants and requires a discrete science (RTS).  
The stratification of the sciences  
 
In the hierarchy of intransitive and causally efficacious mechanisms, each 
ontological level has properties irreducibly distinct enough to require an 
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autonomous science (Danermark, 2001). Given the priority of ontology over 
epistemology, it is the nature of the object under investigation that determines its 
own cognitive possibility and thus defines the science proper to it. Hence, the 
ontological emergence found in reality breeds a parallel emergence among the 
sciences, so that a science dedicated to higher-order entities and processes is 
founded on a lower-order science and is to a certain extent defined by it. 
However, given the irreducibly distinct properties of the objects of its 
investigation, the higher-order level science is legitimate in its own right and 
cannot be supplanted by a more basic science. Psychology, for instance, cannot 
be reduced to biology just as biology cannot be reduced to physics and 
chemistry. The transitive stratification of scientific knowledge reflects—and is 
grounded on—the intransitive stratification of nature (RTS). 
TMSA and SEPM: Against reductionism 
 
The notion of emergent stratification is a roadblock to contemporary 
reductionist tendencies to explain the nature of complex objects, structures, 
events, or actions in terms of simpler and more fundamental things in a way that 
diminishes their causal and ontological status. 34  According to reductionism, 
complex entities, despite their appearances, have no causal efficacy of their 
own.35 They have no sui generis reality: The two entities cannot occupy the same 
place without being identical or one not becoming simply a part of the other 
(RTS).    
                                            
34 Reductionism here specifically refers to synchronic explanatory reduction, which should be 
distinguished from diachronic explanatory reduction (the explanation of a given entity’s emergent 
process of formation out of lower-order entities without prejudicing its sui generis reality) (Hartwig, 
2007). 
 
35 Two common examples of reductionism are physicalism or materialism, where higher-order 
mechanisms are reduced to the natural, and individualism, where the social is reduced to the 
psychological (Price, 2014). 
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The concept of ontological emergence opposes the reductionist 
explanation of a phenomenon in terms of its more basic strata by insisting on its 
sui generis reality and distinct causal powers—as illustrated by the 
Transformational Model of Social Agency (TMSA) and the Synchronic Emergent 
Powers Materialism (SEPM). TMSA and SEPM are two critical realist concepts 
that resist the gratuitously reductionist conflations of ontologically distinct levels of 
causal mechanisms—in this case, between the social and the psychological, and 
the psychological and the material. 
Transformational Model of Social Activity 
 
According to TMSA, an adequate conceptualization of social reality 
requires a clear distinction between structure and agency, as well as an 
articulation of their mutual dependency. Through this model, not only is structure 
established as irreducible to agency (vs. individualism and atomism), but also, 
just as importantly, agency is asserted as no less reducible to social structure (vs. 
collectivism and holism). Both structure and agency have irreducibly distinct 
properties and causal powers (PN). 
However, just as societies are irreducible to people and as such, constitute 
legitimate objects of social scientific knowledge, so too should the sui generis 
reality and causal status of intentional human agency be preserved. Intentional 
agency is causally efficacious in its own right and requires its own science: 
People are legitimate objects of scientific study, with properties that cannot be 
conflated with those of society (collectivism and holism) or reduced to their 
neurophysiological condition of possibility (materialism) or to behavior 
actualization (behaviorism) (PN). 
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Synchronic Emergent Powers Materialism 
 
SEPM contradicts the ontological doctrine of materialism by defining the 
mind as having irreducible properties emergent from matter: Mental powers are 
rooted in and emergent from matter, but by no means reducible to it. While the 
neurophysiological constitutes the condition for the possibility of the 
psychological, the psychological cannot be completely explained or determined in 
terms of the neurophysiological. Although the autonomy of the mind is 
constrained by the matter from which it is emergent, it remains a sui generis real 
and irreducible causal power (PN).  
SEPM just as vigorously opposes the epistemological doctrine of 
behaviorism, which commits actualism by collapsing mental powers to their 
exercise or conditions. SEPM, therefore, rejects the positivist reduction of 
psychological powers to their material conditions of possibility, as well as their 
actualist reduction to mere behavioral manifestations (PN). 
Insight 4: The anti-determinist theory of open-systemic causality 
 
Aside from the stratification of reality, the transcendental analysis of 
experimental activity also establishes the differentiation in the world. Unlike the 
experimentally closed conditions of the laboratory, the world-at-large is an open 
system, where a host of causal mechanisms operate and interact with one 
another, and in that manner, co-determine phenomena. 
The prevalence of open systems 
 
A defining feature of experimental activity is the closure achieved through 
experimental control, where laboratory conditions are controlled in order to 
investigate the operations of a single mechanism that has been postulated as 
causing a given phenomenon. That there is a necessity for this experimental 
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control in the first place indicates that mere observation is inadequate in 
identifying the causes that account for phenomena. Unlike the closed systems 
painstakingly created in laboratories, the world beyond is normally an open 
system, where there operates a flux of generative mechanisms that interact and 
co-determine events. The open-systemic world offers no guarantee that a desired 
pattern of events under study would actually occur and be observable. Moreover, 
the flux of conditions in the world-at-large makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine the causal operations of specific mechanisms (RTS). 
If as presumed by empirical realism, the world were a universally closed 
system, there would be no need for experimental activity. In a world with 
universal and spontaneous closure, with readily available and observable 
constant conjunctions of events, science would be merely empirical and not 
experimental. The world, however, is an open system, where spontaneous 
empirical regularities occur rarely (RTS). We need to conduct experiments to 
render phenomena and their causal mechanisms empirically accessible by 
excluding the actions of countervailing mechanisms. Science experiments create 
‘windows on the world of underlying mechanisms which usually operate 
unactualized’ (Collier, 1994, p. 45). 
The reconceptualization of causality 
 
The ubiquity of open systems in the world demands a revision of the 
notion of causality. Contra Hume, causality is not to be identified as the constant 
conjunctions of events, but rather, attributed to underlying causal mechanisms 
that, given the open system, may or may not yield an outcome.  
Hume’s identification of causality with empirical invariances is incompatible 
with the depth stratification posited by critical realism, where causality is 
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attributed not to an antecedent and empirical event, but to underlying causal 
agents that belong to the non-empirical domain of the real. One implication of 
depth stratification is this shift in the locus of causality from the domain of the 
empirical to an ontological basis for causal laws—namely, the enduring causal 
structures that belong to the domain of the real. It is the operations of these 
underlying mechanisms—and not the mere presence of empirical invariances—
that cause the events in the world (RTS). 
According to critical realism, the constant conjunctions of events, 
canonized by Humean empiricism as necessary and sufficient to establish 
causality, are neither necessary nor sufficient in the open system. Given the 
intervention of other mechanisms, causation cannot be inferred just because the 
expected—but possibly coincidental—empirical regularities have occurred. At the 
same time, the absence of expected conjunctions of events does not rule out the 
natural necessity that may not have been manifested due to contraventions from 
other mechanisms. 
On the other hand, the differentiation of reality—specifically, the 
acknowledgement of the ubiquity of open systems—requires that causal powers 
operating in the normally open-systemic world be reconceived as ‘transfactual 
tendencies’: tendencies because they inevitably work in synergy with other 
causal mechanisms in the open system, and transfactual because they exercise 
their causal powers whether or not their operations actually yield the expected 
outcome.  
Causal laws make claims about the activity of a causal tendency (a) when 
their initial conditions are satisfied, and (b) when the mechanism can operate 
without the interference of others, resulting in (c) the realization of the tendency. 
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Causal laws, however, make no attempt to define the conditions in which the 
tendency is exercised and consequently cannot make claims about whether it will 
be realized or prevented. The operation of a mechanism does not depend on the 
conditions since the mode of application of the causal law remains the same 
regardless of the conditions. For this reason, the value of a causal law is not 
affected by the outcome of the operation of a mechanism since the outcome is a 
function not of the tendency of the mechanism, but of the conditions in the 
system. Hence, whether a system is open or closed, whether a causal tendency 
is realized or hindered, the generative mechanism is at work, as accounted for by 
the causal law. Causal laws are non-empirical, but transfactual statements 
because they do not refer to events or experiences, but to structures. They are 
about the causal tendencies of things, which may not be actualized and 
perceived. Hence, as statements about transfactual tendencies, causal laws are 
about causal powers that act as tendencies in both closed and open systems, but 
cannot be the basis for prediction of phenomena in the open system (RTS). 
In summary, the Humean theory reduces causality to empirical invariances, 
which, as revealed by the idea of depth stratification, constitute only the tip of the 
iceberg of reality: Not only are their occurrences limited to experimentally closed 
conditions, but they are also but occasional manifestations of the operations of 
underlying generative mechanisms that constitute their real causes. Contrary to 
Hume, therefore, the constant conjunctions of events are neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for causality. 
The need for interdisciplinary investigations 
 
Most phenomena in the open-systemic world are multi-mechanismic—i.e., 
the result of the interaction of several causal mechanisms. Moreover, given the 
emergent stratification of reality, a phenomenon would be the outcome of the 
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interaction of mechanisms that belong to different ontological levels. If the world 
has multiple levels of irreducible mechanisms with their own emergent powers, 
each requiring its own science, single-factor and mono-disciplinary explanations 
of phenomena will most likely be insufficient. If an open-systemic phenomenon is 
indeed generated by a plurality of causal mechanisms, each belonging to a 
different stratum, only an investigation that draws from the distinct fields of 
science relevant to the phenomenon and that integrates their knowledge and 
methodology can yield a non-reductionist explanation. Moreover, the 
investigation must resist the temptation of methodological colonialism, where 
methodology from one discipline is simply transposed and in the process, mis-
applied to a different type of mechanism (FCR; Danermark, 2013). 
The fallacy of actualism: Against determinism 
 
Ontological actualism, which refers to the Humean definition of causal 
laws as empirical regularities, is based on a misapprehension of the world-at-
large as a universally closed system. Such a vision of the world is characterized 
by constant conjunctions of events and leads to a deterministic notion of the 
universe, where the prediction of events is perfectly feasible. This form of 
determinism—i.e., regularity determinism—leaves no room for the possibility of 
autonomy (RTS). 
According to the actualist thesis of regularity determinism: (a) the same 
event has the same cause (i.e., the total set of conditions that regularly proceeds 
or accompanies an event); and (b) ‘for everything that happens there are 
conditions such that, given them, nothing else could have happened’ (DCR, p. 
122). 
 112 
Actualism reduces the ordinarily open-systemic world to a globally closed 
system, and focuses on empirical invariances instead of the invariant 
mechanisms that serve as the ontological basis for causal laws. Far from 
referring simply to the relations between events and states of affairs, causal laws 
pertain to the relations between events and states of affairs based on the action 
of an underlying causal mechanism (RTS). Hence, critical realism shifts our 
attention away from the merely empirical and actual to the deep structure of 
reality.  
Actualism fails to recognize the normally open-systemic and multi-
mechanismic character of phenomena that can be adequately understood only in 
an interdisciplinary manner. Consequently, actualist theories are often superficial, 
if not false, since they focus exclusively on surface constant conjunctions of 
events, which for transfactual theories are but the empirical starting points for the 
construction of empirically grounded depth explanations (Price, 2014). 
In contrast to the actualist thesis of regularity determinism, open-systemic 
causality, according to critical realism, is recast as ‘necessity without 
determination’. Laws do not undifferentially describe phenomena or uniquely 
govern them. Since causal laws are about tendencies of acting, which may or 
may not be realized in any sort of outcome, what they define are possibilities and 
limits of how things act in the world. By no means do causal laws dictate their 
outcomes. Anscombe’s metaphor of a chess game is instructive: ‘Outside the 
domain of closure, laws are like the rules of chess. The play is seldom 
determined, but no one breaks the law’ (cited in RTS, p. 101). In this sense, 
therefore, causal laws inform us of possibilities and limits on the ways of acting of 
causal structures without determining or predicting outcomes or events. Laws 
ascribe possibilities that may not be realized; they impose necessity in the sense 
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that they set constraints or limits but do not determine events. Hence, events do 
not violate laws or falsify them (RTS).  
Consequently, in the critical realist view, the laws of nature are not 
determinants of events—making it, on the one hand, impossible to predict all 
events, and on the other, creating room to conceive of things as acting 
autonomously. The revised concept of causality as ‘necessity without 
determination’ creates a space for a conception of human freedom and self-
determination that is compatible with science and its laws. In addition, the idea of 
emergent stratification supports the conceptual plausibility of human freedom. 
First of all, based on the idea of dual/multiple control across strata, while human 
agency is constrained by physical, biological, and social laws and is unable to 
change them, it can nevertheless act back on them, enabling or constraining their 
operations. In this manner, human agency is, to a certain extent, capable of self-
determination, transcending empirical generalizations and defying predictions 
(RTS). 
Moreover, intentional human agency is identified as a sui generis type of 
causally efficacious mechanism that cannot be reduced to either social cause or 
neurophysiological cause. As the psychological generative mechanisms that 
account for human action and behavior, reasons are real powers with an actual 
ontological purchase on the world and consequently are valuable in accounting 
for human behavior (PN). However, as in the case of other types of causes, two 
qualifications need to be made about intentional causes: First of all, like other 
open-systemic mechanisms, reasons can operate only as tendencies. Given the 
multiplicity of interacting mechanisms in the open world, reasons, while causally 
efficacious, may not necessarily yield an outcome since they are subject to 
changes in circumstances and to the operation of countervailing forces (PN). 
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Secondly, like other causal mechanisms, reasons shape human action in 
conjunction with other types of mechanisms. Human action, like other types of 
phenomena, is co-determined by reasons as well as a host of other mechanisms 
in the open system. Since reasons operate causally alongside and jointly with 
other types of causes, an adequate explanation of human action needs to include 
not only psychological generative mechanisms (both conscious and unconscious 
reasons), but also non-psychological mechanisms that the former interacts with 
(PN). 
The recognition of human intentionality as a causally efficacious 
mechanism belonging to an irreducibly distinct level in the hierarchy of causes 
does not imply that reason can violate or is exempted from natural and social 
laws. All causal laws define possibilities and limits without determining the 
resulting outcome or behavior. They operate continually and transfactually, acting 
on intentional agency, providing it with possibilities and constraints without 
determining the agent’s decision or action. Intentional human agency, for its part, 
can set boundary conditions for the operation of these other laws. In this manner, 
critical realism allows for a conception of freedom that does not cheat or defy the 
natural laws, and is not opposed to—or divorced from—science. In fact, for 
critical realism, human freedom is entirely compatible with science (PN).  
THE SHARED CRITIQUES OF CRITICAL REALISM AND CHRISTIANITY 
 
 
The compatibility between critical realism and Catholic thought can be 
surmised from their shared critiques of the philosophies hostile to Christianity—
namely, modernist and postmodernist anthropocentrism, positivism, material 
reductionism, and determinism. All these counter-Christian philosophies are 
forms of reductionism, resulting from either a failure to accept reality in its own 
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messy and mysterious terms or an insistence on making it conform to what is 
easier to understand. 
Modernism and postmodernism both prioritize epistemology over ontology, 
and are therefore, equally culpable of the epistemic fallacy. However, they 
commit the epistemic fallacy in two completely different and opposite ways. 
Committed to its Cartesian quest for epistemic certainty, modernism colonizes 
ontology through epistemology by wresting control over ontology and reducing it 
to epistemology. On the other hand, in its frustration over uncertainty, 
postmodernism embraces epistemic skepticism and declares its independence 
from any sort of ontology, which it totally discards. Both, however, end up with 
self-contradictions and delusions: Modernism enjoys an illusory epistemic 
certainty, while postmodernism’s divorce from ontology earns it an epistemic 
skepticism that remains tainted by a tacit certainty in its very denial of ontology 
(Wright, 2013).  
Against modernism and postmodernism, both critical realism and Catholic 
thought assert that reality cannot be reduced to what we know—or do not know—
about it. Pius X’s (1907) encyclical letter, Pascendi Dominici Gregis, was 
primarily a condemnation of a set of loosely connected ideas that were combined 
into a theoretical system called ‘modernism’ and condemned as the ‘synthesis of 
all heresies’ (PDG §39). What is relevant here, however, is its condemnation of 
modern philosophical systems—in particular, the epistemologies of Descartes 
and Kant, characterized by the anthropocentric prioritization of epistemology and 
eventually, a denial of ontology (PDG §38). Like critical realism, Christianity has 
always affirmed the existence of an objective and non-anthropocentric reality, 
independent of our knowledge and existence.  
Positivism follows quickly as a natural consequence of the epistemic 
fallacy, when the world is reduced to its empirical features. This actualist 
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epistemology, according to which only what we experience through our senses 
can be known (DCR, pp. 169-170), is condemned in the same letter: ‘According 
to [Agnosticism] human reason is confined entirely within the field of phenomena, 
that is to say, to things that are perceptible to the senses, and in the manner in 
which they are perceptible’ (PDG §6).  John Paul II (1998, §5) condemned 
scientism, which denies the validity of forms of knowledge apart from those of the 
positive sciences, describing it as the new guise of the discredited notion of 
positivism. 
Through its idea of depth stratification, critical realism asserts the 
existence of non-empirical realms that transcend the positivist parameters of 
limiting the real only to what is perceived by the senses. Moreover, it rejects the 
empiricist perceptual criterion for ascribing reality and instead adopts a causal 
criterion, which holds that what qualifies something as real is not its empirical 
quality, but its causal efficacy (RTS). These critical realist positions render 
Christianity’s fundamental assertion of invisible and spiritual realities, contra 
positivism, as philosophically plausible—or at least not unintelligible. 
Materialistic reductionism maintains that the only real causes are the most 
basic—i.e., material—constituents of matter (DCR, pp. 290-291). Higher 
functions are reducible and completely explained by physical realities. Hence, the 
mind, spiritual experiences, and noble aspirations are no more than chemical 
changes or biological processes since the lower level organization and functions 
provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for all that happens at the higher 
level. But like critical realism, Christianity rejects material reductionism and insists 
on the irreducibility of entities beyond the physical. 
Finally, for determinism, the behavior of higher-level systems (e.g., human 
agency) is completely determined by what happens at lower levels, eliminating 
the possibility of human freedom (Stoeger, 2012). Through its concepts of open-
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systemic causality, emergent stratification, and particularly, the causal efficacy of 
human intentionality, critical realism refutes determinism by establishing that self-
determination—including human freedom—is not mutually exclusive with the laws 
of nature, in the process preserving the integrity of free will, which the Catholic 
Church has always taught: ‘Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to 
act or not to act, to do this or that, and so perform deliberate actions on one’s 
own responsibility. By free will one shapes one’s own life’ (CCC §1731). 
As I will discuss in the next section, another contemporary philosophy that 
seeks to undermine Christianity and which critical realism also refutes is what 
Ratzinger (2005) has labeled ‘the ‘dictatorship of relativism’—an attitude that 
‘does not recognize anything as definitive and ‘whose ultimate goal consists 
solely of one’s own ego and desires’. In Fides et Ratio, John Paul II (1988, §5) 
wrote, ‘A legitimate plurality of positions has yielded to an undifferentiated 
pluralism, based upon the assumption that all positions are equally valid, which is 
one of today's most widespread symptoms of the lack of confidence in truth’. 
Consequently, relativism poses a threat to orthodoxy (J-B. Metz & E. 
Schillebbeckx, 1987). 
The Church’s rejection of this general relativism and religious relativism in 
particular (CDF, 2000, §22) is supported by the fifth core insight of critical 
realism. 
 
CRITICAL THINKING AS THE EXPRESSION OF  
 
THE COMMITMENT TO JUDGEMENTAL RATIONALITY 
 
To unpack the epistemological conception of critical thinking, I will draw 
from the critical realist triad of ontological realism, epistemic relativism, and 
judgemental rationality. First, I will discuss what I regard as the fifth core insight 
of critical realism: the anti-relativist commitment to judgemental rationality. 
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Insight 5: The anti-relativist commitment to judgemental rationality 
 
At the heart of its four-fold vision of the world as intransitive, structured, 
emergent, and differentiated is critical realist epistemology, which is defined by its 
anti-relativist commitment to judgemental rationality.  
The triumvirate of critical realism 
 
Three fundamental principles constitute the epistemology of critical 
realism. Ontological realism refers to the critical realist principle that the world is 
intransitive—i.e., that reality endures and acts independently of our knowledge. 
As discussed earlier, ontological realism is a necessary condition for the 
possibility and intelligibility of science in particular, but also of all human knowing 
(SRHE).  
Epistemic relativism refers to the transitive process of human knowing. All 
knowledge is socially produced and necessarily contingent. Like every human 
activity, knowing requires a social process that conditions and determines the 
very way we perceive and make sense of things. Our knowing is characterized by 
perspectival relativity, and our knowledge of the world necessarily shaped by the 
particularity of our epistemic framework and constrained by our categories, 
modes of analysis, and other available conceptual resources (DCR, p. 345; 
Fleetwood, 2004; Lawson, 2003). We have no unmediated access to reality, and 
given the historically conditioned nature of our truth-values and even of our 
criteria for rationality, our knowing is inherently finite, characterized by a 
susceptibility to error that renders all our knowledge corrigible and that demands 
a constant vigilance to revisions (DPF; DCR, p. 241). 
Finally, judgemental rationality is the belief in the possibility of rational 
assessment of alternative competing truth claims and, despite the finite and 
fallible quality of our knowing, a commitment to making the best possible choice 
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among them. Judgemental rationality is implied by a belief in both ontological 
realism and epistemic relativism (SRHE). Without ontological realism and its 
assertion of a reality that serves as an independent criterion for knowledge, 
judgemental rationality would neither be possible nor intelligible. Without 
epistemic relativism and its acknowledgement of the constitutive and historical 
limits of our knowing, there would be neither need nor value for judgemental 
rationality. If human knowing were not finite and fallible, there would be no need 
to exercise critical thinking in order to make a rational choice among the existing 
alternative views. Hence, while ontological realism serves as the condition for the 
possibility and intelligibility of judgemental rationality, epistemic relativism 
accounts for its necessity and value. 
Duality of truth 
 
Judgemental rationality is made possible by what Bhaskar calls ‘the duality 
of truth’—i.e., the intransitive and transitive dimensions of knowing: an 
acknowledgement of the independent existence of reality irrespective of human 
knowing (ontological realism), and an admission of the inherent quality of human 
knowing as socio-historically contingent and consequently, perspectivist and 
fallible (epistemic relativism) (SRHE, p. 99). 
Ontological realism and epistemic relativism express the fundamental 
conditions of human knowing: While asserting a human-independent world 
establishes an objective basis for knowledge, recognizing the socially dependent 
nature of knowing uncovers its finitude and fallibility. Through a consistent 
distinction between the intransitive and transitive dimensions, critical realism is 
able to insist equally on a ‘realism of things and beings’ and on a ‘relativism of 
thoughts and beliefs’. By confining relativism to the transitive dimension of 
epistemology and at the same time preserving realism in the intransitive 
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dimension of ontology, critical realism succeeds in resolving the dilemma that 
Bhaskar has called ‘the Scylla of epistemic absolutism and the Charybdis of 
judgemental relativism’ (SRHE, p. 43). 
 
Judgemental rationality and critical thinking 
 
A critical realist epistemology faces two opposite extremes: Naïve realism 
and radical relativism (Scott, 2005). Both epistemologies, failing to preserve the 
intransitive-transitive distinction, are deficient in either ontological realism or 
epistemic relativism, consequently falling into the very Scylla and Charbydis 
successfully circumvented by critical realism: Wanting in epistemic relativism, 
naïve realism ends up committing epistemic absolutism, while radical relativism, 
bereft of ontological realism, is trapped in judgemental relativism.  
Deficient epistemologies 
 
The lack of either ontological realism or epistemic relativism in these two 
deficient epistemologies has significant impact on the possibility of judgemental 
rationality and the exercise of critical thinking.  
Radical relativism 
 
Radical relativism is a perspectivist, but non-evaluativist, epistemology. It 
subscribes to epistemic relativism, accepting the contingent nature of human 
knowing. It, however, denies ontological realism, neglecting the intransitive 
dimension of knowing. Unlike critical realism, it fails to restrict relativism to the 
transitive dimension, allowing it into the intransitive, and slipping to the gratuitous 
conclusion of judgemental relativism. As a result, it rejects any possibility for—or 
sense in—judgemental rationality. All truth claims, after all, are based on opinion 
and are consequently equally valid and correct. Such a judgemental relativism 
constitutes an abandonment of critical thinking. 
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A radical relativist epistemology is inconsistent in its epistemic relativism 
because despite its allergy to dogmatism, it ends up precisely culpable in that 
regard. As Bhaskar puts it: ‘To be a fallibilist about knowledge, it is necessary to 
be a realist about things. Conversely, to be a sceptic about things is to be a 
dogmatist about knowledge’ (RTS, p. 33).  
Naïve realism 
 
Naïve realism is a non-perspectivist and non-evaluativist epistemology, 
accepting ontological realism, but neglecting the socio-historically conditioned 
quality of knowledge (epistemic relativism). By overlooking the transitive 
dimension of human knowing, it commits epistemic absolutism. Hence, a naïve 
realist epistemology maintains that there is only one possibly correct view of 
every reality.  
Unlike radical relativism, however, it does not give up the assessment of 
truth claims. Although assertions are not reduced to opinion, they are, however, 
demoted to facts. The task of critical evaluation becomes limited to the mere 
assessment of the correspondence of such facts to reality and of the credibility of 
the sources of these facts. The judgemental rationality that issues from naïve 
realism is compromised, and its expression in critical thinking substantially 
circumscribed. 
Critical realist epistemology 
 
Distinguished by its commitment to a judgemental rationality, a critical 
realist epistemology is grounded on the two indispensable principles of 
ontological realism and epistemic relativism. Only a critical realist epistemology 
acknowledges both the intransitivity of reality and the transitivity of human 
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knowing, and at the same time, preserves their distinction, so that if—and only 
if—bundled together, they provide the conditions for judgemental rationality.  
Ontological realism, epistemic relativism, and the resulting judgemental 
rationality are necessary beliefs that enable one to engage in the enterprise of 
critical thinking. To be a critical thinker is to be a judgemental rationalist. But to be 
a judgemental rationalist, one must simultaneously be an ontological realist and 
an epistemic relativist. 
Ontological irrealism, epistemic absolutism, and judgemental relativism 
 
The repercussions of the lack of ontological realism and epistemic 
relativism are clarified when they are compared with their opposites, and their 
impact on judgemental rationality is examined. Judgemental rationality is 
inconsistent with ontological irrealism, the denial of the intransitivity of reality 
characteristic of a radical relativist epistemology. On the other hand, while the 
commitment to ontological realism of naïve realism offers room for judgemental 
rationality, its epistemic absolutism—i.e., its neglect of the intransitive quality of 
human knowing—results in the devaluation of judgemental rationality, diminishing 
the need for critical thinking (Table 16).  
Table 16: Critical realism compared to naive realism and radical relativism 
 EPISTEMIC ABSOLUTISM 
(Non-recognition of 
the transitivity of knowing) 
EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM 
(Recognition of  
the transitivity of knowing) 
ONTOLOGICAL REALISM 
(Recognition of  
the intransitivity of reality) 
NAÏVE REALISM 
Non-perspectivist, non-
evaluativist 
Limited judgemental rationality 
CRITICAL REALISM 
Perspectivist and evaluativist 
Judgemental rationality 
ONTOLOGICAL 
IRREALISM 
(Non-recognition of  
the intransitivity of reality) 
 RADICAL RELATIVISM 
Perspectivist but non-
evaluativist 
Judgemental relativism 
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The compatibility of epistemic relativism and judgemental rationality 
 
Ontological realism need not, as anti-realists have mistakenly presumed, 
necessarily entail epistemic absolutism. Precisely by virtue of the critical realist 
distinction between the intransitive and transitive, ontological realism and 
epistemic relativism are not incompatible. To be a realist about reality does not 
demand a denial of the historically conditioned and inherently transient nature of 
human knowing (SRHE).  
One who subscribes to epistemic relativism, on the other hand, need not 
jump into the unwarranted conclusion of judgemental relativism. While both 
epistemic and judgemental relativism are premised on the finite and fallible 
character of human knowing, radical relativists rashly assume that the 
contingency of human knowing and its capacity for rational judgements are 
mutually exclusive. Just because human knowing is necessarily fallible does not 
mean that it is always necessarily mistaken (Gunton, 1983). 
Its insistence on the intransitivity of reality enables critical realism to posit 
that alternative and competing theories are ultimately about one and the same 
theory-independent world, which provides the necessary referential overlap 
between them, which, against the thesis of incommensurability, serves as the 
basis for the possibility of judgemental rationality (Bhaskar 1998a).  
Bhaskar’s distinction between the intransitive and transitive dimensions 
enables him to qualify—and clarify—Kuhn’s claim of the incommensurability 
between paradigms: ‘Though the [intransitive] world does not change with a 
change of paradigm, the scientist afterwards works in a different [transitive] world’. 
It is, therefore, entirely possible to have ‘transitive disagreements about a 
common intransitive object’ (Wright, 2013, p. 79). Because of this referential 
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overlap, judgemental rationality is possible36 in spite of the inevitable meaning 
variances resulting from the contingency of human knowing (SRHE). In addition, 
precisely on account of these variances, judgemental rationality is necessary. A 
commitment to judgemental rationality is, therefore, entirely compatible with 
epistemic relativism. 
The crucial distinction preserved by critical realism between reference 
(ontology) and sense (epistemology) serves as an important corrective to two 
erroneous views: (a) that epistemic relativism is synonymous with judgemental 
relativism and therefore, incompatible with judgemental rationality, and (b) that 
ontological realism with its rejection of judgemental relativism constitutes an 
embrace of epistemic absolutism (SRHE). 
Table 17: Ontological realism/irrealism and epistemic absolutism/relativism 
  Possibility &  
Intelligibility 
Necessity & 
Value 
ONTOLOGY  
(Intransitive 
dimension) 
Ontological realism Yes  
Ontological 
irrealism 
No  
EPISTEMOLOGY 
(Transitive 
dimension) 
Epistemic 
absolutism 
 No 
Epistemic 
relativism 
 Yes 
 
A commitment to ontological realism is, therefore, a condition for the 
possibility and intelligibility of judgemental rationality, while the acceptance of 
epistemic relativism is a condition for the necessity and value of judgemental 
rationality (Table 17). Critical thinking is the expression of this critical realist 
                                            
36 To exercise judgemental rationality between two competing truth claims, two conditions need to 
be met: (a) The two theories should be in conflict with each other and, therefore, true alternatives, 
requiring a choice; and (b) both theories must share a referential commonality—i.e., they refer to 
the same world. Should one encounter a case where two theories have no referential overlap 
(Bhaskar’s total ‘Kuhn-loss’), then the theories cease to be alternatives (for either the same 
community over time, or for different communities at the same time). Since they are not 
alternatives, there is neither sense nor value in making a choice between them, much less, 
replacing one with the other (SRHE). 
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commitment to judgemental rationality, and belief in judgemental rationality 
provides the motivation for the enterprise of critical thinking. 
Critical realist analysis of critical thinking 
 
Critical thinking analyzed through a critical realist prism yields two 
important implications: (a) founded on the non-negotiable priority of ontology, and 
(b) motivated by a commitment to judgemental rationality. 
The primacy of ontology 
 
A critical realist epistemology explicitly anchors the exercise of critical 
thinking to an ontology. It insists not only on the distinction of ontology from 
epistemology, but also on its unequivocal priority over the latter. According to the 
critical realist notion of emergence, reality is stratified into ontologically distinct 
levels; each level, therefore, possesses irreducible properties and consequently 
requires a discrete science proper to that level. Each level of reality, given its 
uniquely distinctive nature, determines how it reveals itself to us—and 
consequently, its own legitimate form of study. As Bhaskar puts it, it is the world 
that determines its own cognitive possibility (SRHE). In other words, whether we 
like it or know it or not, when it comes to knowing, it is intransitive reality 
that defines the possibilities and limits of our transitive knowledge. Ontological 
realism refers precisely to this recognition of the primacy of being, challenging us 
to resist every procrustean temptation to stretch or amputate it to 
suit our necessarily limited conceptions.  
This anchoring of every human knowing on reality is captured succinctly in 
what Catholic theologian Bernard Lonergan’s (1973, p. 55) calls the 
‘transcendental precepts’: ‘Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be 
responsible’. It is a call to base our decisions and actions on knowledge that is 
purposefully and—to the degree possible—faithfully grounded in reality.  
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Aside from this non-negotiable ontological realism, critical realism also 
demands that epistemic relativism be taken no less seriously than ontological 
realism: Given our intrinsically limited knowing, we may at times feel unable to 
‘step into the same river twice'. Yet explore the depths of that river we must, 
respecting its mystery and trusting that if we persist in our work, its riches will be 
revealed in time.  
Against the post-Enlightenment notion of pure objectivity and universal 
reason, the brand of critical thinking animated by critical realism by no means 
aims at achieving a mastery of reality, but at retrieving its mystery—or as the later 
Bhaskar in his Philosophy of metaReality puts it, ‘a re-enchantment of being' 
(PMR). With attentiveness and reverence, the critical realist thinker is necessarily 
an ‘agent-subject-in-relationship’ with the world (Groome, 1991, p. 32), standing 
before reality, ever mindful of its sovereignty. Critical thinking conceived as the 
expression of our judgemental rationality, therefore, entails not so much that we 
issue our judgements about reality, but that we submit our necessarily finite and 
possibly fallible judgements to the more authoritative judgement of reality.  
Commitment to judgemental rationality 
 
Viewed as the expression of judgemental rationality, critical thinking can 
now be analyzed not only in terms of an underlying ontological realism that 
makes it possible in the first place, but also—just as crucially—an epistemic 
relativism that makes it necessary. 
According to a critical realist analysis of critical thinking, knowers will not 
exercise critical thinking unless they are committed to judgemental rationality. 
Judgemental rationality, however, becomes possible and intelligible if and only if 
one’s epistemology is a properly critical realist one, where there is, first of all, an 
explicit recognition of the intransitivity of reality (ontological realism). However the 
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actual need for—and the value of—judgemental rationality will surface only given 
an acknowledgement of the contingency of human knowing (epistemological 
relativism).  
Mining the critical realist triad of epistemological principles, I propose that 
it is by virtue of the principle of epistemic relativism that the epistemology shifts to 
a perspectivist one, and by virtue of ontological realism that it becomes properly 
evaluativist. In other words, what leads to a perspectivist epistemology is at least 
a tacit acceptance of the contingency of human knowing (epistemic relativism), 
and for an evaluativist epistemology, a similarly implicit and fundamental 
commitment to the autonomous existence of reality (ontological realism). 
Kuhn’s (2000) three levels of epistemic development—namely, the 
absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist—are defined according to two important 
shifts in epistemic development: 
(a) a perspectivist shift: from belief that there is only one possible correct view 
of reality (absolutist) to one that there exist several possibly correct 
perspectives (multiplist or evaluativist); and 
(b) an evaluativist shift: from belief in the multiplicity of diverse views of reality 
(multiplist or evaluativist) to a commitment to the rational assessment of 
these different claims given one’s admittedly limited knowledge 
(evaluativist). 
These two shifts are necessary to attain what is considered the most 
sophisticated epistemic level, the requisite level for the exercise of critical thinking. 
Only given a post-subjectivist epistemology that is both perspectivist and 
evaluativist will a knower engage in the enterprise of critical thinking. Unlike the 
multiplist, the evaluativist has not abandoned the responsibility to assess which of 
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the different views about reality is the better or more correct one. Only upon 
reaching this highest level of epistemic development does critical thinking acquire 
a value, when assertions are regarded neither as mere facts to be received 
primarily and passively from authority (absolutist epistemology), nor as different 
opinions that are equally valid and require no critical assessment (multiplist 
epistemology).  
Analyzed in this manner, the three levels of epistemic cognition correspond to 
naïve realist, radical relativist, and critical realist epistemologies, respectively 
(Table 18). 
Table 18: The three epistemic cognitions 
 Non-Perspectivist Perspectivist 
 
Non-Evaluativist 
 Level 2: Multiplist 
Radical Relativist 
Assertions as opinions 
Several equally correct views 
 
Evaluativist 
Level 1: Absolutist 
Naïve Realist 
Assertions as facts 
Only one correct view 
Level 3: Evaluativist 
Critical Realist 
Assertions as judgements 
One more correct view among several others 
 
The investigation into teacher epistemologies in Philippine Catholic 
schools, showed a significant prevalence of an absolutist epistemology especially 
among religious educators. This non-perspectivist and non-evaluativist 
epistemology—considered a constraint to the exercise of critical thinking—can be 
identified as naïve realist. According to our critical realist analysis, critical thinking 
is the expression of one’s commitment to judgemental rationality. Judgemental 
rationality, however, is possible and necessary only given an underlying 
ontological realism and epistemic relativism, respectively.  
From the prevailing naïve realist religious epistemology observed to be 
prevalent among religious education teachers in the survey, we may infer that 
while such an epistemology subscribes to ontological realism, what is lacking is 
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an epistemic relativism that takes adequate account of the transitive aspect of 
knowing in the domain of religious beliefs. If teachers do not have the requisite 
appreciation of the contingency and fallibility of human knowing, then what will 
result is a form of epistemic absolutism that inhibits the practice of critical thinking 
in the classroom. If we do not believe that there are different, possibly correct and 
conflicting perspectives to reality, then the necessity and value of critical thinking 
would be minimal. 
In the next chapter, I will investigate Catholic religious epistemology based 
on its theology of revelation and especially its notion of ‘sensus fidei’. Having 
identified a prevalence of a naïve realist epistemology among our religious and 
values educators in the domain religious beliefs, I will examine whether or not 
Catholic religious epistemology is compatible with critical thinking in the first place. 
In other words, can it, based on Catholic theology, be characterized as critical 
realist—i.e., defined by a commitment to judgemental rationality with an 
underlying fundamental ontological realism and especially epistemic relativism? 
And if so, how can the notion of the ‘sensus fidei’ instruct us on the exercise of 
Catholic religious critical thinking? 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
CATHOLIC RELIGIOUS CRITICAL THINKING  
AS THE EXERCISE OF SENSUS FIDEI 
After demonstrating that critical thinking ought to be problematized in 
confessional Catholic religious education in the Philippines, I have proposed an 
epistemological and specifically critical realist approach to critical thinking that 
defines it as the expression of one’s commitment to judgemental rationality. 
Given this critical realist account of critical thinking, the religious epistemology 
identified in the empirical study as most prevalent among our religious educators 
has been diagnosed as naïve realist—i.e., lacking in epistemic relativism and, 
therefore, detrimental to critical thinking. 
In this chapter, I will argue that such an epistemology does not conform to 
Catholic religious epistemology as inferred from its theology of revelation and 
especially its notion of the sensus fidei. Prevailing impressions to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the epistemic absolutism associated with Catholic religious 
epistemology as evident from the survey, far from being authentically Catholic, is 
an anomalous by-product of the Church’s polemical reaction to both post-
Enlightenment concern for rational certainty and post-modernist attraction to 
relativism (Groome, 1991). Possible reasons for the surveyed teachers’ 
predominantly naïve realist religious epistemology include the Catholic Church’s 
emphasis on teaching authority, as well as recent tendencies towards 
centralization and stress on doctrinal clarity, both symptoms of an underlying fear 
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of change because it is perceived as a threat to the permanency of revelation and 
the stability of the institutional Church (Orsy, 1987). 
Focusing on the traditional—but until recently, underplayed37—notion of 
the sensus fidei, I will argue that Catholic religious epistemology is, in fact, critical 
realist, defined by a strong commitment to judgemental rationality that is founded 
on ontological realism and—contrary to the survey findings—epistemic relativism. 
By showing how the doctrine of the sensus fidei expresses the Catholic 
commitment to judgemental rationality and its subscription to ontological realism 
and epistemic relativism, I will argue that Catholic religious critical thinking is not 
only possible and intelligible, but also, in fact, by virtue of the sensus fidei, 
necessary and valuable. 
Finally, I will offer some recommendations on how the issue of religious 
critical thinking in Philippine Catholic religious education may be addressed given 
the findings of this study.  
 
THE DOCTRINE OF REVELATION, RECEPTION, AND SENSUS FIDEI 
 
 
The significant percentage of naïve realist religious epistemologies 
revealed in the survey suggests a fundamental problem in the practice of Catholic 
religious critical thinking in our schools: an apparent incompatibility between 
Catholic religious epistemology and epistemic relativism. We need to investigate 
whether epistemic relativism, without which critical thinking would not be valued, 
is, in fact, compatible with Catholic religious epistemology in the first place. 
                                            
37 Vatican II’s teaching on the sensus fidei (LG §12) was considerably weakened, for example, in 
the Code of Canon Law, where it is reduced to a ‘common adherence of Christ’s faithful under the 
guidance of sacred magisterium’ (CCL §750). The sensus fidei has understandably been 
described as ‘a gift that has been buried for the moment’ (Burkhard, 2008, p. 560) and ‘an elusive 
ecclesial reality’ (Rush, 2001, p. 231), whose consequences, for Walter Kasper, are ‘far from 
[being] exhausted in principle and in practice’ (quoted in Burkhard, 1992, p. 18). 
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Any discussion of Catholic religious critical thinking must begin with a 
consideration of its underlying epistemology. For believers, it is the constellation 
of Catholic doctrines concerning divine revelation and its reception that defines 
the possibility and limits of their religious knowing.  
In this section, I will show that (a) based on Catholic doctrine, revelation, 
while believed to be of divine origin, requires the human process of reception by 
the Church for it to be actualized; (b) the reception of revelation is enabled by the 
sensus fidei —a sense for the faith given both to the corporate body of the 
Church and individual believers for the faithful interpretation of revelation; and (c) 
contrary to the survey’s predominantly naïve realist religious epistemology, the 
Catholic religious epistemology resulting from this theology of revelation and the 
sensus fidei is critical realist, undergirded by both an ontological realism and an 
epistemic relativism that together result not only in the possibility of judgemental 
rationality in the domain of religious beliefs, but also its necessity. It is, in fact, this 
commitment to judgemental rationality—expressed through the Church’s exercise 
of the sensus fidei in its ongoing reception of revelation—that has generated its 
body of teachings, including what it considers the two fundamental norms for all 
subsequent ecclesial reception, Scripture and Tradition. 
Revelation and the need for reception 
 
Revelation in Catholic theology is complex and full of paradoxes, with 
multiple aspects that need to be sorted out. Several distinct models of revelation 
have been proposed to highlight distinct aspects of revelation.38  
                                            
38  Dulles (1983) names five such models—revelation as: (a) doctrine, (b) historical events, 
especially the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, (c) interior encounter with God, (d) divine 
initiative and human response, and (e) a new consciousness resulting from revelation. 
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The act and content of revelation   
 
Catholic doctrine makes a distinction between the process of revelation 
and the product of revelation. 39 In its primary sense, revelation refers to God’s 
free initiative of self-communication to humanity, when out of God’s goodness 
and wisdom, God discloses not only His existence and identity, but also His 
eternal decrees (DV §2; ND §113). This act of revelation happens in history, 
realized as much in deeds as in words, occurring gradually and believed finally to 
culminate definitively in the teachings and life of Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word 
of God, who is ‘both the mediator and fullness of all revelation (DV §2-4). The 
entire foundational revelation of Christianity is considered summed up in this so-
called Christ event. As ‘the definitive and normative self-communication of God’, 
the Christ event serves as the ultimate criterion against which all other claims to 
revelation are measured, with no further need for nor expectation of additional 
revelation (McBrien, 1994, p. 268). 
Revelation, however, refers not only to the action initiated by God, but also 
to the result of that action: the accumulated data of revelation, which once 
officially accepted by the Church, is incorporated into its so-called ‘deposit or 
heritage of faith’ (depositum fidei). This deposit of faith has two distinct but 
related modes—Sacred Scripture and Apostolic Tradition—which together 
comprise a single sacred deposit of the Word of God—‘in the written books and 
in the unwritten traditions’ (ND §216)—and are to be ‘accepted with equal 
sentiments of devotion and reverence’ (DV  §9-10). This deposit of faith is the 
product of the Church’s reception of revelation. 
                                            
39 The main references for Catholic doctrine are the dogmatic constitutions of the Catholic Church, 
documents of the highest teaching authority, issued by the Pope or a Church council to proclaim 
a dogma. Vatican II issued two such documents: one on the Church (Lumen Gentium) and 
another on divine revelation (Dei Verbum). Although these two documents define no new dogma, 
they reassert and reinterpret existing ones for the contemporary world. Their authority remains 
undiminished, and they are considered infallible.  
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The reception of revelation 
 
Apart from the original speaker and the text of what is communicated, the 
receiver is often a neglected, but no less crucial, element in communication 
(Rush, 2004). Without reception, revelation remains merely revelatory. The Word 
of God is heard if and only if it is received—i.e., God’s self-communication as 
accepted in one’s life and not just in theory. It is, therefore, the reception of 
revelation—the experience and acceptance thereof—that actualizes revelation 
(Schneiders, 1991). Since ‘the entire holy people united with their shepherds’ are 
the intended recipient and transmitter of revelation, the Church plays a crucial 
role in this reception of revelation (DV §10).  
Spiritual reception 
 
The reception that actualizes revelation refers primarily to the Church’s 
response of faith to God’s offer of salvific revelation.40 ‘Revelation always and 
only becomes a reality where there is faith’ (Ratzinger, 2008, p. 52). The 
Christian response of faith can be understood properly only in relation to the 
Catholic notion of revelation as fundamentally relational: God’s primary purpose 
for revelation is to establish a personal relationship with humanity. Faith is the 
response to God’s invitation to a relationship, entailing a free commitment of 
one’s self, ‘offering the full submission of intellect and will to God who reveals’ 
(DV §5). 
                                            
40 Rush (2009) lists a total of nine senses of reception: (a) personal (the condition for the 
possibility of any relationship, communication, interaction, and learning), (b) spiritual (the 
response of faith); (c) juridical (the canonically required assent to an official teaching of the 
Church), (d) hermeneutic (interpretation and application to one’s context), (e) theological (the 
theological understanding of revelation), (f) approbative (the determination of the orthodoxy of a 
specific matter of faith or morals), (g) literary (appropriation of a literary work into one’s own), (h) 
intra-ecclesial and (i) ecumenical (exchanges between local churches within the Roman Catholic 
communion and beyond, respectively). For the purpose of this thesis, I have focused on spiritual 
reception, interpretive reception (which corresponds to Rush’s hermeneutic and theological 
reception), and approbative reception. 
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However, aside from being God’s act of self-communication, revelation 
also includes the content of that communication. Faith, therefore, has a cognitive 
dimension, entailing not only a commitment to a relationship, but also an assent 
to beliefs. Faith cannot be considered an exclusively affective relationship 
stripped of propositional truths, but neither should it be reduced to a purely 
intellectual response. A disproportionate focus on its cognitive dimension reduces 
revelation into a mere set of beliefs and the faith response of the believer into 
mere intellectual assent. Albeit valid, such an extrinsic conception of revelation 
with its separation of the action of revelation from its content is incomplete and 
loses sight of revelation as an invitation to a personal relationship (Latourelle, 
1994). 
Interpretive and approbative reception 
 
Just as spiritual reception corresponds to the fundamental relational 
dimension of faith, reception has two additional senses that more directly concern 
its cognitive dimension: (a) interpretive reception (the making sense of the data of 
revelation—including Church teachings—and applying them to one’s context, and 
(b) approbative reception (the evaluation of the fidelity of particular teachings to 
revelation) (Rush, 2009). These interpretive and approbative tasks comprise the 
Church’s meaningful and faithful reception of revelation. 
The Church’s task of reception is both creative and critical: First of all, it 
generates imaginative interpretations of the contents of revelation, adapting them 
to new and diverse historical contexts, which make such interpretations possible 
in the first place. Secondly, the approbative function of reception entails the 
critical discernment of the resulting interpretations in terms of their fidelity to the 
core elements of revelations and past authoritative interpretations (Rush, 2009). 
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Since the reception of the Word of God lies at the very heart of its mission, 
the Church has been rightly described as a ‘communion of those who receive the 
Gospel’ (Alberigo, 1987, p. 3; italics added). Guiding this ‘community of reception’ 
is the Holy Spirit, which not only makes reception possible, but also brings it to 
fulfillment by granting the recipient of revelation the wherewithal to engage in its 
reception (Beinert, 1997, p. 325). This gift from the Holy Spirit is called sensus 
fidei and is bestowed on the primary recipient of God’s revelation, which is the 
whole Church (CCC §91). 
The Catholic notion of the sensus fidei  
 
Key contemporary Church teachings on the sensus fidei are found in 
Vatican II’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (1964) (Lumen Gentium) and, 
most recently, in the groundbreaking 2014 document issued by the International 
Theological Commission called ‘Sensus fidei in the life of the Church’ (henceforth, 
SF).41  
Sensus fidei (literally, ‘sense of the faith’) refers to the Church’s and its 
members’ active capacity for spiritual discernment in their appropriation of 
revelation, the capacity to understand it (interpretive reception) and to discern 
authentic Christian doctrines and practices and reject what is false (approbative 
reception) (SF §2). The Church has recognized the notion of sensus fidei as early 
as the patristic and medieval periods, but its conceptualization emerged only with 
                                            
41 The International Theological Commission, composed of theologians distinguished ‘in the 
science of theology and fidelity toward the magisterium’ and appointed by the Pope, was 
established in 1969 to study important doctrinal questions and issues and acts in an advisory 
capacity to the pope and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Other conciliar 
documents use the following terms to refer to the sensus fidei: sensus catholicus (AA §30); 
sensus christianus fidelium (GS §52), sensus christianus (GS §62), sensus religious (NA §2, DH 
§4, GS §59); sensus dei (DV §15; GS §7), sensus Christi et ecclesiae (AG §19); instinctus (SC 
§24; PC §12, GS §18); implicitly in DV §8. 
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the passage of time in response to the context and needs of the Church 
beginning with the Reformation (SF §22ff).  
The capacity for meaningful and faithful reception 
 
Lumen Gentium makes two important points about sensus fidei: First, it is 
a common ecclesial gift, which expresses the underlying unity of faith in the 
Church despite its diverse charisms and ministries (Burkhard, 1993b). The 
sensus fidei is given to all members of the Church, by virtue of their baptism, 
enabling all the baptized, both lay and ordained, to participate in the prophetic 
office of Christ and to share in the Church’s teaching office (LG §12, 35). In a 
significant shift from a juridical ecclesiology that focuses almost exclusively on 
the hierarchy, Vatican II stresses the participation of all the faithful—including the 
laity—in the common mission of the Church. The Church’s mission is portrayed 
as a sharing in the three-fold ministry of Christ as ‘king, priest, and prophet’, 
corresponding respectively to the Church’s governing, sanctifying, and teaching 
office (LG §10-13, 31). Given this lay participation in Christ’s prophetic office, the 
Church’s teaching authority is not limited to its official teaching office, the 
magisterium (the college of bishops in unity with the Pope), but shared with the 
laity.  
Secondly, as a result of this gift, the Church as a corporate body ‘cannot 
err in matters of belief’ because of the charism of infallibility that is given to the 
whole Church’ (Vorgrimler, 1985, p. 3) based on its unity with Christ and the 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit (SF §28). This corporate infallibility is manifested in a 
consensus fidelium, when there is a common consent among the faithful—a 
universal agreement in matters of faith and morals in the Church ‘from the 
Bishops down to the last of the faithful’ (LG §12). 
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Hence, the sensus fidei is a ‘collective faith-consciousness’ that enables 
the whole Church to participate in the prophetic office of Christ, leading not only 
to a stronger faith, but also to a more correct understanding of it and its fuller 
application in one’s life (LG §12; Vorgrimler, 1985, p. 3). It is what enables the 
Church to engage in meaningful and faithful reception of revelation. 
Dimensions of sensus fidei 
 
To appreciate the different dimensions of sensus fidei, two distinctions 
need to be made: (a) the ecclesial and personal, and (b) the subjective and 
objective. 
Ecclesial and personal dimensions 
On the one hand, sensus fidei has for its agent the whole body of the 
Church. As an ecclesial reality, it is the Church’s instinct of faith, by which the 
Word of God is discerned and God’s presence and action recognized (Pie-Ninot, 
1994; SF §3). The sensus fidei is the Church’s ‘eyes of faith through the 
centuries’ 42  that enables it to fulfill its mission of faithfully receiving salvific 
revelation and effectively transmitting it for future generations through the 
centuries (Rush, 2009). 
However, the sensus fidei is not just the faith conviction of the whole 
Church, but also a believer’s interior disposition to the whole of revelation 
(Burkhard, 2005). Every member, especially those struggling to become 
‘believing and practicing disciples’, by virtue of baptism, also possesses a 
personal instinct of faith. 43 This capacity of individual believers is formed by one’s 
                                            
42 A range of synonyms and metaphors employed to refer to sensus fidei includes: ‘eyes of faith’ 
(Augustine, Epist. 120.2.8 [PL 33:458]), ‘light of faith’ (Aquinas, ST, 2-2, q. I, a. 5, ad I), ‘eyes of 
the spirit’, ‘illative sense’ (Newman, 1870).  
 
43 Although there is no unanimous consensus on the matter, Rush (2009) includes ‘inactive, 
lapsed, and disaffected’ Catholics as secondary sources of the sensus fidelium and other 
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participation in the life of the Church (ARCIC II, §29). Having no authoritative 
status of its own, the individual’s sensus fidei can be exercised legitimately only 
within the communion of believers and in union with the ecclesial sensus fidei 
(Tillard 1988, cited in Burkhard, 2005). 
Ambiguity in its terminology in the literature calls for some clarification. In 
such documents as Lumen Gentium, sensus fidei and sensus fidelium are 
employed interchangeably to refer to the Church’s communal sense of the faith 
while other authors reserve sensus fidei for the individual believer’s capacity and 
restrict sensus fidelium to its communal sense (Legrand, 1997; Rush 2001; Vitali, 
2001).  
In this study, the term sensus fidei will be used generically, but sensus 
fidelium (‘sense of the faithful’) or sensus fidei fidelium (‘sense of the faith on the 
part of the faithful’) will be restricted to the ecclesial dimension. When exercised 
by individual believers, sensus fidei will be called ‘sensus fidei fidelis’—i.e., the 
personal capacity of the believer to discern the truth of faith (Legrand, 1997; 
O’Donnell, 1996; SF §3). 
Subjective and objective dimensions 
 
Aside from the distinction between its ecclesial and personal dimensions, 
sensus fidei also refers to both the subjective capacity for making sense of the 
faith (‘a sense for the faith’) and the objective interpretations produced by the use 
of that capacity (‘senses of the faith’). This distinction corresponds to the 
distinction between fides qua creditur (the act of faith by which one believes) and 
                                                                                                                                  
Christian churches as its ancillary source, citing the ‘subsistence’ of the Church in the Catholic 
Church (LG §8) as indicating the presence and guiding action of the Holy Spirit in communities 
outside the Roman Catholic communion  (cf. AARC II; Burkhard, 2005; 2006; Glaser, 1968; Hartin, 
1991; Rush, 2001; 2009).   
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fides quae creditur (the content of faith which one believes) (Rahner, 1988b, p. 
152).  
Sensus fidei as a ‘sense for the faith’ refers to the Church’s organ of faith 
and its understanding, which, whether exercised corporately or individually, 
generates diverse ‘senses of the faith’—a multiplicity of interpretations of the faith 
resulting from the interpretive reception of revelation. These interpretations are 
not unconditionally authoritative; hence, the need to discern the authenticity of 
these varying senses of the faith, not all equally valid, and to judge which one, 
given a particular question of faith or morals, is faithful to the Word of God, and 
ought to be accepted and promulgated as ‘the faith of the Church.  
As I will propose later, the subjective dimension of the sensus fidei fidelis 
refers precisely to the believer’s capacity for religious critical thinking, while its 
objective dimension consists of their factual but ‘fragmentary and imperfect faith’ 
(Rahner, 1991, p. 167), or ‘concrete catechisms’ with their own hierarchy of the 
truths of faith that need precisely to be measured against the sensus fidelium 
(Rahner, 1988a, p. 165-166).  
 
On the other hand, the sensus fidelium refers to the faith of the Church—
more specifically, the underlying truths of the faith—i.e., ‘what the faithful believe 
and profess that can be grasped externally, objectively’ (Pie-Ninot, 1994, pp. 992-
3)—yet not necessarily articulated. If the Church reaches a consensus in its 
discernment and the hierarchical magisterium recognizes the ‘universal consent 
of the faithful’ and officially declares it as the faith of the Church, it is identified 
explicitly as a consensus fidelium (Legrand, 1997; O’Donnell, 1996). 
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Table 19: Terms and dimensions of sensus fidei 
 Personal dimension 
‘Sensus fidei fidelis’ 
Ecclesial dimension 
‘Sensus (fidei) fidelium’ 
Subjective dimension 
‘fides quae creditur’ 
(the faith by which  
we believe) 
Personal ‘sense for the faith’ 
The capacity for  
religious critical thinking 
Ecclesial sense for the faith 
 
Objective dimension 
‘fides qua creditur’ 
(the faith which we believe) 
Personal ‘sense of the faith’ 
Concrete catechisms 
Ecclesial ‘sense of the faith’ 
(‘The faith of the Church) 
If promulgated:  
Consensus fidelium 
The three conditions for the sensus fidelium  
 
Typical of its consistently anti-Gnostic allergy to ‘the elite and the esoteric’, 
it is the Church as an entire body—and no single privileged group within it—that 
is affirmed as the primary recipient of both revelation and the requisite sensus 
fidei to interpret revelation meaningfully and faithfully (LG §12; Rush, 2009, p. 64).  
The principle of reception 
 
The Holy Spirit as the very principle of the reception of revelation stirs this 
inner sense for the faith among the members of the Church and inspires not only 
the receptivity of faith to divine revelation, but also its correct understanding and 
formulation (ITC, 1989, C, II, I). The Holy Spirit’s guiding action, therefore, is a 
non-negotiable condition for the Church’s exercise of the sensus fidei. 
However, the dangers experienced by the early Church demonstrated the 
need for a continuation of apostolic authority in some form in order to preserve 
the truth of revelation, as well as the unity of faith (Scanlon, 1990). Aside from the 
Spirit’s gift of understanding, the Church’s reception of revelation is further 
conditioned by two norms established in the second and third centuries: the 
canon of Scripture and the judgements of bishops as embodied in the Church’s 
living tradition. Scripture and Tradition, comprising the deposit of faith, ensure the 
continuation of apostolic oversight and regulates the evaluation of all subsequent 
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‘senses of the faith’ and their approbation as the Church’s sensus fidelium (Rush, 
2009; Vorgrimler, 1985). 
The deposit of faith 
 
The mission of the Church consists of the meaningful and faithful reception 
of revelation, as well as its transmission and propagation. The reception of 
revelation and the ‘traditioning’ of what has been received are two distinct but 
inseparable aspects of the Church’s mission (Brueggemann, 2003, pp. 8-9).44  
The Church’s reception of revelation is in the service of tradition (Legrand, 
1997). Tradition is the living transmission of the apostolic preaching preserved 
and perpetuated through the continuous line of the succession of bishops (DV 
§7-8), and entails the reception of revelation: What has been received in faith and 
understanding needs to be handed on in tradition, but what has been handed on 
needs to be received anew for the sake of effective transmission to the next 
generation. Tradition is, therefore, intrinsically related to reception. In fact, in 
Catholic doctrine, the usual meaning of tradition as a process includes the 
reception of revelation because it is ‘the act of reception that renders the content 
of tradition concretely effective or formative of the life of the Church’ (Scanlon, 
1990, p. 3).  
Moreover, tradition refers not only to this twin process of reception-
transmission, but also to its product—i.e., what the Church has determined as 
official interpretations of revelation. Tradition as content refers primarily to the so-
called ‘deposit of faith’, which includes the written Word of God—Sacred 
Scripture—that norms revelation in a privileged—but by no means, exhaustive—
way. Both Scripture and Tradition are, therefore, themselves fruits of the 
                                            
44 ‘Tradition’ is used as a verbal to stress that it is a living tradition, an active and ongoing process 
of ‘imaginative remembering’ (Rush, 2009, pp. 8-9).  
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Church’s ongoing reception of revelation and sui generis products of the sensus 
fidelium: While Scripture is the foundational written expression of the early 
Church’s sensus fidelium, Tradition is the ongoing authoritative articulation of its 
sensus fidelium throughout history. The primary and secondary norms of 
revelation respectively, Scripture and Tradition are construed as foundationally 
normative of all subsequent receptions of revelation, against which the 
authenticity of every Church teaching is to be measured (DV §9-10) even as they 
themselves continue to require reception.  
Figure 1: Sensus fidelium, the apostolic tradition, and sacred scripture 
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            Sacred Tradition 
 
       Sensus fidelium 
 
The hierarchical magisterium 
 
The third condition for the Church’s exercise of the sensus fidei is the 
normative judgements of the hierarchical magisterium, the Church’s official 
teaching office. As a privileged criterion of Christian faith, the magisterium is 
entrusted with safeguarding the faith of the Church through its supervision of its 
faith-statements. As trustees of the content of revelation, the magisterium’s role is 
nevertheless restricted to the interpretation of faith, and their teaching is no less 
subject to reception (Burkhard, 1993b). 
The members of the magisterium—namely, the Pope and the bishops—
share in the sensus fidei, the fundamental instinct for the truth of the Gospel 
given to all the baptized. However, by virtue of their episcopal ordination, they are 
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believed to have received ‘the sure charism of truth’ (charisma veritatis certum) 
(LG §25; SF §76, 79). This magisterial charism refers to an ‘infallibility in teaching’ 
(infallibilitas in docendo) reserved for the Church’s official teaching office, which 
has been granted the special power to proclaim and authenticate the Word of 
God. It is, however, grounded on the Church’s more fundamental and universal 
charism of ‘infallibility in believing’ (infallibilitas in credendo) (LG §12, 25; SF 
§128). The episcopal charism is inseparable from the sensus fidelium and is 
linked to it in a mutual coordination of responsibilities (ARCIC-II, 1999) so that the 
two are exercised ‘in communion and in complementary, mutual service’ 
(Burkhard, 2005, p. 454). 
While the doctrine of the sensus fidei, therefore, corrects Vatican I’s 
overemphasis on hierarchical infallibility by contextualizing it within the Church’s 
infallibility (Beinert, 1971, cited in Burkhard, 1993b), it recognizes the 
magisterium’s special regulative function in the exercise of sensus fidelium (CCC 
§94). To it alone belongs the prerogative to make authoritative judgements and 
official formulations of the Church’s sensus fidelium (DV §10). The sensus 
fidelium, therefore, is intimately linked not only with Sacred Scripture, but also 
with the magisterium, whose normative judgements are necessary for the 
continuing development of Tradition.  
Three agents of the sensus fidei 
 
Vatican II does not limit the teaching office of the Church to the official 
magisterium, but declares it as shared by the whole Church, including the lay 
faithful. As the primary recipient of revelation and of the corresponding gift of the 
sensus fidei, the whole Church participates in Christ’s prophetic office and fulfills 
its teaching function (LG §12, 35). 
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The contribution of the faithful 
 
Vatican II stresses the positive contribution of the lay faithful in the 
development of the apostolic tradition by highlighting their experiences of ‘the 
intimate sense of spiritual realities’ in contrast to the theologian’s study of 
revelation and the bishops’ preaching (DV §8). The Church’s understanding of 
the Word of God is enriched by the praxis of faith because it is in the believer’s 
life of faith (vita fidelium) that the Christian faith is most concretely realized. Each 
lived faith is a privileged locus of revelatory experience because the sensus fidei 
is founded in the immediate experience of faith, where faith is inculturated and 
the meaningfulness of revelation comes to expression (Burkhard, 1993b; Tillard, 
1988, cited in Burkhard, 2005).   
Compared to the ordained and religious, lay people experience a greater 
proximity to family responsibilities, the economy, politics, and culture, and 
experience them with greater intensity. This privileged access to important realms 
of human existence and society enables the laity to appreciate certain facets of 
Christian revelation differently. Given the reciprocity between the practice of faith 
and the understanding of its content (SF §65). this daily immersion in the world 
provides them with a privileged grasp of the concrete implications and 
imperatives of the Gospel (Burkhard, 1993a). Questions and issues about a 
teaching sometimes emerge only when it is applied to one’s life; hence, the 
believers’ life of faith enables them to anticipate a development or explanation of 
a practice. The understanding of revelation takes place primarily in the daily faith-
life of believers (Alszeghy, 1988). 
It is the laity that accomplishes the religious socialization of each new 
generation, mediating revelation and handing on the faith (Burkhard, 1993b). 
Bishops and theologians play crucial roles in presenting the authentic Christian 
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faith in ever-changing situations, and at times need to confront and correct 
prevailing inaccurate notions with the truth of the Gospel. Many times in the 
history of the Church, however, the laity has played a significant role in the 
development of various Church doctrines—either through an unmistakable 
consensus among bishops, theologians, and the people (conspiratio pastorum et 
fidelium) or through a consultation with the laity, where the emerging consensus 
fidelium was considered an argument in support of a teaching. The Church’s 
history, in fact, includes occasions when the ‘truth of the faith’ has been 
preserved neither in theological study nor magisterial teaching, but, especially at 
times of disagreements between bishops and theologians, through the hearts of 
believers, whose intuitions have served as the deciding factor that tipped the 
scale45 (SF §72, 119).  
The development of Christian moral teachings, in particular, constitutes a 
contribution of the lay faithful. Guided by their sensus fidei, the lay faithful’s 
reflections on their concrete experiences in living out the Gospel and on the 
imperatives they encountered in real-life situations have served as the basis for 
the study of theologians and the judgements of the magisterium. Hence, the 
faithful’s life experiences, where they carry out their faith in actual practice and 
make moral judgements arising from their sensus fidei, are a valuable source of 
data for both the hierarchy and theologians, and a significant locus theologicus 
for the Church (Glaser, 1968; SF §73). In particular, the experiences and insights 
of Catholic social pioneers and activists have influenced the Church’s social 
                                            
45 For example, the laity’s sensus fidei was the decisive factor in the debates on the divinity of 
Christ, when for nearly sixty years even after its definition from the Council of Nicea in AD 325 
until the Council of Constantinople in AD 381, the bishops remained uncertain about the matter. It 
was the lay faithful that proclaimed it more than the bishops, constituting a ‘temporary suspension 
of the functions of the Ecclesia docens’ (i.e., the teaching Church) (SF §26). For other examples, 
see Newman (1859).  
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teachings especially in Pope Leo XIII’s 1896 Rerum novarum (1891), and the 
declaration on religious liberty in Dignitatis Humanae (1965) (SF §72-73). 
The unique contribution of the laity in matters of faith lies in the fact that 
the sensus fidelium is expressed not through rational or logical formulations, but 
through its practice in life, communicated in the richness of human experience. 
Since the truth of the faith encompasses the whole person’s existence rather than 
just what is expressed propositionally, it is the sensus fidelium that can more 
appropriately express what is intended by the faith (Burkhard, 1993a). Moreover, 
it is the lay faithful’s life of witness that endows faith with vitality and the power to 
attract believers (Bottigheimer, 1997, cited in Burkhard, 2006).  
As a genuine mediation of God’s Word, therefore, the sensus fidelium has 
a legitimate authority alongside that of the magisterium and theology, and is not 
merely to be tested against revelation or magisterial teachings (Beinert, 1993, 
cited in Burkhard, 2005). It serves what Beinert (1971, cited in Burkhard, 1993a) 
calls a ‘criteriological function’: The sensus fidelium, while inseparable from the 
magisterium, is unique because it provides a more concrete and more complete 
witnessing to the faith. But due to the lack of institutional means for expressing it, 
sensus fidelium as found in the praxis of the faith is not easy to clarify and 
determine (Vergauwen, 1999). 
The lay faithful are thus significant bearers of revelation. Far from being 
passive recipients of their bishops’ teachings and theologians’ explanations, the 
lay are called to be ‘living and active subjects’ who are expected to participate in 
the articulation and development of the faith (SF §67). The faithful are to be 
treated with respect, no longer expected to remain mere obedient and meek 
followers of their pastors or undervalued as second-class citizens in the Church. 
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Rather, they are encouraged to speak up and express themselves, playing an 
active role and to be, in appropriate ways, consulted in matters of governance 
and pastoral issues, as well as doctrine (SF §121-122; Vorgrimler, 1985).  
Three teaching authorities 
 
Along with the magisterium and the theologians, the lay faithful are agents 
of the sensus fidei that generate the development of doctrine and shape Tradition 
(SF §39, 46). By virtue of their sensus fidei, all three are called to participate in 
the prophetic office of Christ, each offering its own distinctive contribution (SF 
§11):  
(a) The magisterium, through their pastoral leadership, as well as their 
authentic interpretation of the Word of God, serves as the Church’s 
final arbiter in determining the Church’s sensus fidelium and 
formulating it into authentic teachings (DV §2, 8). 
(b) The theological community, through their academic scholarship and 
rational study (scientia fidei), promotes a deeper understanding of the 
contents of revelation in the light of the present context (DV §6; DVer 
§23-24; GS §2, 7, 44, 62; UR §4). 
(c) The lay faithful, who are neither authoritative teachers nor trained 
theologians, but comprise the vast majority of believers, make their 
unique contribution through reflections and insights that can only come 
from the concrete experiences of their lived faith, the vita fidelium, the 
most concrete incarnation of revelation (DV §2, 8; Gaillardetz, 1997a).  
The magisterium, theologians, and the lay faithful constitute ‘three 
teaching authorities within the Church’s one teaching office’: the official authority 
of the magisterium (normative), the scholarly authority of the theologians 
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(scientific), and most preeminently, the authority that derives from the believer’s 
concrete life of faith (experiential) (Duquoc, 1985). These are the three modes of 
the sensus fidei, of which the depositum fidei is the norm, and the sensus 
magisterii the sole official voice.   
Figure 2: The three agents of the sensus fidei 
 
Vatican II’s theology of revelation and reception mentions only scripture, 
tradition, and the magisterium, and does not explicitly mention two other essential 
expressions of Christian faith: theology and the sensus fidelium (Beinert, 1993, 
cited in Burkhard, 2005). Rush (2009) proposes that the formulation in DV §10, 
which merely implies sensus fidelium and theology, be revised so that these are 
made explicit. Hence: ‘It is clear, therefore, that [the sensus fidelium], sacred 
tradition, Sacred Scripture, [theology] and the teaching authority of the Church, in 
accord with God’s most wise design, are so linked and joined together that one 
cannot stand without the others, and that all together and each in its own way 
under the action of the one Holy Spirit contribute effectively to the salvation of 
souls’. 
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Ecclesial reception as a quest for consensus 
 
The interpretive and approbative reception of revelation is a quest for 
ecclesial consensus for the determination of the Church’s sensus fidelium in a 
particular matter of faith or morals. This universal ecclesial consensus—the 
‘consensus fidelium’ (‘the consensus of the faithful’)46—is the primary object of 
discernment in the Church. As the public expression of the faith of the whole 
Church, it is both a criterion for the authenticity of a Church teaching and a 
condition for the magisterial exercise of its infallibility in teaching.47 Consensus 
fidelium, which provides the service of interpreting dogmas (ITC 1989, C, II, 4), 
refers to a single formulation of an agreement among believers in a particular 
matter resulting from a process of ecclesial discernment involving the entire 
Church, though authoritatively judged, authentically formulated, and officially 
promulgated by the magisterium. In practice, the consensus fidelium, far from a 
given fact, remains an unfinished task, ‘always to be desiderated, of course, yet 
never completely attained’ (Haarsma, 1972, p. 125). 
The consensus fidelium refers not to a mere collection of opinions in the 
Church regarding a matter of faith or morals, but to a genuine faith-inspired 
convergence of faith among bishops, theologians and other scholars, as well as 
the ordinary faithful based on their fundamental sensus fidei. (Legrand, 1997). 
Hence, consensus fidelium is by no means decided exclusively through majority 
opinion, but through a careful discernment process whose primary criterion is 
what is eventually judged as the Church’s universal corporate sense of the faith, 
found not only bishops and theologians, but also in the laity (SF §47; Scheffczyk, 
                                            
46 Also referred to as: universum ecclesiae sensus (the universal understanding of the Church), 
sensus chirstianus, catholicus intellectus, communis fidei conscientia (Rush, 2009). 
47 The three other conditions to the content of infallible dogma aside from universal consensus 
are: (a) revelation, (b) Holy Spirit, and (c) magisterium (DV §8, 10; LG §12, 25). 
 151 
1988). Public opinion, however, remains valuable as one of several ways of 
determining the sensus fidelium (Burkhard, 2006).  
Given the controversies and heresies faced by the Church during the 
patristic period, the consensus fidelium—i.e., the faith of the whole Church as 
inferred from the faith and practices discerned in all the local churches—became 
an important criterion for discerning the content of the Apostolic Tradition (SF 
§23). In the first five centuries of its history, in fact, it was this sensus fidelium that 
was decisive not only in articulating the foundational doctrines of Christianity such 
as the divinity of Christ and the divine motherhood of Mary, but also in the 
formation of the canon of Scripture. 
 
A dialogic process 
The process by which the sensus fidelium is discerned and identified as a 
consensus in the Church can be a tedious and thorny process, requiring not only 
openness, but also the patient endurance of the tensions inherent in such a 
dialogic process (Beinert, 1993, cited in Burkhard, 2005). In recent decades, 
efforts in the Church to build such consensus have been weak, and not all parties 
involved have permitted themselves to be engaged in the process (Legrand, 
1997). If the Church’s reception of revelation, however, is a quest for authentic 
ecclesial consensus, the three foundational witnesses of revelation need to enter 
into a dialogue made possible by a balance between the faithful’s understanding 
of the faith and the hierarchy’s responsibility to define and teach it (Finucane, 
1996). While the faithful attend constantly to the teachings of bishops, the pope 
and the bishops, on their part, must listen to the concerns and questions of the 
faithful, with neither ‘lording it over the word of God’ (DV §10; Vitali, 2001). In a 
true conspiratio among its three agents, the sensus fidelium, first intuited by the 
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faithful, needs to be normed by Scripture, clarified by theologians, and finally, 
accepted by the magisterium (Burkhard, 1993a).  
A listening magisterium 
 
Ecclesial consensus is achieved only when the magisterium listens 
attentively to both the lay and the theological community. In order to determine 
the Church’s sense of the faith in the matter, the bishop—particularly through his 
priests—must listen attentively and respectfully to these manifestations of the 
sensus fidelium (Tillard, 1982). In a ‘reception in reverse’, the bishop enters into a 
process of ‘rethinking, weighing, testing and clarifying what the faithful (including 
theologians) are saying’ (Tillard, 1988, cited in Burkhard, 2005), and is, in the 
process, alerted by the sensus fidelium to any need that his local church might 
have for its well-being and mission, specifically if there is a necessity for a new 
reception of elements of the tradition (ARCIC-II, 1999; SF §74-75). 
Scheffczyk (1988) rejects three current models of the sensus fidei that 
impact on the relationship between the hierarchy and the laity: (a) as a wedge of 
opposition between the two, (b) as a means of check and balance against the 
abuse of power by either, and (c) as a mere device for elevating the self-worth of 
the lay faithful vis-à-vis the ordained. In their place, a more organic 
interrelationship between the two is proposed, where not only do both share in 
the sensus fidei, but the exercise of their distinct charisms are mutually reciprocal 
and beneficial: The sensus fidei of the faithful is provided direction and clarity 
from the magisterial guidance, while the magisterium draws from the 
concreteness of the laity’s life of witness. 
A listening theologian 
 
The process of determining the Church consensus likewise requires a 
listening theologian. Since the Christ event is believed to be a present salvific 
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reality that is most concretized in contemporary experiences of revelation, the 
starting point of theology is faith as lived by the Church, and its proper locus the 
sensus fidelium. Hence, theologians must be open to the legitimate and rich 
theological resource that is the sensus fidelium, including prophetic and mystical 
movements (SF §82). 
The theologian strives for a rational, critical, and systematic understanding 
of the faith both as taught by the magisterium and as embodied in the practical 
intuitions of the sensus fidelium; theirs is a necessary mediation between the 
hierarchy and the faithful that results in the credibility of the Gospel both within 
and beyond the Church (Bottigheimer, 1997). 
Hence, the three distinct witnesses to revelation depend on one another in 
their communal pursuit of the truth of the faith.  For this reason, the pastors and 
theologians need to encourage the laity to express themselves. The ‘listening 
bishop and the ‘listening theologian’ are, therefore, crucial for receiving and 
determining the sensus fidelium (SF §74, 81). A genuine voice for the laity can be 
heard only through meaningful dialogues, such as those possible in synods. But 
the contemporary Church lacks adequate institutional means for expressing and 
clarifying this voice, with the laity de facto resorting to public opinion, as 
illustrated by the widespread rejection of the Humanae Vitae (Pottmeyer, 1991). It 
is, therefore, through the deliberate efforts of both bishops and theologians that 
the sensus fidelium, in the absence of procedures or mechanisms, can be 
accessed and included in the discernment of ecclesial consensus. 
 
CATHOLIC RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY AS CRITICAL REALIST 
 
 
In this next section, I will propose that the Catholic religious epistemology 
that emerges from its theology of revelation manifests a critical realist 
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commitment to judgemental rationality by showing its underlying conviction in 
both ontological realism and epistemic relativism. In particular, I will argue that 
the notion of sensus fidei establishes the epistemic relativist quality of Catholic 
religious epistemology because it highlights: (a) the socio-historical process of 
reception, (b) the perspectival relativity of our beliefs, and (c) the inevitable 
development of doctrine. By virtue of its ontological realism and epistemic 
relativism, therefore, not only does Catholic religious epistemology permit the 
possibility of judgemental rationality, but also, in fact, requires it. 
Sensus fidei and the possibility and necessity of judgemental rationality 
 
As in the case of the sciences and human knowing in general, religious 
knowing is possible and intelligible only if the intransitivity of reality is assumed. 
The denial of a mind-independent reality renders knowing in any domain 
unintelligible. Catholic religious epistemology, in particular, requires an 
ontological realism that posits the intransitivity of God and the reality revealed by 
His revelation. For if the contents of revelation were but human fabrications, then 
it would not make sense at all to speak either of revelation or reception. 
Ontological realism: The intransitive dimension of revelation  
 
Catholic doctrine’s assertion of the necessity of divine revelation illustrates 
the intransitive dimension of revelation and reveals the ontological realism 
underlying Catholic religious epistemology. 
Reason as limited and our need for revelation and faith 
 
The whole Christian theology of revelation is premised on the inadequacy 
of human reason to know God. The utterly independent existence of God—i.e., 
His transcendence—is the basis for the Catholic teaching on revelation; it also 
constitutes the foundation for Catholic ontological realism.  
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While the Church teaches that human reason can know about God with 
certainty from the created world (DF §114, DS §6), human reason inevitably falls 
short because God is transcendent—‘the inexpressible, the incomprehensible, 
the invisible, the ungraspable’ (Chrysostom, —then human reason will inevitably 
fall short (DS §3876). As Thomas Aquinas wrote in his via negativa: 
‘…concerning God, we cannot grasp what he is, but only what he is not, and how 
other beings stand in relation to him’ (SCG §1, 30). The Fourth Lateran Council 
similarly declared that ‘between creator and creature, no similitude can be 
expressed without implying an even greater dissimilitude’ (Lateran Council IV; DS 
§806). 
Hence, we require divine revelation because the limits of natural reason 
prevents us from accessing what only revelation can offer: ‘divine treasures 
which totally transcend the understanding of the human mind’ (DF, DS §3005).  
While we can rely on our reason to know God’s existence (‘that God is’) 
and to infer, to a limited extent, God’s nature (‘what God is’), only the illuminative 
light of faith can offer us a fuller knowledge about God and ‘the eternal decrees of 
His free will’ and the ‘divine goods which altogether surpass the understanding of 
the human mind’ (DF §5, ND §113-114). In fact, the knowledge offered by 
revelation is a personal knowledge of God (‘who God is’). According to Aquinas, 
for instance, reason can establish the existence of the one God, but only 
revelation enables us to recognize the mystery of God’s triune nature (Benedict, 
2010). Because of these limits of human reason, faith in divine revelation is 
necessary for salvation (ND §122, 132). 
According to Catholic theology, God can be known through human reason 
only in a limited manner given the finitude and fallibility of our knowing. We are 
dependent on God for our knowledge of Him; revelation is not only distinct from 
our knowledge, but also wholly independent of it. 
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Revelation as pure divine initiative 
 
Revelation is God’s act of self-communication with humanity, freely 
initiated by Him, its manner and time of implementation completely determined by 
God. Revelation is a purely divine and totally human-independent initiative. 
Without asserting this human-independent nature of revelation, revelation would 
be a mere human product, so there can be neither possibility nor sense in the 
notion of either revelation or reception. The idea of the reception of revelation is, 
therefore, rooted in and contingent on the intransitivity of reality—in this case, the 
transcendence of God and His revelation. 
Ontological realism underlies the Catholic theology of revelation, most 
evident in its insistence on revelation as a completely free initiative from God. 
Based on its theology of revelation and its reception, Catholic religious 
epistemology is premised on the belief that God, the ultimate ground of reality, 
can be known only in God’s own terms—i.e., in the precise manner and time that 
He wishes. It is God who initiates His self-communication, and God alone who 
determines His own cognitive possibility. Since it is God who, as it were, calls the 
shots in His self-revelation, and since His act of revelation is by no means 
dependent on its intended human recipients or the power of their reason, Catholic 
religious epistemology is unmistakably grounded in ontological realism. 
The teaching that unless there is reception, revelation remains unrealized 
may be misconstrued as a case of the epistemic fallacy, where the intransitivity of 
revelation is collapsed into the transitive dimension of reception. Instructive here 
are the critical realist insights into depth stratification and open-system causality. 
Since the world is an open system, divine revelation may have no realized—and 
perceived—effect given the interaction of divine, social, and especially 
psychological causes operative during the act of reception. Without reception, 
revelation is not actualized. 
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Epistemic relativism: The historical nature of revelation and the transitive  
 
process of reception 
 
While divine revelation has a non-negotiable intransitive dimension, it also 
has an essentially transitive—i.e., historical and sociocultural—aspect. This 
inherent—but often overlooked—epistemic relativism of Catholic religious 
epistemology may be gleaned from its teachings on the historicity of revelation 
and the transitive nature of the process of reception and tradition.48  
By no means synonymous with the judgemental relativism rejected by the 
Catholic Church as incompatible with its faith, epistemic relativism refers to the 
historically conditioned quality of Church teachings, as well as their reception and 
articulation. This acknowledgement of the socio-historical process of reception by 
no means compromises the Church’s essential continuity with the first apostles. It 
is, in fact, the sensus fidelium resulting from the ongoing inculturation of the 
Gospel by the Church that ensures this continuity (Crowley, 1992). 
The historical and relational quality of revelation 
  
Historicity is a constitutive and organic element of revelation. According to 
Christian doctrine, God has chosen to reveal Himself within history through a 
gradual and piecemeal process of divine self-communication involving different 
stages of revelation that unfolds through specific historical events and is 
mediated by specific historical persons before definitively culminating in a 
chronologically specified point in the person of Jesus of Nazareth (DV §4; 
Latourelle, 1994).  
                                            
48 There are indications that Aquinas had an insight into epistemic relativism, as evidenced by the 
following: ‘whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the 
receiver (Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur’) (ST, 1a, q. 75, a. 5; 3a, q. 5); and ‘“a 
thing known exists in a knower according to the mode of a knower’ (Cogitum…est in cognoscente 
secundum modum cognoscentis) (ST, 1a, q. 12, a. 4). 
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This historical particularity of Christianity, labeled in the 19th century as ‘the 
scandal of particularity’, is rooted in its central doctrine of the Incarnation and the 
belief that the salvation of all humanity is achieved through one geo-historically 
particular person, Jesus of Nazareth. The same historical particularity is evident 
in its theology of revelation: Christianity is not a religion of timeless truths as it is 
about accounts of particular events in the lives of particular people belonging to 
particular historical eras (Himes, 1997). 
Its historical and relational notion reveals the transitive dimension of 
Christian revelation and illustrates the epistemic relativist quality of Catholic 
religious knowing. For God’s interventions are ‘embedded in human events, are 
perceived by human minds, and are communicated by human words and images’ 
(Orsy, 1987, p. 476).  
The historical and social process of the reception of revelation 
 
The Church’s insistence on the equally important role that Tradition plays 
alongside Sacred Scripture acknowledges the transitive dimension of revelation. 
It is the process of ecclesial reception, empowered by its sensus fidei, that drives 
and shapes the Church’s tradition and makes it a living one. For Congar (1966), 
tradition makes explicit what is implicit in Scripture. As a result of its centuries-old 
activity of reception, the Church has generated—and continues to generate—a 
tradition that incorporates increasingly deeper understanding and increasingly 
detailed elaborations of revelation. It is because of this constant inculturation and 
interpretation of revelation, requiring both invention and reinvention, that 
Christianity has continued to be ‘the living faith of the dead’ and not ‘the dead 
faith of the living’ (Pelikan, 1984, p. 65). The development of Church Tradition, 
like the ecclesial reception on which it is wholly dependent, is a transitive 
process.  
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The crucial role attributed by Catholic doctrine to the sensus fidei in the 
reception and traditioning of revelation illustrates the epistemic relativism of its 
religious epistemology. The Church’s task of interpreting revelation necessarily 
takes place within socio-historical and cultural specificities, and entails the 
understanding and application of revelation for every new context. Because of the 
historical nature of its intended recipients, by no means have all the implications 
and significance of revelation been spelled out. The passage of time and the 
changing historical contexts require the Church—precisely through the exercise 
of the sensus fidei—to deepen its understanding of revelation and to unwrap its 
manifold meaning (DV §9). Indeed it is for this reason that reception is never 
complete and remains an open and ongoing process long after the core of 
Christian revelation has been completed in Jesus Christ.  
The Church’s continuing need to discern the sensus fidelium across 
generations is proof of the historical and hermeneutical character of reception, 
and consequently, the openness of the truth of revelation. Moreover, the 
necessity for dialogue among its agents demonstrates the incompleteness of 
human knowledge—even of the magisterium: Taken alone, one acquires at best 
a partial understanding of revelation, regardless of one’s ecclesial status 
(Burkhard, 2006). Doctrines are open since they have, in the past and with the 
necessary concurrence of bishops, submitted to change, with bishops learning 
from the sensus fidelium (Dionne, 1987). Moreover, the sensus fidelium always 
has an unfulfilled and open status—‘true knowledge, but knowledge that is also 
partial and that expresses the pilgrim character of all saving knowledge, both for 
the individual believer and for the whole community of believers…. Faith is 
always both project and possession’ (Burkhard, 2006, p. 52). 
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The transitive products of the reception of revelation 
  
The exercise of the sensus fidei in various communal and individual 
receptions of revelation generates a multiplicity of interpretations of the faith with 
varying degrees of orthodoxy. The Church’s sense for the faith breeds different 
senses of the faith. The process of interpretive reception yields what Rahner 
(1988a) calls ‘concrete catechisms’—i.e., individual and communal religious 
convictions based on, but short of, the official catechism.  
Like the production of knowledge in other fields, the generation of these 
interpretations of the faith does not happen tabula rasa or ex nihilo: It is a 
communal and activity-dependent task that continually builds on the past in a 
spirit of creative fidelity. Reception is always normed by the faith of the Church as 
embodied in Sacred Scripture and Tradition. Communal and individual senses of 
the faith, therefore, are conditioned and produced by means of antecedent 
senses of the faith, especially those incorporated within the Church’s deposit of 
the faith. For this reason, the reception of revelation has a necessarily social and 
transitive character.  
There has also been an increased consciousness of the cultural-linguistic 
character of the Church’s expressions of faith: In order to mediate meaning to 
historically particular persons, the language used in expressing the Church’s 
beliefs also need to change. For both theological and cultural-linguistic reasons, 
however, this task of redefining the faith is not the exclusive domain of the 
hierarchy, but is the responsibility of the whole Church (Sartori, 1981). 
The diversity of the expressions of faith resulting from the sensus fidei is 
significant for several reasons. First of all, contrary to expectations, diversity—
particularly the diversity of theological expressions generated by the theological 
community—is necessary for mediating the faith (Tillard, 1982). Moreover, the de 
facto existence of different—and sometimes conflicting—interpretations of the 
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faith with varying degrees of fidelity to revelation demonstrates the perspectival 
relativity of the Church’s reception of revelation. Finally, the historicity, diversity, 
and fallibility of these fallible formulations of faith establishes the Church’s need 
to critically discern these varied interpretations through an ecclesial exercise of 
judgemental rationality. 
Hence, the ongoing task of ecclesial reception, as demanded by the 
changing historical contexts of the Church and as enabled by its sensus fidei, is 
an indication of the epistemic relativism underlying the Catholic theology of 
revelation and characteristic of Catholic religious epistemology that it defines. 
This reception of revelation is an inherently transitive process, by which the 
Church, drawing from its sensus fidei, understands, interprets, and applies the 
content of revelation in changing historical contexts. Resulting from the reception 
of revelation is a multiplicity of communal and individual interpretations of the 
faith, illustrating not only the epistemic relativism characteristic of Catholic 
religious epistemology, but also the Church’s ongoing need to exercise 
judgemental rationality. 
In conclusion, the Catholic theology of revelation and its human—and 
necessarily socio-historical—reception fosters a religious epistemology that is 
properly critical realist, defined by a fundamental ontological realism and 
epistemic relativism, resulting not only in an option for judgemental rationality, but 
an actual mandate for it.  
Judgemental rationality: Doctrines as retroductive models   
 
In its approbative reception of revelation, the Church assesses the 
authenticity of various interpretations of the faith generated by its interpretive 
reception, constituting an ecclesial exercise of judgemental rationality. The 
sensus fidei underlying this interpretive reception, which produces the multiplicity 
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of finite and fallible interpretations of the faith, is the same sense for the faith 
operative in the Church’s task of approbative reception. In Catholic religious 
epistemology, the sensus fidei is the condition for the possibility of exercising 
judgemental rationality.  
Abductive reasoning and retroductive explanations 
 
Ecclesial reception refers not only to the ongoing interpretation and 
deepening of understanding of Christian revelation, but also the judgement of the 
authenticity of these interpretations in light of their fidelity to the faith of the 
Church. Despite the limits of reason, the Church needs to evaluate different ways 
of understanding the revealed mysteries of faith and to identify which one best 
articulates their truth. The sensus fidei provides the Church an assurance of the 
Holy Spirit’s assistance in this two-fold task of interpretive and approbative 
reception. The Church’s meaningful and faithful reception of revelation, which 
generates the multiplicity of expressions of the faith with varying degrees of 
orthodoxy, may be conceived as an ecclesial exercise of judgemental rationality, 
paralleling the critical realist abductive-retroductive-iterative process through 
which scientific explanations are produced.  
The abductive-retroductive-iterative process entails a search for the most 
powerful and comprehensive explanations possible to help us understand an 
object or event. It consists in the construction of theoretical models, beginning 
from abduction leading to retroduction and onto iteration. Abductive moments are 
constituted by breakthrough encounters with reality, characterized by new 
insights or hunches resulting from the discovery of new data or fresh 
perspectives of existing problems. These novel insights and perspectives prompt 
us to formulate retroductive hypotheses of plausible underlying causes to account 
for the reality under investigation. Judgemental rationality is exercised in the 
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choice of the best possible explanation, which is iteratively tested, refined, and if 
necessary, replaced with an explanatorily superior one (McGrath, 2009). 
The canon of scripture 
 
The formation of canonical scripture in the early Church demonstrates the 
Church’s exercise of judgemental rationality in its task of interpretive and 
approbative reception. The whole canonization process of Scripture resulted from 
the exercise of both individual and communal sensus fidei, generating diverse 
senses of the faith and judging between sometimes conflicting claims. From 
among this plurality of interpretations about the meaning of the life and person of 
Jesus Christ, the Church made the choice of which writings to include in the New 
Testament based largely on their usage by the different churches. The ecclesial 
consensus on the canon of Scripture affirms that these—and only these—writings 
provide ‘a single standard sufficient for both expressing the unity of the faith and 
for judging legitimate diversity in the ongoing interpretation of the Christ event’ 
(Rush, 2009, p. 151).  
Two things need to be noted in the formation of the canon of the Christian 
scripture: First, the books included in the New Testament continue to represent 
an entire range of diverse retroductive accounts of Jesus Christ, illustrating that 
unity in the faith and the plurality of its expressions need not be mutually 
exclusive (Burkhard, 2005). Secondly, the Scripture, unlike, for example, the 
Q’uran, is acknowledged as a transitive product of the Church’s transitive process 
of interpreting revelation and as a norma normans ut normata (‘an interpreting 
interpretation’ because Scripture constitutes a ‘model interpretation’), requires 
continuing interpretation (Boff, 2009, p. 140). 
The canonical scripture was the outcome of a careful discernment in 
pursuit of ecclesial consensus. Its formation exemplifies the prolonged, if not 
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convoluted, process through which the Church reaches a universal consensus in 
particular questions of faith and morals. Far from following a neat and formal 
decision-making procedure, the determination of the Church’s sensus fidelium 
entailed a wide and diffuse communal discernment that lasted over four 
centuries, involving the laity, theologians, and bishops, and was overseen—but 
by no means controlled by—the latter. 
Possible objections to a critical realist Catholic religious epistemology 
 
Epistemic relativism in Christianity entails a rejection of any form of 
premature epistemic closure and the recognition that its truth claims about the 
ultimate nature of reality are historically conditioned and consequently 
necessarily incomplete. True to the critical realist spirit, this admission of the 
contingency of human knowing does not entail an abandonment of the evaluative 
task.  
For Catholic theologian Edward Schillebeeckx, precisely because all 
knowledge is made possible by the framework of language and history, ‘the Holy 
Spirit can be distorted by the manipulation of those in office or their negligence. 
The Magisterium can produce poorly formulated or one-sided doctrines that need 
correction in the context of the wider Christian tradition’ (Thompson, 2003, p. 27; 
italics mine). The Church recognizes the products of its exercise of judgemental 
rationality—the classical Christian doctrines—as human constructs that cannot 
be complete expressions of the ultimate truth even as a classical Christian 
doctrine like the Blessed Trinity, for instance, is officially promulgated as having a 
superior explanatory power—at least, thus far—as a retroductive account of the 
nature of God (Wright, 2013).  
A Catholic dogma like the teaching on papal infallibility, taken in itself—has 
understandably been described as a Catholic ‘flirtation with epistemic closure’ 
 165 
(Wright, 2013, p. 88). However, the dogma of papal infallibility, when examined 
within its historical context, emerges as largely a defensive reaction of the papacy 
against the perceived perils of modernism. Secondly, it was a contested doctrine 
even during its discussions at the First Vatican Council, so that as a result of the 
deliberations, the exercise of papal infallibility was restricted only to matters of 
faith and morals and only to occasions when the pope speaks ex cathedra.  
What is significant is that the dogma of papal infallibility by no means 
ignores the sensus fidelium, but in fact presupposes it as its basis. The original 
draft constitution, Supremi Pastoris, had devoted one chapter to the infallibility of 
the Church as the foundation of papal infallibility although its discussion was 
deferred and not taken up. However, the spirit of the teaching on papal infallibility 
is that it is not divorced from the rest of the Church and entails consultation (SF 
§40). Papal infallibility, far from a personal prerogative of the Pope, is an 
expression of—and cannot be divorced from—the ecclesial ‘infallibility in 
believing’—reserved especially for occasions when there is a clear consensus 
fidelium (Sartori, 1981). The consensus fidelium serves as one of the criteria 
used by the magisterium in defining the faith of the Church. While the consent of 
the Church is not a juridical requirement for the legitimacy of a doctrine, it serves 
as a confirmation of what is officially taught (Haarsma, 1972). For this reason, in 
the Catholic Church, the common consent among the faithful—or consensus 
fidelium—is considered the sure manifestation of the authenticity of a doctrine or 
practice and serves as a confirmation that it belongs to the apostolic faith (SF 
§3). 
This restriction of the exercise of papal infallibility to cases of the 
consensus fidelium is illustrated in the infallible definitions of the dogmas of the 
Immaculate Conception of Mary and the Assumption into Heaven; in both cases, 
the sensus fidelium played an important role (Heft, 1992; SF §27). Consultation 
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was conducted for both, and the data showed the belief in Mary’s Immaculate 
Conception, as well as her Assumption, was ‘thoroughly rooted in the minds of 
the faithful’. Pope Pius XII observed that the conspiratio showed ‘in an entirely 
certain and infallible way’ that Mary’s Assumption was ‘a truth revealed by God 
and contained in that divine deposit which Christ delivered to his Spouse to be 
guarded faithfully and to be taught infallibly’. In both cases, then, the papal 
definitions confirmed and celebrated what were already the deeply held beliefs of 
the faithful’ (SF §42). 
The Catholic teachings on infallibility—whether or not actually exercised 
officially by the Pope and bishops—may be misconstrued as a claim to epistemic 
closure that is contrary to epistemic relativism. However, without explicitly 
admitting their fallibility, the Church’s doctrines on the necessary reception of 
revelation and the function of the faithful’s sensus fidei acknowledge the 
contingency and limitations of its retroductive doctrines and dogmas.  
In summary, Catholic religious epistemology, understood as critical realist, 
subscribes to what Collier (1994) calls a realist and rationalist account of religious 
belief: Not only does it make truth claims about reality (realist), but it also asserts 
that there are grounds for faith in these truth claims (rationalist). Only such a 
realist and rationalist epistemology—i.e., critical realist—enables us to accept ‘a 
judgmental rationalism within an epistemic relativism within an ontological 
realism’ (p. 44). 
The sensus fidei and a critical realist Catholic religious epistemology 
 
The Catholic notion of the sensus fidei helps us define a Catholic religious 
epistemology that may be characterized as critical realist, with the requisite 
ontological realism and especially epistemic relativism. Ontological realism is 
manifested by its fundamental assertion of the transcendental nature of God’s 
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revelation as a totally free and independent divine initiative and as humanly 
inaccessible knowledge, as well as the resulting human need for divine revelation 
and our strictly non-negotiable reliance on God for the manner and content of 
revelation.  
Its less apparent epistemic relativism, however, is established by the 
sensus fidei by highlighting the historicity of reception: The sensus fidei 
constitutes precisely the Church’s capacity to engage in the socio-historical 
process of interpretive reception—i.e., its inevitably ongoing task of making sense 
of revelation in changing historical times. Furthermore, the plurality of finite and 
fallible ‘senses of the faith’ generated by ecclesial and individual reception 
illustrates the perspectival relativity of the human reception of revelation and 
establishes the need precisely for judgemental rationality: The Church’s task of 
assessing the diverse interpretations in order to determine the sensus fidelium 
becomes all the more necessary—not just for the preservation of the truth but 
also for the unity of the faith. 
The Church’s doctrine-generating task of reception is significant because 
these formulations of the Church’s beliefs indicate its realist character: The 
doctrines claim epistemological purchase on ontological reality (Wright, 2013). 
Reception also results in the development of doctrine—i.e., the Church’s ever-
deepening understanding of the content of revelation as the fruit of centuries of 
prayer, study, reflection, and practice of faith—demonstrating its commitment to 
and exercise of judgemental rationality. The Church’s body of doctrines—the 
depositum fidei—may be viewed as a growing collection of retroductive accounts 
of reality that are iteratively refined and deepened in time—in a manner similar to, 
but also significantly different from, the scientific enterprise. 
While the logic of judgemental rationality is shared by—and 
characterizes—every science, the way it is exercised varies in a domain-
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dependent manner. True to the critical realist spirit, the possibility and manner of 
verifying a particular retroductive account—whether it can be purposefully 
induced as in the case of the experimental sciences or not as in the intrinsically 
open human and social sciences—varies from one ontological level to another, 
just as the criteria used for the selection, refinement, or rejection of retroductive 
accounts also differ from domain to domain. 
Hence, Catholic religious epistemology may be characterized as properly 
critical realist as it adheres to the triad of ontological realism, epistemic relativism, 
and judgemental rationality (Table 20). This commitment to judgemental 
rationality, which is possible, intelligible, and necessary in light of its ontological 
realism and epistemic relativism, provides the oft-overlooked but much-needed 
raison d’etre for Catholic religious critical thinking. 
Table 20: Summary of the critical realist character of Catholic religious epistemology 
Ontological realism Transcendent nature of revelation: divine initiative and limits of reason 
Epistemic relativism Socio-historical nature of interpretive reception 
Perspectival relativity of interpretations and expressions of faith 
Judgemental rationality Need for approbative reception 
 
In the next section, I will focus on the individual believer’s exercise of the 
sensus fidei and suggest its exercise as the legitimate form of Catholic religious 
critical thinking.  
 
CATHOLIC RELIGIOUS CRITICAL THINKING 
 
AS THE EXERCISE OF SENSUS FIDEI 
 
Critical thinking as the expression of one’s commitment to judgemental 
rationality provides the needed rationale for the practice of critical thinking and 
constitutes an essential basis for the so-called ‘critical spirit’. However, the 
disposition for critical thinking, while necessary, is not sufficient. A domain-
appropriate competence in critical thinking is also called for.  
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In this section, I will first analyze the notion of the individual sensus fidei 
based on the Church’s recognition of the role of the laity in the reception of 
revelation. I will then propose that the specific form of critical thinking involved in 
one’s personal reception of revelation is the exercise of one’s sensus fidei, 
clarifying that Catholic religious critical thinking entails a distinct kind of knowing 
that is not purely rationalistic. Given this conception of Catholic religious critical 
thinking as both an expression of judgemental rationality and an exercise of the 
believer’s sensus fidei, an important goal of Catholic religious education will be to 
encourage reasoned and faithful assent. I will discuss how sensus fidei opens up 
the possibility of legitimate dissent, a necessary condition for any authentic 
exercise of critical thinking. Finally, I will recommend two initial concrete steps to 
work towards promoting critical thinking in confessional Catholic religious 
education, given the insights of this study.  
The sensus fidei of the individual believer 
 
An important dimension of sensus fidei is its exercise by the individual 
believer. This personal aptitude to discern the truth of the faith (‘sensus fidei 
fidelis’) enables the believer to judge the conformity of a particular doctrine or 
practice to the Gospel and to the Christian faith as received in the Apostolic 
Tradition (SF §49). It is distinct from, but rooted in, its communal counterpart. 
Since all members of the Church share in its corporate sensus fidei (LG 
§12), they each possess a personal form of this faith consciousness, rooted in 
one’s response to the revelation entrusted to and interpreted by the Church (SF 
§49). Just as the faith of the individual believer participates in the faith of the 
Church, the individual’s sensus fidei is inseparable from its sensus fidelium (SF 
§48; 65-66). The ecclesial sensus fidelium is the environment that both nurtures 
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and regulates the individual’s sensus fidei. But every believer’s sensus fidei also 
contributes to—and enriches—the Church’s sensus fidelium. 
Sensus fidei as a mode of knowing 
 
If, as proposed, Catholic religious critical thinking is conceived as the 
exercise of one’s sensus fidei, we need to investigate whether sensus fidei 
constitutes a valid way of knowing and what mode of knowing it entails. At the 
outset, the sensus fidei is to be distinguished from the scientia fidei of theology 
and from the normative judgements of the magisterium. Compared to the 
scientific and normative modes distinctive of theologians and bishops, 
respectively, the mode of understanding by the faithful is fundamentally 
experiential (Alszeghy, 1988). However, this ‘spontaneous judgement of a loyal 
and faithful Catholic’ possesses not only a credibility grounded on the witness of 
their lived faith, but also, as a consequence, significant theological value (Glaser, 
1968, p. 742). 
What sensus fidei is not 
 
To define the type of knowing that constitutes sensus fidei, we need to 
eliminate common misconceptions about it—namely, that it is (a) purely 
discursive, (b) anti-rational and subjective, (c) passive and mechanical, and (d) 
individualistic. 
Purely discursive  
 
What its very name as a ‘sense of faith’ makes clear is that the sensus 
fidei is not identical to discursive or theoretical knowledge. It is not a science (as 
in the theologian’s scientia fidei), but rather a sense, a ‘supernatural instinct’ (SF 
§2). It refers to the more direct and immediate kind of knowing prior to the 
secondary moment of abstraction and conceptualization. It is more intuitive and 
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not totally susceptible to conceptual articulation. The sensus fidei corresponds 
more to the fides qua (‘the act of faith by which we believe’) which enables and 
conditions our understanding, interpretation and application of the fides quae 
(‘the content of faith that we believe’) (Rush, 2009).  
The sensus fidei is what Rahner calls a pre-conceptual form of knowing 
(knowledge as tacit, non-discursive, non-reflexive) as distinguished from 
conceptual knowing (knowledge as explicit, thematized, reflexive). Both forms of 
knowing have limitations, which can be overcome only through the use of both. 
Neither is superior to the other, with the exclusive right ‘to act as the court of last 
appeal in all instances’ (Glaser, 1968, p. 749). Hence, the pre-conceptual mode 
of knowing entailed by the sensus fidei is valid, but requires the conceptual 
modes of theological study and magisterial teachings to complete it. 
Anti-rational and subjective 
 
The unfortunate, though understandable, definition of sensus fidei as 
‘intuition, instinct, or spontaneous judgement’ may suggest that it is not rational. 
The point of these definitions is to clarify that the sensus fidei is not limited to 
discursive reasoning, definition or strict analysis, but no less legitimately belongs 
to the realm of knowing (Burkhard, 1993b). It has been compared to an 
experienced medical practitioner’s ‘clinical eye’ (Haarsma, 1972, p. 120). Hence, 
the sensus fidei is not an anti-rational ‘feeling’ or ‘sixth sense’ (Thompson, 1973). 
Though spontaneous and non-discursive and non-conceptual, it is no less 
rational but is specific to the faith out of which it arises: It gives reasons for 
everything relevant to that faith (Haarsma, 1972). In fact, it has theological value 
despite its inarticulate and spontaneous form (Glaser, 1968). 
Moreover, while it constitutes a personal and interior understanding of the 
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faith, it cannot be reduced to subjective knowledge or opinion. Even tacit and 
non-theoretical knowledge (practice, emotion) is object-centered—i.e., defined 
not by its knower, but by its object. In fact, tacit knowledge, when articulated, 
often proves as objective as theoretical knowledge (Collier, 2003). 
Passive and mechanical 
 
Sensus fidei is also not the mere passive reception of magisterial 
teachings. It refers to the underlying pre-conceptual grasp of the faith that actively 
seeks consensus within the Church. The sensus fidei is always active—and 
interactive (Thompson, 1973).  The temptation to conceive of the sensus fidei as 
passive, as compared to the active knowing of the magisterium and theology 
corresponds to the outdated and artificial distinction between a ‘learning Church 
(ecclesia discerns) and a ‘teaching Church (ecclesia docens). As clarified by 
Vatican II, the entire Church is called to learn and teach (Burkhard, 1993b).  
There is also a naïve tendency to regard the sensus fidei as supernatural 
not only in terms of its origin in the Holy Spirit, but also in its actual operation: A 
believer automatically or even magically acquires infallible understanding of the 
faith—without any reliance on one’s human faculties (Thompson, 1973). 
Recipients of the sensus fidei, however, are called to exercise it, and in its 
exercise, they inevitably bring ‘the weight of their own fragility, power, self-
appointed goals and sinfulness into play’ (Burkhard, 1993b, p. 133). 
Individualistic 
 Finally, as discussed earlier, the sensus fidei can never be exercised 
exclusively by an isolated individual believer in a manner divorced from the 
primary recipient of revelation, which is the whole Church. It must always be 
understood relationally—in terms of the believer as a member of the Church 
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(Beinert, 1971, cited in Burkhard, 1993a). Its authentic exercise must always be 
regulated by the rule of faith, the rule of dialogue with theologians and 
magisterium (Alszeghy, 1988; Beinert, 1993, cited in Burkhard, 2005). Moreover, 
sensus fidei requires a basis of trust between believers since a person’s faith is 
necessarily mediated by the faith community and operates in a circular structure, 
where the Church’s beliefs (fides quae) elicit an individual’s faith (fides qua), 
which in turn enriches the ecclesial faith (fides quae) (Burkhard, 1993b). 
Sensus fidei as a way of knowing 
 
Two models can help us understand the type of knowledge that sensus 
fidei constitutes: as existential and connatural knowledge. 
Existential knowledge 
 
Since revelation applies to all of life, the sensus fidei is directed towards 
existential knowledge, providing a context for understanding and acting in the 
world, and encompassing life in both its richness and uncertainties. Because it is 
experiential, the primary form of the sensus fidei is the ‘narrative of a life’ (Rush, 
2009, p.246). The understanding offered by sensus fidei is global, not limited to 
‘either the scientific or nonscientific, to either the conscious or the subconscious, 
to either the known or the experienced, to either the defined or the undefined’ 
(Burkhard, 1993b, p. 134). 
Connatural knowledge 
 
Sensus fidei has been explicitly linked to what Aquinas calls ‘knowledge by 
connaturality’, a legitimate and rational form of knowing that is acquired more 
through inclination and sympathy rather than concepts and discursive reasoning 
(Glaser, 1968)—what Thompson (1973, p. 480) calls ‘spontaneous knowledge’, 
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which enables one actually to discern more than what can be conceptualized or 
articulated.  
Sensus fidei is rooted in the connaturality that faith establishes between 
the believer and the truth of God as revealed in the Gospel. It is a relationship 
marked with enough familiarity and intimacy that the two share in the same 
dispositions and inclinations, making possible a knowledge that is different from 
conceptual and discursive knowledge, but rather spontaneous knowledge based 
on empathy—i.e., ‘a knowledge of the heart’ (SF §50). 
Sensus fidei and dissent 
 
The notion of sensus fidei is valuable not only because it defines the kind 
of knowing entailed in Catholic religious critical thinking, but also because it 
provides an important condition for critical thinking: the possibility of dissent. 
For McDonough (2010a), the Church needs an explicit philosophical 
concept of dissent that will provide a more adequate theoretical grounding for the 
expression and reception of dissent in the Church, particularly in Catholic 
schools. In the absence of such a theory, the default Catholic response to the 
expression of dissent in the classroom—or any public forum, for that matter—has 
been aimed at the minimization, marginalization, and restriction of dissent. Such 
a response is problematic, exacerbated by the inability of families to address 
questions about the controversial teachings of the Church (McDonough, 2010b). 
Not only is the existing practice intellectually frustrating among sincere thinking 
Catholics, but it also often eventually leads to resignation and eventually, to the 
abandonment of the faith (McDonough, 2012).  
Dissent must be understood as distinct from outright rebellion 
(McDonough, 2009). To dissent is ‘to sit apart from those one is a part of’ 
(McDonough, 2010a, p. 254). Legitimate dissenters, therefore, are necessarily 
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insiders who: (a) are expressing a disagreement that is morally sound and not 
socially divisive, and (b) are challenging the authority and the status quo in their 
group precisely out of loyalty and out of a desire for the good of the group. Only 
given such a conception can there be faithful and, therefore, legitimate dissent 
(McDonough, 2009). By avoiding the two extremes of total adherence and total 
sedition, such an understanding of dissent creates a space for what McDonough 
(2012, p. 226) has appropriately called ‘high-quality dissent’—i.e., dissent 
expressed on behalf of and as part of the Church, so that one is able to thinks 
with and for the Church without either blind conformity to the prevailing view or 
separation from the group.49  
The possibility of dissent is established by the three-fold discernment 
involved in the individual believer’s exercise of the sensus fidei: (a) the 
discernment of the coherence of a doctrine or practice taught by the Church with 
what they sense as the Church’s authentic faith; (b) the discernment of its 
significance in relation to the core of the faith; and (c) the discernment of the 
practice of the faith through the application of a Church teaching in their lives (SF 
§60). This three-fold discernment is significant because they acknowledge the 
legitimacy, possibility, and value of dissent in the Church.  
Discernment of coherence: The legitimacy of dissent 
 
In the discernment of coherence, believers, relying on their sensus fidei, 
judge whether or not a particular teaching is faithful to what is intuited as the 
sensus fidelium. In discerning its authenticity, Catholics may respond by granting 
their assent—or withholding it. Upon detection of an incongruence with authentic 
Christian faith, believers may respond with a ‘warranted interior resistance’ 
                                            
49 Cf. McDonough (2012, 145ff) for his seven conceptual criteria to describe reasoned and faithful 
dissent (enfranchisement, shared epistemic history, contra-hegemony, ethical purposes, public 
expression, and persuasive argument). 
 
 176 
leading them to withhold their assent. Such a dissent may be made ‘even to the 
teaching of legitimate pastors if they do not recognize in that teaching the voice of 
Christ, the Good Shepherd’ (SF §62-63).  
The legitimacy of dissent follows from the teaching on the sensus fidei, 
and by no means constitutes new teaching. 50 The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, however, downplays the contested nature of the reception of 
authoritative teaching, placing the faithful’s duty to obey the magisterium within 
the context of the sensus fidelium (Yarnold, 1994). The issue of the reception of 
magisterial teaching, however, is not as unproblematic as suggested. The history 
of reception in the Church is one of ‘discontinuity, detours, and even dead ends’ 
(Dionne, 1987, p. 362). The occasions when official doctrines are received not 
with unanimous reception in the Church, but with indifference and even rejection 
are acknowledged in the 2014 document on sensus fidei. Whereas in the past, 
dissent was invariably attributed to a believer’s lack of faith or reason (e.g., an 
uncritical acceptance of contemporary culture), this time, equal blame is pinned 
on a failure of consultation with the faithful and the insufficient consideration of 
their experiences and sensus fidei (SF §123). Especially in cases of inadequate 
prior consultation, the lay faithful’s refusal or inability to give its assent to 
authoritative teaching can no longer automatically be labeled sinful or ignorant 
(Murray, 1994). 
By acknowledging a valid reason for a lack of reception, the Church 
recognizes occasions when dissent may be considered legitimate (SF §63), 
                                            
50 Aquinas, referring to the sensus fidei as ‘habitus’ writes: ‘[The believer] must not give assent to 
a prelate who preaches against the faith…. In fact, the habitus of faith inclines him against such 
preaching because that habitus necessarily teaches whatever leads to salvation’ (Scriptum, III, 
d.25, q.2, a.1, qla 4, ad 3). Ratzinger in his commentary on Vatican II writes: ‘Over the Pope as 
the expression of the binding claim of ecclesiastical authority, there stands one’s conscience, 
which must be obeyed before all else, even if necessary against the requirement of ecclesiastical 
authority’ (Ratzinger, 1967, p. 134).  
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representing an important shift towards acknowledging the reality of difficult 
reception and the legitimacy of a reasoned and faithful dissent.51 While authentic 
sensus fidei is, in principle, incompatible with a resistance to magisterial teaching, 
the faithful are nevertheless encouraged to express and articulate their sensus 
fidei, and the magisterium is asked to listen attentively (SF §124). 
Such an explicit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of dissent is 
significant given the Church’s previous reluctance to do so, as evidenced by the 
absence of any statement on dissent even in Vatican II’s teachings on sensus 
fidei (LG §12, 25). The Church’s stance towards dissent has been at best 
inconsistent. Referring to ‘schizoid pronouncements’ in Church documents, 
Callahan (1986) notes, for instance, the discrepancy between Vatican II’s 
declaration on religious freedom, which acknowledges the authority of the 
conscience and freedom of non-Catholics and non-Christians on the one hand, 
and the Vatican’s position that conscientious objection should be retracted if 
requested by the magisterium.  
The Church’s tendencies to repress dissent in the past have largely been 
a reaction to perceived threats to the truth of revelation and the unity of the faith. 
Much effort has been exerted towards institutional centralization precisely to 
protect the identity and unity of the Church against modernist positivism and 
postmodern relativism (Alberigo, 1987). The Catechism of the Catholic Church is 
an example of Vatican efforts to strengthen magisterial authority and to preserve 
a gratuitous unity of expression of faith (Burkhard, 2005). A claim of a premature 
epistemic closure, however, is not only unwarranted, but also discourages a 
commitment to judgemental rationality and its expression in critical thinking.   
                                            
51 Levada (1988) has, for example, expressed his opposition to Catholic religious educators 
teaching their students what he calls ‘responsible dissent’, declaring it as counterproductive and 
opposed to the requirements of the Catholic faith.  
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In cases where there is such a dissent or lack of reception, the 
magisterium is enjoined to evaluate the process in two ways: (a) whether or not 
adequate consultation has been held, with proper consideration of the vita 
fidelium and the sensus fidei; and (b) whether or not there is a need to 
reformulate the message for clearer and more effective communication (SF §80). 
The magisterium ought to ensure that open channels of communication through 
regular dialogues on issues of faith and morals are maintained with the lay faithful. 
Although the sensus fidei is not equivalent to public opinion, such exchanges of 
opinion can serve as a helpful forum for gauging the sensus fidelium (SF §124-
125). 
The faithful, on the other hand, is expected to exert every effort to be open 
to the new teaching, to understand and accept it, if possible. In cases where 
dissent is the discerned legitimate response, Aquinas cautions the individual 
believers against considering themselves as the ultimate criterion of the truth of 
faith, and advises them to defer assent and appeal interiorly to the authority of 
the universal Church (SF §63).  
In creating room for legitimate dissent, therefore, the Church is 
demonstrating that it is not simply paying lip service to sensus fidei because 
sensus fidei ought to transcend mere blind assent and lead to reasoned and 
faithful assent, which corresponds to the believer’s responsibility for the 
interpretive and approbative reception of the Word of God. However, among the 
issues concerning Church authority that remains unresolved is precisely the 
permissibility of legitimate dissent from authoritative but non-infallible teaching52 
(Gaillardetz, 2012). 
                                            
52  The other three unresolved issues named by Gaillardetz (2012) are: (a) the subject of 
magisterial authority (roman curia, the synod of bishops, episcopal conferences), (b) the object of 
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Discernment of significance: The possibility of dissent 
 
Sensus fidei and its exercise in religious critical thinking require the 
possibility of dissent as a condition for its authentic exercise. But what kind of 
dissent is allowed in the Church? The second discernment that an individual 
believer is called to undertake is a discernment of the significance of a given 
teaching—to distinguish between what is essential and non-negotiable and what 
is only of secondary importance. There exists a hierarchy of Church teachings, so 
that they are not of equal importance or significance in defining one as a Catholic. 
Some teachings are relatively more central and essential, rightly belonging to the 
core of the Christian faith, while others are more remote and secondary in 
importance (Rahner, 1988a).  
The doctrines of the Incarnation and the dual nature of Christ are relatively 
more central and fundamental than the Catholic teachings on the Immaculate 
Conception of Mary and her Assumption, despite their officially dogmatic status. 
Consequently, assent to these central Christological beliefs ought to be more 
mandatory than the Marian doctrines even if the latter have been infallibly defined 
as dogmas. 
The believers’ sensus fidei enables them to distinguish between beliefs 
that are essential to the core of the faith and those that are only of relatively 
secondary importance. The sense of the faith, therefore, grants Christians an 
authentic liberty in light of this hierarchy of doctrines taught by the Church (SF 
§64).  
 
                                                                                                                                  
magisterial teaching (disputed status of definitive doctrine), (c) the exercise of magisterial 
authority (ordinary papal magisterium to confirm teachings of the ordinary universal magisterium).  
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The hierarchy of authoritative teachings in the Church 
 
The significance of Church teachings can also be discerned concretely in 
terms of their level of teaching authority. Not all teachings are equal; there are 
significant differences in their authoritative character. There are a total of four 
categories of Church teachings, each one with a different attitude and response 
expected of the faithful (Gaillardetz, 1997b).  
Definitive dogma 
 
The highest level refers to dogmas, which are teachings that are taught 
infallibly as divinely revealed.53 With regard to dogmas, Catholics are expected to 
respond with an assent or submission of faith (obsequio fidei), in which the 
believer makes an act of faith trusting that God has revealed the teaching to the 
Church.  
Only a limited number of dogmas have been defined by the hierarchical 
magisterium in an ex cathedra exercise of its teaching infallibility (e.g., the dogma 
of the Immaculate Conception). While Catholics are bound to accept such 
dogmas, there is a theological opinion that dissent towards dogmas may not 
necessarily exclude one from the Church, the infallible character of the teaching 
notwithstanding, especially since heresy is committed only with full understanding 
and volition and as long as the believer accepts the more central doctrines in the 
Church’s hierarchy of doctrines (Rahner, 1974; Gaillardetz, 1997b, 1997c). 
Definitive doctrine 
 
Belonging to a second category of Church teachings is a fairly recent 
addition called definitive doctrine, referring to teachings that, strictly speaking, are 
                                            
53 There are four restrictions to the content of infallible dogma, which constitute the conditions for 
both the Church’s infallibility in teaching and in believing: (a) a matter of universal consent of the 
faithful; (b) refers to the content of revelation only (LG §25); (c) the agency of the Holy Spirit; and 
(d) the recognition of the magisterium (Pie-Ninot, 1994, p. 993). 
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not considered divinely revealed, but ‘are so intimately linked with [divine 
revelation] that for practical purposes they stand and fall together’. Definitive 
doctrine is proposed infallibly as irreversible teachings and, therefore, though 
falling short of demanding an assent of faith, requires ‘firm acceptance or assent’ 
from a Catholic, in which the believer ‘accepts and holds’ the teaching to be true. 
What this response exactly entails is not clear; what is clear is that it is a 
response to a teaching register that is distinct from dogma and the other levels of 
Church teachings (Gaillardetz, 1997c).54 
Non-definitive but authoritative doctrine 
 
The majority of Church pronouncements on doctrine and especially morals 
belong to this category of ‘non-definitive but authoritative doctrine’.  These are 
teachings, which, while issued by the magisterium, are not proposed as infallible 
because the magisterium has, for some reason, opted against an appeal to 
infallibility in its pronouncement. In its judgement, the Church is unable or is 
simply not ready to bind itself to the revelatory character of a particular teaching. 
Because of its non-infallible authority, one can, in principle, accept the possibility 
of its error.   
The desired response from the faithful here is called ‘obsequium of the 
intellect and the will’ (obsequium mentis et voluntatis). Although its precise 
meaning remains contested and unclear, the Second Vatican Council carefully 
distinguishes it from obsequio fidei (assent or submission of faith) due to infallible 
teachings: While assent is an act of faith in a teaching as true, the obsequium of 
the intellect and will is but a response of submission or respect (Kaufman, 1995). 
Dissent, therefore, is in principle a legitimate response to non-infallible teachings. 
                                            
54 This category is not included in the 1983 Code of Canon Law, which speaks only of assent of 
faith (for dogma) and obsequium (for non-definitive authoritative doctrine). 
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Prudential admonitions and provisional applications of doctrine  
 
Finally, prudential admonitions and provisional applications of doctrine 
include such ecclesiastical pronouncements as warnings against dangerous 
theological trends and opinions, or the laying down of concrete disciplines of 
Church or specific moral norms. The expected response from the faithful is 
‘conscientious obedience’, entailing an external assent to a law or judgement 
while reserving the right to question the advisability, prudence, or even 
correctness of that law or judgement. It is called ‘conscientious’ because it is 
conditioned by the exercise of one’s conscience and prudential judgement 
(Gaillardetz, 1997c). 
Table 21: Types of Church teachings 
TYPES OF  
CHURCH TEACHINGS 
EXPECTED RESPONSE OF 
THE BELIEVER 
Possibility 
of dissent 
Definitive dogma  
infallibly defined teachings (definitive credenda) 
(Boyle, 2000, p. 360) 
Assent or submission of faith 
(obsequio fidei;  
theological faith)  
 
 
 
No Definitive doctrine  
“proposed definitively, even if they have not been 
taught to be divinely revealed” (definitive 
tendenda (Boyle, 2000, p. 360) 
 
Firm acceptance 
Non-definitive authoritative doctrine  
what “the Church proposes as true, though not 
defined as infallible and not necessarily 
unchangeable” (Pilarczyk, 1986, p. 175). 
 
Obsequium of intellect & will 
 
 
Yes 
Prudential admonition and provisional 
applications of doctrine  
Conscientious obedience 
 
Gaillardetz, 1997c  
In general, all magisterial teachings, by virtue of their nature as 
judgements of the magisterium, are to be received in principle as an expression 
of the consensus fidelium—i.e., assuming that it has been arrived at through 
dialogue with the two other teaching authorities of the Church—namely, the 
theological authority of scholarship and expertise and the wider and more basic 
ecclesial authority of the sensus fidelium (Rush, 2009). However, the basic 
principle to follow is that the commitment that the Church makes to a 
pronouncement in terms of infallibility defines the commitment expected of the 
faithful (Orsy, 1987). Of the four levels of Church teachings, only the first two are 
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proposed infallibly: definitive dogma and definitive doctrine. Strictly speaking, 
therefore, the remaining two allow for the possibility of legitimate dissent—i.e., 
obsequium of intellect and will although this has been far from consistently 
accepted in the Church.55 
The discernment of practice: The value of dissent  
 
The final discernment involves determining the concrete ways in which the 
faithful can put their faith into practice. Individual Christians draw from their Spirit-
gifted sensus fidei not simply to receive and transmit the faith, but also to approve 
it, in the process, making a vital contribution to the Church’s reception of it (SF 
§126). This personal reception requires the practice of the faith in their lives 
because only in their very concrete experiences can the faithful discern the 
implications and application of a particular teaching. The sensus fidei as ‘a truth-
finding and truth-attesting function’ draws from the faithful’s experiences (Beinert, 
1995, p. 656). 
Dissent from the faithful is, therefore, a valuable datum. Constructive 
dissent helps the Church uncover hidden layers of Scriptures not yet articulated 
by the magisterium, as well as refine its formulations and integrate new 
knowledge, without giving up core dogmatic beliefs. Valid dissent, coming from a 
minority ahead of their times, is a vital and necessary component of living 
Tradition, and may be a manifestation of the Spirit in bringing the Church to a 
deeper fidelity to the Gospel—even if its source may be the marginally involved 
or even hostile critics (Burkhard, 2005).  
                                            
55 The Vatican under the papacy of John Paul II, with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger at the helm of 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, has shown a tendency to dissolve the distinction 
between infallible and non-infallible teachings, as exemplified in the 1986 case of Charles Curran 
(Curran, 1987). This lack of distinction becomes problematic when it involves controversial non-
infallible teachings, where there is a significant lack of consensus among stakeholders [e.g., 
artificial contraception (Paul VI, 1968), female ordination (John Paul II, 1994), and homosexuality 
(Congregation for the Doctrine for the Faith, 1986)]. Although proposed by the Church as true, 
they are not taught as infallible and are not necessarily unchangeable (Pilarczyk, 1986).  
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Implications of Catholic religious critical thinking  
 
as the exercise of sensus fidei 
 
There are several important implications in the proposal to conceive 
Catholic religious critical thinking specifically as the exercise of one’s sensus 
fidei. 
First of all, Catholic religious critical thinking should, in principle, include 
self-critique—i.e., a critique of the institution of the Church and a disagreement 
with its teachings—but is not to be reduced to negative dissident thinking. 
Although it is a way of ‘thinking with the Church’ that does not—and need not—
always conform to its official positions, its disagreement with the magisterium is 
rooted in a deep fidelity to Catholic tradition (McDonough, 2012). 
Secondly, Catholic religious critical thinking belongs to its own genre. 
While motivation for it cuts across disciplines, as expressed by the critical realist 
commitment to judgemental rationality, competence in critical thinking is domain-
specific. Catholic religious critical thinking is not a generic form of critical thinking 
whose principles and procedures are simply transposed from other disciplines 
and applied in the domain of Catholic beliefs. This brand of critical thinking 
especially proper to confessional Catholic religious education is defined by a 
religious epistemology that is grounded on the Catholic theology of revelation and 
its reception through the sensus fidei.  Hence, the critical thinking to be taught 
and promoted in Catholic religious education—proposed here as entailing non-
discursive connatural knowledge—has a shape different from its counterparts in 
other disciplines. Catholic religious critical thinking is ‘thinking religiously’—
analogous to and distinct from thinking mathematically or historically.   Catholic 
religious critical thinking is not purely rational, but includes personal spiritual 
experiences, even an examination of conscience (McDonough, 2012, p. 28). 
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Moreover, Catholic religious critical thinking is necessarily contextualized 
in the individual believers’ appropriation of their faith—i.e., in their personal task 
of meaningful and faithful reception. It is an integral component of the believers’ 
response of faith to God’s revelation that has first been received and is now 
mediated by the Church. As a result, the individual practice of Catholic religious 
critical thinking—i.e., the exercise of one’s sensus fidei—cannot be divorced from 
the Church’s sensus fidelium and ought to be accomplished within its context. 
Seen in this light, Catholic religious critical thinking may be characterized as one 
that not only aims for reasoned and faithful assent, but also, in principle, permits 
the possibility of equally reasoned and faithful dissent.56 
Consequently, strictly speaking, Catholic religious critical thinking can only 
be properly exercised by a believer—in fact, given the proportionality between 
one’s commitment to the praxis of faith and the person’s credibility in expressing 
the sensus fidei, only by a practicing believer—even if lapsed and inactive 
Catholics are, by virtue of their baptism, included among the recipients of the 
sensus fidei. Given the complexity involved in exercising the sensus fidei and in 
discerning the Church’s sensus fidelium, certain dispositions are required as 
conditions necessary for one’s authentic participation in the sensus fidei. These 
dispositions, which serve as criteria for the authentic exercise of the sensus fidei, 
are: (a) participation in the life of the Church; (b) attentiveness to the word of 
God; (c) openness to reason; (d) adherence to the magisterium; (e) a life of 
holiness characterized by humility, freedom, and joy; and (f) a desire for the unity 
                                            
56 Obsequium—the response permitted for non-definitive but authoritative teaching—may be 
interpreted precisely as reasoned and faithful dissent, a valid exercise of the sensus fidei in 
fulfilling one’s obligation to seek the truth and accept the consequences. Several conditions for 
obsequium have been proposed (The West German bishops, 1967; McCormick, 1993; Gaillardetz, 
1997b, 1997c).  
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of the Church (SF §73).  Clearly then, one has to be an ‘insider’ to practice 
Catholic religious critical thinking.57  
Finally, sensus fidei as connatural knowledge depicts knowing as primarily 
relational—i.e., as a relationship between the knower and the object of 
knowledge, characterized in true critical realist spirit by the sovereignty of the 
latter. Knowing conceived as such a relationship entails more than exclusively—
or even primarily—the cognitive located as it is on a fundamental existential level. 
It sketches a distinct genre of critical thinking that is specific to a Catholic 
religious epistemology and one that is only properly promoted in a Catholic 
religious education classroom: a form of rationality primordially rooted in a faith 
commitment and necessarily mediated by the faith community. Catholic religious 
critical thinking aims precisely at the understanding sought, but only made 
possible, by faith. 
 
SOME PROFESSIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
This study proposes two conceptions of critical thinking, one more general 
than the other: An explicitly critical realist account of critical thinking as a 
commitment to judgemental rationality provides us with the very motivation for 
critical thinking. A specifically Catholic conception, on the other hand, presents 
Catholic religious critical thinking as the exercise of one’s sensus fidei in the 
meaningful and faithful reception of the Word of God and guides the actual 
practice of critical thinking. Whereas the first corresponds to the dispositional 
component of critical thinking (the ‘why’), the second one focuses on its more 
                                            
57 This restriction by no means implies that the critical thinking that non-Catholics employ in 
investigating Catholic beliefs and practices is not valid; rather, it would not be the Catholic 
religious critical thinking that is to be taught in the Catholic religious education classroom.  
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domain-specific competence component (the ‘how’). They have valuable 
implications in the professional context of our schools. 
Staff development on religious epistemology  
 
One immediate implication from this study is that teachers will benefit from 
learning about their religious epistemic cognition and its impact on learning and 
critical thinking. In order to practice and to promote critical thinking in the 
classroom, teachers need to appreciate their often-unconscious assumptions 
about the possibilities and limits of knowing and their consequences on their 
practice and their students’ learning. Our religious education teachers should be 
offered guidance in reflecting on their level of epistemic cognition and growing 
conscious on how it can facilitate or hamper critical thinking—their own as well as 
their students’.  
An appropriate professional development program can also be designed to 
educate our religious education teachers on Catholic religious epistemology as 
defined by the Church’s doctrine on revelation and the sensus fidei. An 
understanding of the critical realist character of this epistemology, especially its 
underlying epistemic relativism, would be helpful in clarifying the possibility and 
necessity of Catholic religious critical thinking. 
The classroom as a nursery for sensus fidei 
 
The confessional Catholic religious education classroom provides an ideal 
venue for fostering the needed critical realist epistemology to motivate critical 
thinking, as well as for developing the specific competence for practicing Catholic 
religious critical thinking—namely, the exercise of one’s sensus fidei fidelis. For 
McDonough (2009, 2011), the Catholic school serves as a privileged—though by 
no means exclusive—forum for the expression and nurturing of reasoned and 
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faithful dissent. More than the family and the parish, the school can provide 
students with ‘the informational, critical intellectual, and environmental means to 
support decisions of conscience and ecclesial choices outside the school that do 
not reduce to a binary between strict conformity to or rejection of the official 
prevailing view’ (McDonough, 2012, p. 234). The religious education classroom in 
particular presents numerous valuable opportunities to nurse the students’ 
sensus fidei and to orient them on its authentic exercise.  
In this connection, a preliminary step that a Catholic school may consider 
is to specify the development of the students’ sensus fidei as an explicit goal of 
its programme. The fostering of the faithful’s sense for the faith remains one of 
the important tasks of the Church, to prepare the faithful for the responsibility to 
participate in the ongoing ecclesial definition of faith. The adoption of this goal 
has implications in curriculum, instruction, and assessment. 
In terms of the curriculum, the degree and manner of the promotion of the 
students’ sensus fidei, needless to say, have to be age-appropriate. It may, for 
younger students, be limited to the nurturing of the dispositions identified as 
essential for the authentic exercise of the sensus fidei. The existing curricula 
most likely already address most, if not all of these dispositions, and these 
dispositions constitute a necessary foundation in the Catholic Christian formation 
of the students anyway. However, it makes a difference if the development of 
these dispositions were expressly aimed at developing the students’ sensus fidei. 
The way the goal is operationalized will be significantly different if the exercise of 
sensus fidei is articulated as a valued goal of the programme. 
Instruction will also undergo changes given the goal of fostering the 
students’ sensus fidei. Fundamentally, teachers will have to examine the status 
and agency that they grant their students. It has been observed that student-
centered instruction tends to be promoted more explicitly in other subjects than in 
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Catholic religious education classes. Teachers will have to employ a pedagogy 
that optimizes learners’ agency as preparation and training for their active role as 
mature believers to exercise their sensus fidei in the Church, in contrast to a 
merely passive following of the hierarchy. They need to learn the high regard that 
the Church reserves for their dignity and contribution in defining the faith and 
sharing it (Burkhard, 1992). Students should increasingly be encouraged not only 
to learn Church doctrines and practices, but also evaluate them, following the 
three-fold discernment of coherence, significance, and practice of faith, and 
always in the spirit of the sensus fidei: with the proper respect accorded to the 
magisterium and an appreciation for the Church’s reasons for the doctrines and 
practices. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, schools may consider revising the 
way student learning is assessed in confessional Catholic religious education. All 
the schools in our network have limited the assessment of student learning to the 
mastery of content—i.e., understanding, if not sheer recall, of Church teachings. 
With the nurturing of sensus fidei as an explicit aim, learning will have to be 
redefined as not only consisting of understanding of content, but also reasoned 
and faithful assent. In other words, the question that has never been asked in a 
confessional religious classroom will now be added as an important, if not central 
question: ‘Should I give my intellectual assent to this teaching? Why or why not?’ 
There are at least three implications here. By including this question, the 
teacher is sending the students the message that demonstrating their 
understanding of the doctrine or practice is not sufficient. The second implication 
is that blind assent is no longer adequate. Mere acceptance of a Church teaching 
simply based on an appeal to authority is not ideal. What is sought is ‘reasoned 
and faithful assent’. In other words, in developing the students’ sensus fidei, the 
classroom should provide training and rehearsals for the fundamental mission of 
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the Church, in which every Christian is invited to participate: the meaningful and 
faithful reception of revelation. A reasoned and faithful dissent requires not only a 
correct and sufficient understanding of Church teachings, but also an 
appreciation of the historical contexts from which they have emerged, their 
rationale and value at the time, as well as at the present.  
Finally, to inquire about the student’s assent opens up the possibility of 
dissent. It is important that students are taught the parameters of reasoned and 
faithful dissent as well. 
Concretely, all this entails assessing student learning not only in terms of 
recall and understanding of Church teachings, but also beyond the mere 
measurement of the student's understanding of the content and authoritative 
status of Church teachings to demonstrate: (a) an appreciation of the rationale for 
the teachings and arguments in their favor, including their historical context, their 
value then and relevance now; (b) a fundamental tone of continued respect and 
trust in the Church, particularly, the magisterium; and finally, (d) the student's 
reasoned and faithful assent—or dissent, where blind/unreasoned assent and 
especially unreasoned and unfaithful dissent ought to be challenged. A Catholic 
religious education class that promotes religious critical thinking, therefore, must 
measure what it ought to treasure most: high-quality—i.e., academically 
responsible—reception, be it in the form of assent or dissent. 
The role of the listening teacher 
 
A religious education class envisioned to be explicitly anchored on a 
critical realist religious epistemology and purposefully designed to promote 
reasoned and faithful reception calls for a rethinking of the role of the religious 
education teacher. McDonough (2008) distinguishes three pedagogical stances 
for the religious educator: (a) the dogmatic indoctrinator, who is primarily 
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concerned with teaching the official beliefs of the Church; (b) the professional 
equivocator, who neutrally presents the prescribed curricular material and just as 
neutrally facilitates student debates without betraying his or her own personal 
stance; and (c) the ‘pedagogue of dissent’ (p. 59), where the teacher plays the 
role of classroom theologian or philosopher of religion, who guides the students 
in participating in critical discussions of the issues and eventually in making 
reasoned and responsible personal decisions about the matter.58  
In playing this third role, Catholic religious educators need to mediate 
between the institutional demands to teach official Church beliefs and individual 
students’ pedagogical needs to make sense of and to appropriate them. Like the 
magisterium and the theologian, religious education teachers are challenged to 
listen to their students, making every effort to solicit what they think and feel 
about the teachings of the Church—not only concerning their formulations, but 
also the controversies and consensus surrounding them (McDonough, 2008). As 
listening teachers, Catholic religious educators need to use a pedagogy that not 
only encourages questions, but also admits dissent, not only respecting it, but 
also challenging it. 
Needless to say, before students can be taught reasoned and faithful 
reception, the teachers themselves must understand why a particular Church 
doctrine or practice warrants our assent. For this reason, their class preparation 
should include the articulation of their own answer to the question, ‘Should I give 
my intellectual assent to this teaching? Why or why not?’  
To promote Catholic religious critical thinking as an expression of one’s 
commitment to judgemental rationality on the one hand, and as an exercise of 
                                            
58 Hand’s (2008) distinction between ‘teaching-as-settled’ and ‘teaching-as-controversial’ may be 
instructive here: While teaching something as settled corresponds to the role of the teacher as 
dogmatic indoctrinator, teaching something as controversial would be compatible with both the 
stances of professional equivocator and pedagogue of dissent. An important difference would be 
the willingness of the teacher as pedagogue of dissent to express his/her own belief or to endorse 
one particular belief. Open-mindedness and commitment need not be mutually exclusive. 
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one’s sensus fidei on the other, the religious educator is called upon not only to 
be a model of a critical realist religious epistemology, but also an agent of 
reasoned and faithful reception. 
 It is important to note that, intellectual assent—or dissent—to the Church’s 
teachings does not exclusively or even primarily define a person’s faith. Our 
personal response to the Word of God is disclosed most concretely and most 
definitively in our vita fidelium. It is in our daily following of Jesus that our 
reception of God’s invitation and self-communication—faithfully, but imperfectly 
expressed in Christian doctrine—is most fully actualized (Gaillardetz, 1997b).  
Some examples 
 
I will now discuss three examples of religious education classes that 
illustrate attempts to promote Catholic religious critical thinking. Two of them 
were implemented in a Philippine Catholic school, while the last one was 
observed in a classroom in the United States. Each example features a distinct 
ingredient in a Catholic religious education class that is envisioned as nursery for 
the students' sensus fidei: (a) increased student agency, (b) reflection on 
epistemic cognition; and (c) reasoned and faithful reception. 
 
Increased student agency 
 
The activity ‘Bible circles’ has been designed by a team of religious 
educators in one Philippine Catholic high school and adapted from an activity 
called ‘literature circles’. Literature circles is a carefully scaffolded student-
centered activity that encourages not only thoughtful discussion of literature 
among small groups of students, but also a love for reading (Daniels, 1994). As a 
pedagogical alternative to the more traditional teacher-dominated discourse, 
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literature circles have been observed to be effective in promoting critical thinking 
and reflection among students (DaLie, 2001). 
In its religious education version, students are also divided into small 
groups, where members are assigned specific roles to enable them to contribute 
in their discussion of Scripture. Student roles range from conducting research on 
the historical background of a given passage to citing commentaries on its 
theological meaning, and drawing connections to other Scriptural texts, literature, 
pop culture, historical or current events, and their personal experiences. 
For a class on the Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:29-37), Bible 
circles was conducted in lieu of a traditional teacher-led discussion. In one group, 
a student reported on the parable’s historical context—i.e., the immediate 
situation prompting Jesus to tell the parable, as well as the significance of his 
deliberate designation of a Samaritan as the protagonist in the story. Another 
student cited scriptural passages pertaining to Samaria and describing the 
relationship of its people to the Jews, including Jesus’ encounter with the 
Samaritan woman (John 4:4-43). One student called the group’s attention to how 
Jesus significantly refocuses the meaning of ‘neighbor’ from someone whom one 
ought to help to someone who helps others. From the discussion, a member 
observed that ‘it’s interesting how “Samaritan” used to be a bad word, but now it’s 
a compliment to be called a “Good Samaritan”!’ From there the group discussed 
modern-day versions of ‘Samaritans’—i.e., outsiders—such as the homeless and 
refugees. The discussion led to questions about what the students might be able 
to do as Good Samaritans to help modern-day Samaritans. 
The small group discussions, facilitated by the students themselves, 
allowed the members to participate actively and take the lead in the discussion. 
The students were also able to evaluate their experience and learning since they 
were involved in assessment, both of themselves and their group members. 
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Aside from increased engagement, the Bible circles seems to have encouraged 
greater critical thinking among the students: Not only did they reflect on the 
issues more deliberately, but they were also able to clarify—and even 
challenge—the ideas exchanged in their group. 
 
Reflection on epistemic cognition 
 
‘Reflection triangles' has been designed for my own senior high school 
religious education class not only to encourage student-centered discussions of 
doctrinal and moral questions, but also to provoke student reflections on their 
own underlying epistemological beliefs. A question is raised for individual 
reflection and class discussion, where students are given three possible answers. 
Students are then requested to form a triangle by moving to one of three 
designated corners of the room that represents their choices. Two or three 
students from each corner are asked to present the reasons for their choices. 
After all three sides have been presented, students are given the opportunity to 
ask questions to clarify or challenge their classmates' views. Afterwards students 
are invited to move across the room and to consider switching sides if they have 
found someone else's point convincing. 
Unbeknownst to the students, each of the three corners represents one of 
the three levels of epistemic cognitions: absolutist (naïve realist), multiplist 
(radical relativist), and evaluativist (critical realist) (Kuhn, 1999). After students 
have made their decision to retain or change their positions, this information is 
disclosed, and the implications of the different epistemic cognitions are discussed 
with them. Afterwards students are encouraged to examine their epistemic 
cognitions and to consider a change. 
Reflection triangles proved particularly effective for the discussion on the 
relationship of other world religions to Christianity—specifically, the soteriological 
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role of Jesus Christ. The three options given to the students were: (a) ‘There is 
one and only way to salvation, and it is Jesus’, (b) ‘There are many paths to 
salvation, and Jesus is just as good as any of the others’ (e.g., Buddha, 
Mohammed, even New Age Spirituality)’, (c) ‘There are many possible paths to 
salvation, and Jesus is the better way’. Not only do these three options 
correspond to the three epistemic cognitions of naïve realism, radical relativism, 
and critical realism, but they also represent the three main theological 
approaches to the soteriological role of Jesus Christ (exclusivism, relativism, and 
inclusivism) (Dupuis, 1994).  
The activity turned out to be more engrossing than traditional class 
discussions, with perceptively greater student participation. In the course of their 
debates, students volunteered concrete examples of people in history as well as 
people they knew, and wondered if they would be saved, regardless of their 
religious beliefs or even in the absence thereof.   
Only after the first round of discussion were the concepts of exclusivism, 
relativism, and inclusivism introduced, each representing a distinct approach to 
the role of Christ in salvation (Dupuis, 1994). The corresponding epistemological 
beliefs about religious knowledge were then discussed. Students were asked to 
evaluate their epistemological beliefs and once again invited to make the decision 
whether or not they should change their beliefs.  
Like literature circles, reflection triangles attempt to transform the 
conventionally teacher-centered class into a more student-centered one. 
Students are encouraged to think critically about Church teachings and to 
consider revising their previous judgements in light of new information. Just as 
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importantly, they are guided in making a similar critical re-evaluation of their 
religious epistemic cognitions.59 
 
Reasoned and faithful reception  
 
The third example is drawn from a classroom observation of a tenth-grade 
religious education class at a Jesuit high school in the United States (Walsh, 
2000). The topic for the class—the ordination of women—is telling especially in 
light of the then-recent statement issued by the Vatican suggesting that the 
Pope's opposition to it was—contrary to traditional Church teaching—infallible 
(John Paul II, 1994). The discussion of the pros and cons to women's ordination, 
described by Walsh (2000) as 'judicious and impressive', served as an effective 
springboard to explain such key concepts as the distinction between traditions 
and official Church Tradition ('with a big T', another term for the sensus fidelium), 
as well as between infallible and non-infallible teachings.  
During the discussion, students were challenged to carefully consider 
different possible implications of such a teaching (e.g., the inequality between 
men and women) and to assess whether a teaching with such implicaitons would 
conform to—or contradict—the sensus fidelium.  Without explicitly saying so, the 
teacher was, in effect, inviting the students to draw from their sensus fidei and 
guiding them in an exercise of approbative reception.  
The teacher also asked the students to examine whether or not the claim 
that the teaching on the ordination of women implied male superiority was, in fact, 
a valid claim. By doing so, the teacher was demonstrating a form of high-quality 
religious reasoning that is necessary for the desired academically responsible 
assent—or dissent—to Church teachings. 
                                            
59 Reflection triangles have been especially effective in the discussion of moral issues and 
problems. 
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The teacher synthesized the discussion by telling the students that ‘it’s 
going to be your generation that decides this, so get ready for it’. Perhaps without 
consciously doing so, the teacher was appealing to the students to nurse their 
sensus fidei and to prepare for their role in defining the faith and practices of the 
Church. He also challenged the class to begin this preparation concretely and 
immediately by using inclusive language, supporting campaigns for women, and 
especially, treating women as equals ‘starting 3 pm today’ (Walsh, 2000, p. 142). 
The religious educator was effectively inviting the class to prepare themselves for 
their task of reasoned and faithful reception.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
      I began my research project by problematizing critical thinking in 
confessional Catholic religious education as practiced in the Philippines. While 
‘careful rigour in the study of culture and the development of a critical sense’ are 
listed as among the primary goals of Catholic education (CCE, 1988, §101), I 
argued that given the tensions inherent in the Catholic school’s mission of 
education and evangelization resulting from its dual nature as both an academic 
and ecclesial institution, the promotion of critical thinking cannot be presumed to 
be feasible especially when the de facto goal of the programme is partially 
catechetical, as in the case of confessional religious education in Philippine 
Catholic schools.  
  An empirical investigation into the epistemic development of our teachers 
shows that the prevailing epistemic cognition among religious educators is 
generally considered incompatible with critical thinking. Without eliminating other 
contributing psychological and social factors,60 I hypothesized that our religious 
education teachers’ level of epistemic development may constitute an important 
factor in the problem of critical thinking. 
  To begin addressing the problem of critical thinking in our context, I drew 
from critical realist epistemology and the Catholic notion of the sensus fidei. 
Through an epistemological and specifically critical realist analysis of critical 
thinking and the definition of a Catholic religious epistemology, I have proposed 
that critical thinking be understood as the expression of one’s commitment to 
judgemental rationality, rooted first of all in a reverence for reality as mystery 
                                            
60 The confessional curriculum, the ecclesial nature of the schools, and the generally lower 
ecclesial status and limited agency of lay people—to name a few possible topics for further study. 
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(ontological realism) and a recognition of the socio-historical and perspectival 
character of the reception of revelation (epistemic relativism). Critical thinking 
begins with the recognition of the finitude and fallibility of our knowing so that it is 
precisely on account of—and not simply in spite of—the uncertainty and limits of 
our knowing that we exert effort to be attentive to what reality discloses. 
       A critical realist epistemology provides the motivation for engaging in critical 
thinking in the first place, but the sensus fidei guides us on how to exercise 
Catholic religious critical thinking. For this reason, I have suggested that Catholic 
religious critical thinking be understood specifically as the exercise of one’s 
sensus fidei. The type of critical thinking based on the sensus fidei, given its 
experiential character, employs a mode of reasoning best described as pre-
conceptual and connatural, distinct from discursive reasoning but no less rational. 
       I hope that the framework of critical thinking proposed as the expression of 
a commitment to judgemental rationality, and specifically, of its Catholic religious 
variety as the exercise of one’s sensus fidei constitutes an important contribution 
to the field of Catholic religious education. Given this uniquely critical realist and 
Catholic account of critical thinking, the religious education classroom becomes a 
venue for deepening one’s commitment to judgemental rationality and for 
nurturing the sensus fidei, including the dispositions that make its exercise 
authentic.  
       I also hope that the recommendations at the end of this study will help 
address the challenge of critical thinking in confessional religious education 
classrooms in the Philippines. I intend to report on my findings to the 
administrators and staff belonging to our network of schools as much to educate 
them about epistemic cognition and the sensus fidei, as to provoke the much-
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needed reflections and conversations about the issue of Catholic religious 
education especially in light of the proposed conceptions of critical thinking as 
well as my recommendations. 
       The religious critical thinking that emerges from the critical realist and 
Catholic perspective is, on the one hand, an intellectually humble—but no less 
rigorous—pursuit of understanding, and, on the other, an open-minded—but no 
less committed—relationship to truth. Catholic religious critical thinking is rooted 
in a critical ‘hermeneutic of faith’ rather than a hermeneutic of skepticism, 
subscribing to the medieval counsel of ‘faith seeking understanding’ and rejecting 
the modernist ideology of ‘understanding seeking faith’ (Wright, 2013). This 
pursuit of understanding, therefore, necessarily requires faith as its starting point, 
and in light of both critical realist and Catholic perspectives, the enterprise of 
Catholic religious critical thinking entails a faith that aims not at the full 
possession of truth, but rather, at the unceasing search for it.  
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Appendix A:  STUDY INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
My name is Johnny Go and I am studying for a Doctor of Education (EdD) 
degree at the National Institute of Education (NIE), Nanyang Technological 
University, 1 Nanyang Walk, Singapore 637616, a dual award programme with 
the Institute of Education, University of London, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1 H 
0AL, United Kingdom. 
 
In partial fulfilment of the doctoral program, I am working on a research project 
entitled:  An Exploration of Teacher Epistemology and Religiosity in Primary 
and Secondary Schools in the Philippines.   
 
I wish to invite you to participate/take part in my research study. The period of 
participation is February to April of SY 2009-2010. 
 
Purpose of my research project 
 
My research involves the study of epistemological and religious beliefs of 
teachers in Jesuit basic education schools in the Philippines. 
 
My study intends/aims to explore the relations, if any, between the 
epistemological and religious beliefs of teachers in eight Jesuit schools in the 
Philippines. The following are related questions that the study will seek to 
answer: 
 
1. What are the epistemological beliefs reported by Filipino teachers working 
in religious primary and secondary schools? 
2. Are there significant differences in their epistemological beliefs in terms of 
age, gender, teaching experience, and such school-retlated factors as 
school type and discipline taught? 
3. What is the profile of their religiosity and religious background? 
4. Are there significant differences in their religiosity with respect to age, 
gender, teaching experience, school type, and academic discipline? 
5. How are these teachers’ religiosity related, if at all, to their epistemological 
beliefs? 
 
I intend to address identified gaps in the research in epistemological beliefs by: 
(a) investigating their relations with religious beliefs, (b) studying Filipino school 
teachers, and (c) focusing on practitioners rather than student teachers.  
 
Study/Research procedures and what happens to information gathered 
during the study 
 
The research will involve the seven Jesuit primary schools and eight Jesuit 
secondary schools in the Philippines. 
 
Data/Information will be collected through a survey questionnaire, which will take 
approximately 30 minutes to 1 hour to complete, and if necessary, a follow-up 
interview, which will take no more than two hours of your time. 
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Confidentiality of all research participants and collected data will be protected. 
Research participants will choose to remain anonymous and/or to use 
pseudonyms. Personal information will be de-identified/coded as far and as early 
as possible, and will be stored and transferred as de-identified/coded information. 
The participants’ names will be kept confidential and their identity will not be used 
in the reporting of the research data nor in any intended publication of any sort, 
be it electronic or print media. All records containing personal information will 
remain confidential and no information which could lead to identification of any 
individual will be released. 
 
All research data compiled during the study will be stored in a secure site at 
Xavier School’s standardized exam vault for a period of 3 years from the 
completion of the research. After that time all data will be destroyed. The data will 
be protected against loss or theft and unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, 
use, and modification. Security measures taken will involve restricted access to 
the data and other pertinent documents. 
 
Original data stored on computer/laptop will be deleted after they have been 
transferred to more robust form of storage, e.g., DVD or CD and stored securely 
as described above. Audiotapes (if any) will be similarly stored but notes derived 
from them (if any) will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study. 
 
It is envisaged that the data gathered during the research will be analyzed and 
incorporated in a thesis, which will be submitted to NIE for examination. The 
research findings from this study may/will be summarized as a report which will 
be provided to NIE. The research findings from this study may/will also be 
presented in a conference and published in a journal/conference proceeding or 
other scholarly avenue. 
 
Your participation 
 
Participation in this study is fully voluntary. 
 
If you agree to take part in my study, you will be requested to sign an informed 
consent form before you begin your participation. 
 
You are free to withdraw from this study at any time prior to publication without 
penalty, prejudice, negative consequences, repercussion, or disadvantage. Your 
decision to withdraw from this study will be kept confidential. Upon withdrawal, all 
data obtained from you and associated with you will be erased and destroyed. 
 
There is no foreseeable risk arising from participation in this study. 
 
There may be a risk of psychological/emotional harm that is beyond the normal 
experience of everyday life, in either the short or long term, from participation in 
this project. Confidentiality of results of the study shall be duly ensured. Further, 
information on who did or did not participate will not be provided to the school 
leadership. 
 
Your privacy will be protected and nothing will be published that will identify you. 
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If you would like a summary of the research findings from this study or a copy of 
the final research report/paper published, please tell me so I can arrange to 
provide you a copy. 
 
 
Ethical issues 
 
This project has received ethical clearance from the Interim Research Ethics 
Committee of the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological 
University. 
 
 
 
Signature: ……………………………………….         Date: ……………………….  
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Appendix B:  INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
Name of participating school: 
______________________________________________ 
 
Name of researcher:  Johnny Go 
 
Title of research project: An Exploration of Teacher Epistemology and 
Religiosity in Primary and Secondary Schools in the Philippines. 
 
I have been given and read the Information Sheet describing the study and the 
nature of the study, including interviews and other procedures.  I understand and 
voluntarily accept, in behalf of my organization, the invitation to participate in the 
above study. 
 
I understand the purpose and process of the research project and our 
involvement in it. 
 
I also understand that 
 
• I, in behalf of the school, or any of the participants, can at any time prior to 
publication withdraw from participation without penalty, prejudice, negative 
consequences, repercussion, or disadvantage and demand that my 
personal data/information be permanently deleted from the database. 
• the researcher will use my personal data/information solely for this study. 
• the researcher will render my personal data/information anonymous and 
protect the privacy and confidentiality of my personal data/information. 
• while information gained during the study may be published, the school 
and the participants will not be identified and my personal data/information 
will remain confidential. 
• the research records will be securely kept under lock and key. 
• the ethical aspects of the project have been approved by the ethics 
committee of NIE. 
 
I confirm that participants in this study are over 21 years of age. 
 
If I have any questions about the research at any point in time, I will contact  
(Johnny Go, jcgosj@gmail.com, tel. (632) 723-04-81 loc 201). 
 
 
Name of participant (Principal): …………………………………………….......  
 
Signature:………………………………………………….Date: ……………………….  
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Researcher’s confirmation statement  
 
I have provided information about the research to the participant and believe that 
he/she understands the nature of the study, the expectations of the procedures, 
and the rights of a research participant.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, the participant has voluntarily signed this informed 
consent form, without coercion or undue influence. 
 
I have witnessed the participant signing this form. 
 
 
Researcher’s signature: …………………………….  Date: ……………………….  
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Appendix C: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
Below are cases involving the contrasting views of two fictional characters: Jose 
and Pablo.  Read the cases and the questions following them.  For every item, 
choose the response that best expresses your response to the question by 
putting an X in the appropriate box.  Please note that there is no right or wrong 
answer. 
 
 
1. Jose believes that 
one mathematician’s 
proof of the math 
formula is right.  
 
Pablo believes that 
another 
mathematician’s 
proof of the math 
formula is right. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
2. Jose believes that 
the universe was 
created by a 
Supernatural Being or 
Power.   
 
Pablo believes that 
the universe was 
created of a purely 
natural process. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
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3. Jose thinks the first 
piece of music they 
listened to is better.  
 
Pablo thinks the 
second piece of 
music they listened to 
is better. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
4. Jose has one view 
of why criminals keep 
going back to crime.  
 
Pablo has a different 
view of why criminals 
keep going back to 
crime. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
5. Jose accepts one 
book’s explanation of 
how the brain works.  
 
Pablo believes 
another book’s 
explanation of how 
the brain works. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
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6. Jose thinks lying is 
wrong. 
 
Pablo thinks lying is 
permissible in certain 
situations. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
7. Jose thinks the first 
book they both read 
is better.  
 
Pablo thinks the 
second book they 
both read is better. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
8. Jose agrees with 
one book’s 
explanation of how 
children learn 
language. 
 
Pablo agrees with 
another book’s 
explanation of how 
children learn 
language. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
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9. Jose thinks people 
should take 
responsibility for 
themselves. 
 
Pablo thinks people 
should work together 
to take care of each 
other. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
10. Jose thinks the 
first painting they 
looked at is beautiful. 
 
Pablo thinks the 
second painting they 
looked at is beautiful. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
11. Jose thinks the 
government should 
limit the number of 
children families are 
allowed to have to 
keep the population 
from getting too big. 
 
Pablo thinks families 
should have as many 
children as they 
choose. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 210 
 
12. Jose thinks one 
book’s explanation of 
why World War II 
began is right.  
 
Pablo thinks another 
book’s explanation of 
why World War II 
began is right. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
13. Jose believes in 
life after death. 
 
Pablo believes that 
everything ends in 
death. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
 
 
14. Jose believes one 
book’s explanation of 
what atoms are made 
up of.   
 
Pablo believes 
another book’s 
explanation of what 
atoms are made up 
of. 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
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15. Jose believes that 
God exists.  
 
Pablo doesn’t believe 
that God exists. 
 
 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?  
 
  (A) ONLY ONE OF THE VIEWS IS RIGHT      
  (B) BOTH VIEWS CAN BE RIGHT TO SOME DEGREE 
 
If your answer is (B): Can one view be better or more 
right than the other? 
 
   (A) YES, one view CAN be more right than the other.     
   (B) NO, one view CANNOT be more right than the 
other. 
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